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[O]ne reason monogamy is so important to us is that we are so
terrorized by what we imagine are the alternatives to it. The other
person we fear most is the one who does not believe in the universal
sacredness of-usually heterosexual-coupledom.
-Adam Phillips2
I.
INTRODUCTION
Right now, marriage and monogamy feature prominently on the public
stage. Efforts to lift prohibitions on same-sex marriage in this country and
abroad have inspired people on all sides of the political spectrum to speak about
the virtues of monogamy's core institution and to express views on who should
be included within it.3  The focus of this article is different. Like an
"unmannerly wedding guest,"4 this article invites the reader to pause amidst the
whirlwind of marriage talk and to think critically about monogamy and its
alternatives.
If Senator Rick Santorum is right, then interesting times lie ahead. Before
2. ADAM PHILLIPS, MONOGAMY 98 (1996).
3. In addition to the option of religious marriage available to same-sex couples in various
religions and denominations, civil marriage has recently become open to same-sex couples in the
state of Massachusetts as of May 2004, Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass.
2003); see also Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004), two Canadian
provinces, Ontario and British Columbia, since summer 2003, see Tying the Knot, GLOBE & MAIL
(Toronto), July 15, 2003, at A9, and two countries at the national level: the Netherlands, since
April 2001, see Wet wan 21 december 2000 tot wijziging van Boek 1 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek
in verband met de openstelling van het huwelijk voor personen van hetzelfde geslacht (Wet
openstelling huwelijk), Stb. 2001, nr. 9 (Neth.), translated in Kees Waaldijk, Text of Dutch Act on
the Opening Up of Marriage for Same-Sex Partners, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX
PARTNERSHIPS 455, 455-56 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenaes eds., 2001); Belgium since
early 2003, see Note, Inching Down the Aisle: Differing Paths Toward the Legalization of Same-
Sex Marriage in the United States and Europe, 116 HARV. L. Rv. 2004, 2004 (2003); and two
Canadian provinces.
4. MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER
LIFE 83 (1999).
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the Supreme Court struck down Texas's homosexual sodomy law in Lawrence v.
Texas5 in June of last year, Santorum warned that "[i]f the Supreme Court says
that you have the right to consensual (gay) sex within your home, then you have
the right to bigamy, you have the right to polygamy, you have the right to incest,
you have the right to adultery. You have the right to anything." 6 No doubt,
Santorum does not want the Court to make good his prediction. 7 His radical
vision is instead an example of the oft-noted propensity of gay rights opponents
to claim that same-sex marriage leads a parade of horribles such as polygamy.
8
Like Santorum, proponents of the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA")9 in 1996
warned that same-sex marriage would lead to the legalization of incest,
l0
5. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
6. Sean Loughlin, Santorum Under Fire for Comments on Homosexuality, CNN.COM, at
www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/04/22/santorum.gays/ (Apr. 22, 2003) (quoting interview by
Associated Press with Sen. Rick Santorum, Apr. 21, 2003). The Lawrence Court did not frame the
right at issue as the right to engage in gay sex, see 123 S. Ct. at 2478, but the result, from
Santorum's perspective, was no doubt the same.
7. Santorum is not alone, however, in suggesting that polygamy could be the logical
extension of the Court's decision. See, e.g., Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2490 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery,
fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise sustainable only in light of Bowers' validation of
laws based on moral choices. Every single one of these laws is called into question by today's
decision...."); Jeffrey Rosen, How To Reignite the Culture Wars, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 7,
2003, at 50 ("Taken to its logical conclusion, Kennedy's argument would seem to invalidate all
moral restrictions on intimate associations that, it could be said, cause no harm to others-
restrictions on polygamy, for example.").
8. See, e.g., George F. Will, Culture and What Courts Can't Do, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2003,
at B7; see also Maura I. Strassberg, The Challenge of Post-Modern Polygamy: Considering
Polyamory, 31 CAP. UNIV. L. REV. 439, 439 (2003) (noting conservatives' frequent use of
analogies to polygamy when discussing same-sex marriage); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW:
CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 280 (1999) (same).
9. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000) ("In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress,... the word
,marriage' means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and
the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife."); 28
U.S.C. § 1738C (2000) ("No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe,
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State,
territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is
treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or
claim arising from such relationship").
10. E.g., William Bennett, Leave Marriage Alone, NEWSWEEK, June 3, 1996, in SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON 274, 275 (Andrew Sullivan ed., 1997) ("On what principled ground can
Andrew Sullivan exclude others who most desperately want what he wants, legal recognition and
social acceptance? Why on earth would Sullivan exclude from marriage a bisexual who wants to
marry two other people? After all, exclusion would be a denial of that person's sexuality. The
same holds true of a father and daughter who want to marry. Or two sisters. Or men who want
(consensual) polygamous arrangements."); Hadley Arkes, The Closet Straight, NAT'L REV., July 5,
1993, reprinted in part in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON, supra, at 154, 157-58 ("But then,
once the arrangement is opened simply to 'consenting adults,' on what ground would we object to
the mature couplings of aunts and nephews, or even fathers and daughters-couplings that show a
remarkable persistence in our own age, even against the barriers of law and sentiment that have
been cast up over centuries?").
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bestiality, 11 pedophilia, 12 and polygamy. 13  And rhetoric about polygamy
featured prominently in the legal 14 and popular 15 debates surrounding the 1999
Vermont Supreme Court decision Baker v. State16 and the 2003 Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court decision Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.17
In response, proponents of same-sex marriage have not said, "So what?";
they have not defended polygamy or the other marginal practices in their
opponents' parade of horribles. Instead they have chosen to distinguish same-
sex marriage from multiparty marriage. 18 As David Chambers noted about the
DOMA debates, "Neither side favored polygamy, and neither had any incentive
to examine with greater care the actual history or practice of polygamy."' 19 In
11. E.g., Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing on S. 1740 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 22 (1996) (prepared statement of Gary Bauer, President of the Family
Research Council) (claiming that legalizing same-sex marriage would mean there was no logical
justification for prohibiting polygamy, nor would it be logically defensible to continue "the
limitation of the [marital] relationship to human beings."); 142 CONG. REC. H7443 (daily ed. July
11, 1996) (testimony of Rep. Stephen Largent) ("What logical reason is there to keep us from
stopping expansion of that definition to include.., any other odd combination... ? [I]t does not
even have to be limited to human beings, by the way. I mean it could be anything.").
12. E.g., 142 CONG. REc. H7443, supra note 11; Arkes, supra note 10, at 157 ("If there is to
be gay marriage, would it be confined then only to adults?").
13. E.g., 142 CONG. REC. H7443, supra note 11 ("There really is no logical reason why we
could not also include polygamy or any other definition to say, as long as these are consenting
human beings .... ); Arkes, supra note 10, at 157-58 ("If there is to be gay marriage ..... [a]nd
if men are inclined to a life of multiple partners, why should marriage be confined to two
persons? ... In traditional marriage, the understanding of monogamy was originally tied to the
,natural teleology' of the body-to the recognition that only two people, no more and no fewer,
can generate children. To that understand of a union, or a 'marriage,' the alliance of two men
would offer such an implausible want of resemblance that it would appear almost as a mocking
burlesque.... The mockery would be avoided if the notion of marriage could be opened, or
broadened to accommodate the varieties of sexual experience. The most notable accommodation
would be the acceptance of several partners .... ).
14. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Take It to the People, Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt.
1999) (No. 98-032, 1009-97CNC), http://www.vtfreetomarry.org/tipamicus.htm (last visited Apr.
25, 2004); Brief of Amici Curiae Hon. Peter Brady et al. at 25-28, Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864
(Vt. 1999) (No. 98-032, 1009-97CNC); Brief for Appellee at 73, Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt.
1999) (No. 98-032, 1009-97CNC).
15. See, e.g., Jeff Jacoby, Is Lawful Polygamy Next?, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 15, 2004, at A15.
Responding to a question about polyamory, Beth Robinson, lawyer for the plaintiffs in Baker, said
that she has spoken all over Vermont about the decision and that polygamy "comes out every
time." Beth Robinson, Panel on Same-Sex Marriage, Rebellious Lawyering Conference, Yale Law
School (Feb. 16, 2002).
16. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
17. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
18. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE
CLOSET 280-81 (1999); infra note 19.
19. David L. Chambers, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53, 60
(1997). Andrew Sullivan denied any common political ground between homosexuals and
polygamists, establishing a clear hierarchy between them: "Indeed, few in the same-sex marriage
camp have anything but disdain for [the] idea [of polygamous marriage]." Andrew Sullivan,
Three's A Crowd, NEW REPUBLIC, June 17, 1996, reprinted in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND
CON, supra note 10, at 279-80. Representative Barney Frank of Massachusetts declared: "[Flor
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short, both sides in the debate over same-sex marriage seem to agree on one
thing: whatever happens with gay marriage, multiparty marriage should remain
impossible.
20
This article aims to understand why, at a time of serious debate about the
different-sex requirement of marriage (one man and one woman), eliminating the
numerosity requirement (one man and one woman) is so widely agreed to be
undesirable. The article approaches this question as part of the larger puzzle of
why mainstream culture seems to accept the numerosity requirement of marriage
without question, even while so many people practice alternatives to lifelong
monogamy either secretly (adultery) or serially (divorce and remarriage).
A constitutional challenge to antipolygamy laws may well be foreclosed by
the Supreme Court's decisions upholding criminal and civil sanctions on
Mormon polygamy. 21 After Lawrence, however, some have speculated that
those who pretend not to know the difference between a monogamous relationship between two
human beings and polygamy, I must say that I think they debase [the] debate when they use that
kind of analogy. Everyone knows the real difference." 142 CONG. REC. H7500 (daily ed. July 12,
1996). Representative Frank has since backed off of his claim about this "real difference."
Meeting with OutLaws: The Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender Law Students Association, Yale
Law School Faculty Lounge, in conjunction with Race, Values, and the American Legal Process
(Feb. 23, 2002) (conference notes, on file with author).
20. I should note that I do not think that same-sex marriage will ineluctably lead to multiparty
marriage. Our cultural commitment to the pair, the couple, the idea of total mutual love between
two individuals, runs deep. See infra Part I1. Moreover, to design multiparty marriage would be a
complicated legal endeavor, and the state arguably has an efficiency interest in a status relationship
in which each person names just one other as a partner for all relevant legal purposes. See Mary
Anne Case, What Stake Do Heterosexual Women Have in the Same-Sex Marriage/Domestic
Partner/Civil Union Debates? 37-38 (Feb. 3, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
21. See, e.g., Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (rejecting a First Amendment habeas
challenge to convictions for polygamists' attempt to register to vote and oath that they were not
polygamists); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885) (rejecting procedural challenges to the
application of the Edmonds Act which denied polygamists the right to vote, even if they were only
engaged in plural cohabitation); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (affirming the
criminal conviction of a Mormon for practicing polygamy and rejecting the argument that
Congress's prohibition of polygamy violated the defendant's rights under the Free Exercise
Clause); see also Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1069-70 (10th Cir. 1985) (rejecting a free
exercise and privacy rights challenge to a police officer's termination for polygamy, on the
grounds that Reynolds is still good law and that "protect[ing] the monogamous marriage
relationship" is a compelling state interest); ef Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) ("To the
extent Davis held that persons advocating a certain practice may be denied the right to vote, it is no
longer good law. To the extent it held that the groups designated in the statute may be deprived of
the right to vote because of their status, its ruling could not stand without surviving strict scrutiny,
a most doubtful outcome. To the extent Davis held that a convicted felon may be denied the right
to vote, its holding is not implicated by our decision and is unexceptionable." (citations omitted));
id. at 649-50 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that "[t]o the extent, if any, that [Davis] permits the
imposition of adverse consequences upon mere abstract advocacy of polygamy, it has, of course,
been overruled by later cases. But the proposition that polygamy can be criminalized, and those
engaging in that crime deprived of the vote, remains good law." (citation omitted)). But see, e.g.,
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 247 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (predicting that under the
reasoning of the majority opinion "in time Reynolds will be overturned"); Keith E. Sealing,
Polygamists out of the Closet: Statutory and State Constitutional Prohibitions Against Polygamy
Are Unconstitutional Under the Free Exercise Clause, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 691, 737-57 (2001)
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antipolygamy laws are ripe for challenge. 22 It is not my purpose here to assess
the constitutional arguments. My purpose is instead to try to explain why people
are so opposed to multiparty relationships that the mere idea that such
relationships might be included in the institution of marriage threatens efforts on
behalf of same-sex marriage.
Perhaps because of this country's dramatic relationship to Mormon
polygamy, when Americans hear the term "polygamy" or try to picture
relationships of more than two, they typically think of traditional polygyny-one
man in a hierarchical relationship to several wives. 2 3 But there is another
model--called "polyamory" by its increasingly vocal practitioners-which in
principle eschews hierarchy and which encompasses various models of intimate
relationships of more than two people.
The lack of serious public debate about the numerosity requirement of
marriage is echoed in the scant academic literature on polyamory. 24  Though
some legal scholars mention the practice, the only sustained discussion of
polyamorous relationships has focused on only one subset of these
relationships. 25 The other prominent use of the word "polyamory" in legal
writing has been as a catchall term for nearly any sexual or nonsexual
relationship of three or more adults, including, for instance, the relationship
between two lesbian parents and the gay male sperm donor for their child.2 6
(arguing that laws forbidding polygamous marriage are unconstitutional under the Free Exercise
Clause because marriage is a fundamental right and therefore religious polygamy is a hybrid
situation requiring strict scrutiny under Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
881 (1990), or because current antipolygamy statutes and state constitutional provisions were
enacted out of antipathy to a particular religion and substantially burden a central tenet of that
religion while furthering no compelling governmental interest, under Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993)).
22. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2490 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). A
lawsuit was recently filed challenging the validity of Utah statutes criminalizing bigamy and other
extramarital sex under Lawrence v. Texas. Bronson v. Swensen, No. 02:04-CV-0021 (D. Utah
filed Jan. 1, 2004); see also Leonard Post, Lawyers Square Off Over Polygamy Case, NAT'L LAW
J., Jan. 26, 2004, at 4.
23. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 121.
24. Cf Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the Legal
Construction of the Family and the State, 112 YALE L.J. 1641, 1711-12 (2003) (noting that,
"strikingly, while many politicians bemoan the rise of alternative family structures, alternatives
posed in the nineteenth century by individuals and communities committed to challenging
marriage's hegemony appear as extraordinary and radical today as they did in their own time.
Deviations from the norm of monogamous marriage ... remain as absent from the dominant
contemporary landscape of intimate relations as they were in the late nineteenth century").
25. See Strassberg, supra note 8, at 451 (focusing on polyamorous group relationships that
are sexually exclusive).
26. See Martha M. Ertman, The ALl Principles' Approach to Domestic Partnership, 8 DUKE
J. GENDER L. & POL'Y, 107, 114-17 (2001) [hereinafter Ertman, The ALl Principles] (discussing
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tentative
Draft No. 4, 2000)); Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private
Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 124-25 (2001) [hereinafter Ertman, Private/Private
Distinction]; see also infra note 134 and accompanying text.
Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
[Vol. 29:277
MONOGAMY'S LAW
But the practice of polyamory as "ethical nonmonogamy" 27 bears serious
consideration at a moment when the terms and conditions of intimate
relationships are such a focus of discussion. Polyamory is a lifestyle embraced
by a minority of individuals who exhibit a wide variety of relationship models
and who articulate an ethical vision that I understand to encompass five main
principles: self-knowledge, radical honesty, consent, self-possession, and
privileging love and sex over other emotions and activities such as jealousy.2 8
Contrary to the common view of multiparty relationships as either oppressive or
sexual free-for-alls, at least some set of individuals-polyamorists, or "polys"
for short-seems to be practicing nonmonogamy as part of an ethical practice
that shares some of its aspirations with more mainstream models of intimate
relationships.
Nonetheless, as the same-sex marriage debate illustrates, most people in this
country seem to think that sexual relationships among more than two people are
beyond the political pale. This social hostility sustains various legal burdens on
polyamorists, including two-person marriage and partnership laws, adultery and
bigamy laws, residential zoning laws, and custody consequences. 2 9  Before
confronting these legal issues, each of which deserves sustained attention, we
need to understand the practice of polyamory and the opposition to it. Thus,
while this article addresses the legal issue of adultery laws in Part V, the primary
task of the article is to lay the groundwork for an ongoing discussion of the
relevant legal, ethical, and social issues by seriously considering polyamory and
its opposition.
The societal resistance to the idea of polyamory may merely be an artifact of
historical associations with patriarchal polygyny, which could be partially or
completely ameliorated by contemporary accounts of egalitarian polyamorous
relationships or of polygynous unions where the women feel they benefit from
sharing their wifely duties with other women. 30 Alternatively, resistance to the
idea of polyamorous relationships may stem from other concerns, about practical
inefficiency of such relationships, negative physical or psychological effects, the
equality or sufficiency of love among multiple partners, or associations with
other taboos such as incest or homosexuality. While any of these may contribute
to mainstream responses to the idea of polyamory, as I discuss in Part IV, the
article proposes that something else is also fueling that response.
I argue that a key reason for the opposition to polyamory is, somewhat
paradoxically, the pervasive or potential failure of monogamy. This argument
draws lessons from the theory and politics of homosexuality, which demonstrate
27. E.g., Lana Tibbetts, Commitment in Monogamous and Polyamorous Relationships 1
(Spring 2001) (defining ethical nonmonogamy as "practicing extradyadic relationships with mutual
consent among those involved") (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at
http://www.prairienet.org/-star/polypaper.html.
28. See infra Section III.C.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 430-35.
30. See infra Section II.B.
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that the "universalizing" possibilities of a particular minority practice may drive
allies away, rather than creating the conditions for solidarity through common
ground.31 Many people engage in nonmonogamous behavior; many more have
nonmonogamous fantasy lives. Indeed, one might go so far as to say that it is
the rare person whose sexual thoughts only ever involve his or her partner in
monogamy. Paradoxically, this mainstream impulse to nonmonogamy helps to
explain the position of multiparty relationships beyond the pale of the marriage
debates. Rather than prompting outsiders to identify with polyamorists, the
potential of nearly everyone to imagine him or herself engaging in non-
monogamous behavior leads outsiders to steel themselves against polyamory and
to eschew the idea of legitimizing such relationships through law. This I call the
paradox of prevalence.
A consideration of "poly" and "mono" identity, on a theoretical level,
suggests that few people's desires fall squarely into either camp. In theory at
least, a completely poly disposition might be understood to involve not only
desires for multiple sexual and domestic partners, but desires for one's partner(s)
to have multiple sexual and domestic partners. A person with this disposition
would presumably be happier in nonmonogamous relationships, and perhaps
happy only in nonmonogamous relationships. By contrast, a completely mono
disposition might be understood to involve exclusive sexual and domestic desire
for just one other person, as well as the desire for that person to have only
oneself as a sexual and domestic partner. A person with this disposition would
presumably be happier in-and perhaps happy only in-a monogamous
relationship. Few people are likely to embody either disposition completely.
Rather, most of us are probably a complex mix of desires, which results in our
choosing, or ending up, living a poly or mono lifestyle. And it is my contention
that many people simply end up promising monogamy, rather than actively
choosing between monogamy and other possible relationship models, because of
the many social and legal pressures towards monogamy.
Norms strongly urge people toward monogamy, and law contributes to that
pressure in the various ways listed above, namely criminal adultery laws, bigamy
laws, marriage laws, custody cases, workplace discrimination, and zoning laws.
To the extent that at least some people may be happier in nonmonogamous
arrangements, and others are not harmed by these arrangements, it would seem
that laws should be changed to allow people to find their own path among
monogamy and its alternatives. But the question of harms is complex, and each
legal realm affecting choices about monogamy raises unique questions and could
warrant an article unto itself. This article does not aspire to answer all of these
complex questions. Rather, the purpose of the article is to help promote and
frame a discussion by better understanding the practice of polyamory and the
response to it.
31. See infra Part IV.
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In the interests of promoting discussion about monogamy and its
alternatives, then, the article concludes with a thought experiment imagining
how certain laws might themselves be used to promote discussion about some of
these issues. Criminal adultery statutes are, in theory at least, a coercive
enforcement of monogamy. Repealing these statutes might seem an obvious
way-the natural starting point-to allow people to make their own choices
about monogamy. Indeed, repeal may be the best possible result. But there is
another possibility: instead of allowing these laws to fall into disuse, we might
try to use them for an affirmative purpose. Specifically, instead of repealing
these facially coercive laws, we might make them no longer coercive. In the
language of contract law, we should consider making these immutable rules into
default rules, that is, rules the parties can contract around.32 This thought
experiment allows us to imagine the possibility of law affirmatively encouraging
people to discuss their desires with regard to monogamy or nonmonogamy.
In particular, using the idea of information-forcing default rules, I propose
several model adultery statutes that might encourage partners to discuss and
agree on relationship rules about sexual exclusivity, by criminalizing only
nonconsensual adulterous sex. Ultimately, I conclude that the potential harms of
using the criminal law in this manner probably outweigh the potential benefits.
But in the process, the article considers how law might be used to encourage
people to consider nonnormative alternatives. By presenting an experiment in
using law to prompt dialogue in and around monogamy's most prominent
institution,33 the article aims to lay the groundwork for a broader cultural and
legal discussion of the important, and largely neglected, subject of monogamy's
alternatives.
This article is divided into six parts. Following this Introduction, Part II
frames the article by contrasting the fantasy of monogamy with its reality, as
both are expressed in the diverse realms of statistics, law, literature, and science.
Part III offers a novel account of the contemporary practice .and theory of
polyamory by defining key terms, describing four accounts of polyamorous
relationships, and outlining five principles that seem to capture the ethical vision
32. See infra note 443 for a discussion of the term "contract around."
33. Even in theory, adultery laws affect only situations involving married couples-only
those who can marry and also choose to marry-and they primarily regulate only exclusivity of
sexual behavior. Monogamy's law, by contrast, affects more than just married people, and it
encompasses many strictures along multiple axes-for instance, against fewer than one partner
(singleness) as well as more than one partner (polygamy). The focus in the thought experiment on
only one swath of the population, though self-conscious, is not intended to present marital
nonmonogamy as the paradigmatic model. Rather, the decision to focus on adultery stems from
the purpose of the experiment and the status of our laws and institutions. Marriage is the key
institution of monogamy. Adultery statutes cleanly target the transgression of monogamy that
most prominently defines monogamy-the rule that couples not have sex with anyone outside the
couple. The thought experiment therefore asks whether a change in the design of the legal rules
aimed at enforcing this rule with one swath of the population in this prominent institution of
monogamy could conceivably be retooled to prompt discussions between partners about whether to
embrace, reject, or modify that rule in their own relationships.
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espoused by many polys. Part IV discusses various reasons people may be
concerned about multiparty relationships, then draws on the theory and politics
of homosexuality to argue that mainstream resistance to the idea of polyamorous
relationships is driven in part by the near universality of nonmonogamous
impulses. Part V puts forward a model for thinking about two narrow classes of
individuals who might dispositionally desire either a mono or a poly lifestyle,
interrogates why those with mixed desire might variously choose monogamy or
polyamory, and then proposes a series of information-forcing adultery statutes
that might encourage individuals and partners to make more affirmative choices
about what kind of relationships they want to conduct. In conclusion, Part VI
returns to an issue raised earlier-the same-sex marriage debate-to suggest that
we view this historical moment, when same-sex couples begin to enter the
institution of marriage, as a unique opportunity to question the mandate of
compulsory monogamy.
When writing about what she called "compulsory heterosexuality,"
Adrienne Rich offered the following invocation to her readers:
To take the step of questioning heterosexuality as a "preference" or
"choice" for women-and to do the intellectual and emotional work
that follows-will call for a special quality of courage in heterosexually
identified feminists but I think the rewards will be great: a freeing-up of
thinking, the exploring of new paths, the shattering of another great
silence, new clarity in personal relationships.
34
Rich was criticized by some in the lesbian community for suggesting that those
who were not actually lesbians, and who had no intention of living a sexually
marginal lifestyle, could think in, and profit from, a lesbian perspective on
heterosexuality. 35 Despite the possibility of this sort of criticism, this article
similarly invites the reader to question the idea of monogamy as a choice, indeed
as the only viable choice for many, and to engage in the work of thinking
critically about its margins. Recognizing that readers may come to this point
with varied experiences and views on monogamy, the article joins Rich in
proposing that one need not change one's sexual preferences or practices in order
to learn and profit from a careful consideration of alternatives.
34. Rich, supra note 1, at 648.
35. See, e.g., Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of
Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 267, 301 (Carole S. Vance
ed., 1992) (1984); Amy Goodloe, Lesbian Identity and the Politics of Butch-Femme Roles, at
http://www.lesbian.org/amy/essays/bf-paper.html (1993); infra note 142.
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II.
COMPULSORY MONOGAMY
For many, the fantasy of monogamy is different from its reality. In the
normative fantasy, exclusive relationships of two people are the romantic ideal
that we should and do strive for. At times, this ideal is realized, but at other
times, desire and behavior betray that ideal. That people sometimes behave
nonmonogamously is not a novel proposition, but the idea that love equals
monogamy and jealousy equals love is so pervasive that it seems important to
frame the overall analysis in the article with a brief and plain look at monogamy.
This Part, therefore, uses statistical, legal, literary, and scientific sources to
sketch the contemporary landscape of monogamy.
A. Monogamy's Mandate
The institutions of monogamy loom large in this nation's social landscape.
According to the 2000 census, sixty percent of Americans over eighteen are
married, 36 and seventy-six percent of Americans over eighteen are or have been
married.3 7 In addition, seventy percent of those who divorce will remarry,3 8 and
over ninety percent of Americans say they want to marry. 3 9 These numbers
sketch the contours of our drive toward monogamy's core institution. 40 A vivid
picture of our romance with monogamy, however, requires richer sources. This
section will adumbrate two prevailing discourses of monogamy: the western
romance tradition and the scientific defense of monogamy.
36. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2000 47, tbl. 46
(2002) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT] (reporting data from 2000); see also David L.
Chambers, For the Best of Friends and for Lovers ofAll Sorts, A Status Other Than Marriage, 76
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1347, 1347 (2001); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLDS AND FAMILIES 2000,
CENSUS 2000 BRIEF 2 (2001) (reporting that 51.7% of households are "married-couple
households"), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001 pubs/c2kbrO 1 -8.pdf.
37. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 36, at 47, tbl. 46.
38. David L. Weis, Adult Heterosexuality, in 3 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SEXOLOGY
1498, 1503 (Robert T. Francoeur ed., 1997), available at http://www2.hu-berlin.de/sexology/.
39. Patricia Donovan, The Decline of the Traditional Family, U. BUFFALO REP., Feb. 4, 1999,
at 6 (quoting sociologist Lynn Magdol), available at http://www.buffalo.edu/reporter/
vol30/vol3On 1 9/n7.html.
40. Of course not everyone participates in this cultural norm, as the rest of this article
discusses, and there is some indication that certain subpopulations, most notably gay men, may to
some extent contain a counternorm in favor of open relationships. See, e.g., infra note 339 (citing
two studies of gay male couples, more of which had agreed to sexually open rather than closed
relationships). Commentators disagree as to whether the AIDS epidemic led to an increase in
monogamous relationships among gay men. In addition, class and race, among other factors,
affect norms and behavior surrounding monogamy. See, e.g., Christie D. Penn, Stacy L.
Hemdndez & J. Maria Bermfidez, Using a Cross-Cultural Perspective to Understand Infidelity in
Couples Therapy, 25 AMER. J. FAM. THERAPY 169, 169-70 (1997); Victoria Robinson, My Baby
Just Cares for Me: Feminism, Heterosexuality and Non-monogamy, 6 J. GENDER STUD. 143, 155
(1997).
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1. The Western Romance Tradition
Psychoanalyst Adam Phillips articulates a perplexing aspect of love-the
idea that in friendship the lack of jealousy is a virtue, even a prerequisite to true
friendship, but in erotic love the presence of jealousy is a virtue, even an emblem
of true love. Phillips writes:
We may believe in sharing as a virtue-we may teach it to our
children-but we don't seem to believe in sharing what we value most,
our sexual partners. But if you really loved someone, wouldn't you
want to give them the best thing you've got, your partner? It would be a
relief not to be puzzled by this.4
1
Phillips offers a provocative answer to his own question: "Perhaps this is what
friendship is for, perhaps this is the difference between friends and lovers.
Friends can share, lovers have to do something else. Lovers dare not be too
virtuous. ' '4 2 In Phillips' formulation, jealousy is a form of selfishness, a vice it
might be brave and generous to overcome. But Phillips sees that his view is
uncommon and that in reality lovers indulge jealousy; he is puzzled by this. He
hypothesizes that lovers act out of fear, implying that they fear loss through
abandonment. Like Phillips, literary theorist Roland Barthes seems to valorize
the rejection of jealousy: "'When I love, I am very exclusive,' Freud says (whom
we shall take here for the paragon of normality). To be jealous is to conform.
To reject jealousy ('to be perfect') is therefore to transgress a law.' 43
Phillips and Barthes identify key aspects of monogamy: first, that jealousy is
treated as evidence of love, and, second, that jealousy may be understood
to define romantic love. Phillips highlights how friends and lovers are
distinguished by their approach to sharing. Friends may share themselves and
each other among many; lovers must possess one another.44 This resonates with
the romantic accounts of couples who were friends first and "discovered" their
41. PHILLIPS, supra note 2, at 15. Phillips' language of giving is perplexing here; it seems to
imply that the partner is a possession available for transfer. In the context of Phillips' overall text,
however, this gift metaphor is rare and thus seems to appear here to dramatize this particular
question about generosity-as opposed to possessiveness-with regard to a beloved partner.
42. Id.
43. ROLAND BARTHES, A LOVER'S DISCOURSE 144, 145 (Richard Howard trans., 1979).
Barthes's epigraph for the Jealousy essay is as follows: "'A sentiment which is born in love and
which is produced by the fear that the loved person prefers someone else' (Littr6)." Id. at 144.
44. See, e.g., Joan Iversen, Feminist Implications of Mormon Polygyny, 10 FEMINIST STUD.
505, 515 (1984) (quoting nineteenth-century critic of polygamy Fanny Stenhouse as saying that
plural marriage must mean the loss of "true love" because "where there is no jealousy there is very
little love" (citing MRS. T.B.H. STENHOUSE, Expost OF POLYGAMY IN UTAH: A LADY'S LIFE
AMONG THE MORMONS 75, 123 (American News Co., 2d ed. 1872); MRS. T.B.H. STENHOUSE, TELL
IT ALL: THE TYRANNY OF MORMONISM, OR, AN ENGLISHWOMAN IN UTAH 213 (Praeger, 1971)));
Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 629, n.26 (1980)
(noting that "friendship does not involve the degree of exclusivity that is present in other kinds of
linkage between intimates").
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love only upon realizing their jealousy of one another's lovers.45  A key
distinction between friends and lovers, then, lies in the possessive aspect of
romantic love, in the presumption that romantic love is possessive but platonic
love is not. The operation of jealousy between partners may be understood as a
related tenet of monogamy's law: that one partner's jealousy trumps the other
partner's desire for extracouple sexual experience.
Of course nonsexual relationships do involve jealousy sometimes. And
people, especially children, sometimes speak of having one "best friend." The
difference between friendship and romantic relationships lies in the normative
response to the two forms of jealousy. Jealousy of a friend's other friends is
generally considered a problem for the one who is jealous, who should thus
overcome the jealousy. By contrast, jealousy of a lover's other lovers is
generally considered a problem for the one who inspires the jealousy, who
should overcome the impulse to be unfaithful to the lover. Our toleration of
sexual jealousy may be seen vividly in the criminal law of homicide. For
centuries, sexual jealousy over adultery has been treated as adequate provocation
to mitigate murder to voluntary manslaughter; indeed, rage over adultery is
viewed by many courts and commentators as the paradigmatic case of adequate
provocation. 46 As noted above, Phillips is puzzled by the divergence between
friendship and romantic love along the axis of sexual possession. 47 But Barthes
displays none of Phillips's wonder at the normality of jealousy. Drawing on
Freud, Barthes states the situation simply: Monogamy is the law.
48
This cultural law is reflected in a range of other legal contexts. The most
obvious forms of monogamy's law today are proscriptions-against
promiscuity, 49 adultery,5 °  polygamy, 5 1 and singlehood 52-against deviations
45. See, e.g., JANE AUSTEN, EMMA 407-08 (R.W. Chapman ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1966)
("Emma's eyes were instantly withdrawn; and she sat silently meditating, in a fixed attitude, for a
few minutes. A few minutes were sufficient for making her acquainted with her own heart....
She touched-she admitted-she acknowledged the whole truth. Why was it so much worse that
Harriet should be in love with Mr. Knightley, than with Frank Churchill?... It darted through her,
with the speed of an arrow, that Mr. Knightley must marry no one but herself!"); id at 432 ("[Mr.
Knightley] had been in love with Emma, and jealous of Frank Churchill, from about the same
period, one sentiment having probably enlightened him as to the other."); WHEN HARRY MET
SALLY (MGM/UA Studios 1989) (conveying to the audience that the protagonists are more than
friends through their jealousy over each other's dates).
46. E.g., Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill,
2 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 71, 72 (1992); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two
Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 346 (1996).
47. See supra text accompanying note 41.
48. See supra text accompanying note 43. Adrienne Rich refers to the "[e]arly female
indoctrinations in 'love' as an emotion" in western culture and the "[t]he ideology of heterosexual
romance, beamed at [the young girl] from childhood out of fairy tales, television, films,
advertising, popular songs, wedding pageantry...." Rich, supra note 1, at 645.
49. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 302 (1992) (discussing promiscuity in
homosexual men pejoratively and noting American disapproval of promiscuity); Roberta Cepko,
Involuntary Sterilization of Mentally Disabled Women, 8 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 122, 160-61
(1993) (discussing the role of disapproval of sexual promiscuity in successful petitions for forced
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sterilization of women). At least ten states and the District of Columbia penalize fornication. See
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1602 (2001); IDAHO CODE § 18-6603 (Michie 2003); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/11-8 (2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 18 (West 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.34
(West 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1 (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (2003); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-20-08 (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60 (Law. Co-op. 2002); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-7-104 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-344 (Michie 2003). These laws are occasionally
enforced in certain contexts. See, e.g., Juhi Mehta, Note, Prosecuting Teenage Parents Under
Fornication Statutes: A Constitutionally Suspect Legal Solution to the Problem of Teen Pregnancy,
5 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 121 (1998). Some believe that the presence of these laws on the books
sends an important message of disapproval. See, e.g., Traci Shallbetter Stratton, Note, No More
Messing Around. Substantive Due Process Challenges to State Laws Prohibiting Fornication, 73
WASH. L. REV. 767, 797 (1998) ("Keeping fornication statutes on the books and informing the
public of their existence might not prevent fornication, but it will send a much needed message of
social disapproval, driving this immoral conduct underground.").
50. See, e.g., infra note 112 and accompanying text. At least twenty-three states and the
District of Columbia still have laws criminalizing adultery in some form. See ALA. CODE § 13A-
13-2 (2003); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1408 (West 2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-501 (2003);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.01 (West 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-
19 (Harrison 1990); IDAHO CODE § 18-6601 (Michie 2003); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-7(a)
(West 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3507(1) (2002); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. § 10-501 (2002);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 14 (West 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.30 (West
2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.36 (West 2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1 (1999); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 645:3 (1996); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 2.55.17 (McKinney 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
184 (2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-09 (1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 871 (West 2002);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-6-2 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60 (Law. Co-op. 2003); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-7-103(1) (1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-365 (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8-
3 (Michie 2000); see also John F. Kelly, Virginia Adultery Case Roils Divorce Industry:
Conviction Draws Attention to Little Used Law, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2003, at B1, B8.
Prosecutions for adultery are rare. See, e.g., Martin J. Siegel, For Better or for Worse: Adultery,
Crime & the Constitution, 30 J. FAm. L. 45, 45 n.5, 53 nn.54-57 (1991-92); but cf Kelly, supra.
They are, however, vigorously pursued in specialized contexts such as the military. See Melissa
Ash Haggard, Adultery: A Comparison of Military Law and State Law and the Controversy This
Causes Under Our Constitution and Criminal Justice System, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 469,469-70,476-
77 (1998); James M. Winner, Beds With Sheets But No Covers: The Right to Privacy and the
Military's Regulation of Adultery, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1073, 1073-74 (1998).
51. Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have statutes criminalizing polygamy. See
ALA. CODE § 13A-13-1 (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 11.51.140 (Michie 1983); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-3606 (West 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-26-201 (Michie 2000); CAL. PENAL CODE § 281
(West 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-201 (2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-190 (West
2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1001 (2001); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-501 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 826.01 (West 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-20 (Harrison 1990); IDAHO CODE § 18-1101 (Michie
1997); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-12 (West 2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-2 (West 1998);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 726.1 (West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3601 (1995); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
530.010 (Michie 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:76 (West 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 17-A,
§ 551 (West 1983); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. § 10-502 (2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, §4
(West 1998); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 551.5 (West 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.355 (West
2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-13 (1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 568.010 (2000); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 45-5-611 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-701 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 201.160 (2002); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 639:1 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:24-1 (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-
10-1 (Michie 1978); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.15 (McKinney 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-183
(2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-13 (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.01 (West 1997);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 881 (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.515 (2001); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 4301 (West 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-6-1 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-10 (Law. Co-
op. 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-15 (Michie 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-301 (2003);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.01 (Vernon 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-101 (1999); VA. CODE
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from what we might call "simple monogamy," the idea of one partner at a time.
The significance of this idea is reflected in countless contexts, for example, the
Tenth Circuit's statement in Potter v. Murray City,53 upholding the termination
of a police officer for bigamy, that "[m]onogamy is inextricably woven into the
fabric of our society. It is the bedrock upon which our culture is built."54 In
addition, there are signs that the marital requirement of sexual exclusivity is
becoming ever more visible in the push toward same-sex marriage. In
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,55 holding that the prohibition on
same-sex civil marriage violates the state constitution, 56 the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts expressly emphasized this aspect of the protected
relationships. The opinion uses the word "exclusive" in some form six times.
57
For example, in its second sentence the court celebrated "[t]he exclusive
commitment of two individuals to each other."58 This captures the essence of
simple monogamy.
Condemnation of divorce, both historical and extant,59 points us towards
another, stricter model of monogamy: the fantasy of "supermonogamy."
Supermonogamy is the idea that only one "right" partner exists for each person.
Though it pervades popular and high culture, 60 and hints of it may also be found
ANN. § 20-38.1 (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 206 (1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.64.010
(West 2000); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8-1 (Michie 2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 944.05 (West 1996);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-401 (Michie 2003).
52. See, e.g., Dubler, supra note 24; Arthur B. Shostak, Singlehood, in HANDBOOK OF
MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 355, 365-66 (Marvin B. Sussman & Suzanne K. Steinmetz eds.,
1987); Shari Motro, Single and Paying for It, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004, at WK15.
53. Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065 (10th Cir. 1985).
54. Potter, 760 F.2d at 1070.
55. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
56. The court recently rejected the possible solution of civil unions. Opinions of the Justices
to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004).
57. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948, 949, 959, 961, 965, 969.
58. Id. at 948.
59. See, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of
Women's Rights and Family Law in the United States During the Twentieth Century, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 2017, 2081-83 (2000) (describing a "full-scale," though ultimately unsuccessful, campaign in
the late twentieth century to reverse the no-fault divorce revolution and comparing the campaign to
late-nineteenth-century "condemnation of 'easy divorce').
60. See, e.g., ANNE BRADSTREET, To My Dear and Loving Husband, in THE COMPLETE
WORKS OF ANNE BRADSTREET 180 (Joseph R. McElrath, Jr. & Allan P. Robb eds., Twayne 1981)
(1678) ("If ever two were one, then surely we. / If ever man were lov'd by wife, then thee. / ...
Then while we live, in love let's so persever / That when we live no more, we may live ever.");
LINDA PERLSTEIN, NOT MUCH JUST CHILLIN' 247 (2003) (quoting a seventh-grade Maryland girl as
saying in an interview, "The one for you could be two years old right now, or ninety. My soulmate
could have been Benjamin Franklin."); The Platters, Only You ("Only you and you alone / can
thrill me like you do / and fill my heart with love for only you. / Only you can make this change
in me, / for it's true, you are my destiny. /... You're my dream come true / my one and only
you."); Lionel Ritchie, Endless Love ("My love, there's only you in my life, / The only thing that's
right. / ... Oh yes, you will always be, my endless love. / Two hearts, two hearts that beat as
one. / Our lives have just begun. / Forever, I'll hold you close in my arms, / I can't resist your
charms."); cf JANICE A. RADWAY, READING THE ROMANCE 122 (Univ. of N.C. Press, 1991)
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in the Goodridge opinion,61 the idea of supermonogamy is perhaps most vividly
portrayed in a classical story, Aristophanes' tale of originary beings from Plato's
Symposium.62 "[I]n the beginning... ," Plato writes in Aristophanes' speech,
"[t]here were three kinds of human beings.., male and female... [and] a third,
a combination of those two. . ,,63 These beings were "completely round,
with... four hands each, as many legs as hands, and two faces, exactly alike, on
a rounded neck... There were two sets of sexual organs.. .. "64 Offended by
these beings' ambitions to attack the gods, Zeus split them in two to diminish
their strength. The result was pitiable. The beings ran around looking for their
other halves, which they clung to, "wanting to grow together" again.65 "In that
condition they would die from hunger and general idleness, because they would
not do anything apart from each other,"66 so Zeus took pity on them and moved
their genitals around to the front. This allowed them consummation which in
turn allowed them to "stop embracing, return to their jobs, and look after their
other needs in life." 67
Plato first digests this originary myth in a quiet, conclusory tone, observing,
"This, then, is the source of our desire to love each other. Love is born into
every human being; it calls back the halves of our original nature together; it
tries to make one out of two and heal the wound of human nature." 68  He
continues, "[e]ach of us, then, is a 'matching half' of a human whole."69 Plato
matter-of-factly offers this story as the origin of three types of beings, which to a
modem eye look like gay men, lesbians, and heterosexuals, in terms of the sex of
their desired object. 70
(reporting evidence that the most striking characteristic of female romance readers' favorite novels
is their "resolute focus on a single, developing relationship between heroine and hero"); RUTHANN
ROBSON, SAPPHO GOES TO LAW SCHOOL: FRAGMENTS IN LESBIAN LEGAL THEORY 115 (1998)
(noting that "lesbian relationships are deemed subject to the same aspirations and expectations as
the heterosexual romantic tradition that posits 'true love' and defined it as 'forever' and 'only').
61. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961 ("[I]t is the exclusive and permanent commitment of the
marriage partners to one another, not the begetting of children, that is the sine qua non of civil
marriage." (emphasis added)).
62. PLATO, SYMPosIUM 25-31 (Alexander Nehamas & Paul Woodruff trans., Hackett 1989).
63. Id. at 25.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 27.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. The story is of course much more complicated for a number of reasons. First, it is deeply
questionable whether one says anything meaningful at all by applying these terms of sexual
orientation to periods before their coining. Second, the particular complexities of Greek sexual
desire and practices have been the subject of much dispute and commentary, and this passage from
Plato has received particular attention for its ambiguity. See, e.g., David M. Halperin, The First
Homosexuality?, in THE SLEEP OF REASON: EROTIC EXPERIENCE AND SEXUAL ETHICS IN ANCIENT
GREECE AND RoME 248-52 (Martha Craven Nussbaum & Juha Sihvola eds., 2002). My purpose
here is only to point up the salience of this story to a modem audience, such as the courtroom in
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As Plato proceeds again and again to describe the emotional legacy of this
prelapsarian state, the romantic intensity of his writing increases. "And so," he
writes:
when a person meets the half that is his very own, whatever his
orientation, whether it's to young men or not, then something
wonderful happens: the two are struck from their senses by love, by a
sense of belonging to one another, and by desire, and they don't want to
be separated from one another, not even for a moment.
7 1
The climax of the narratives is a fantasy of complete physical reunion, a
powerful metaphor for supermonogamous romantic love, which merits lengthy
quotation:
It's obvious that the soul of every lover longs for something else; his
soul cannot say what it is, but like an oracle it has a sense of what it
wants, and like an oracle it hides behind a riddle. Suppose two lovers
are lying together and Hephaestus 72 stands over them with mending
tools, asking, "What is it you human beings really want from each
other?" And suppose they're perplexed, and he asks them again: "Is
this your heart's desire, then-for the two of you to become parts of the
same whole, as near as can be, and never to separate, day or night?
Because if that's your desire, I'd like to weld you together and join you
into something that is naturally whole, so that the two of you are made
into one. Then the two of you would share one life, as long as you
lived, because you would be one being, and by the same token, when
you died, you would be one and not two in Hades, having died a single
death. Look at your love, and see if this is what you desire: wouldn't
this be all the good fortune you could want?"
Surely you can see that no one who received such an offer would turn it
down; no one would find anything else that he wanted. Instead,
everyone would think he'd found out at last what he had always
wanted: to come together and melt together with the one he loves, so
that one person emerged from two.73
Plato concludes with the question his story answers: "Why should this be so? It's
because, as I said, we used to be complete wholes in our original nature, and
now 'Love' is the name for our pursuit of wholeness, for our desire to be
complete." 74
It should therefore not surprise us that this story-which evades the
possibility of polyamory (and of bisexuality)-would be the strategic choice of
Romer; see infra note 75 and accompanying text.
71. PLATO, supra note 62, at 28.
72. In Greek mythology, the "craftsman god." Id. at 28 n.27.
73. Id. at 28-29.
74. Id. at 29.
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Martha Nussbaum for her testimony before the trial court in Romer v. Evans.75
Plato's tale colorfully captures the potent fantasy of absolute monogamy, of
supermonogamy, the vision of a unique and permanent bond between two
individuals.
2. Stories from Biological Anthropology
Biological anthropologists, evolutionary psychologists, and other scientists
of human and nonhuman animal behavior have offered various deterministic
explanations for "human monogamy." The basic story follows the selfish gene
into unexpected territory. Darwinian and other adaptive explanations of animal
behavior might seem to argue against monogamy. That is, would not adaptive
creatures seek to reproduce as much and as widely as possible, giving their gene
pool the best chance of survival? This view has its adherents, 76 but various
evolutionary scientists also offer explanations for why humans may pair up in
order to promote the survival of their individual gene pools. 77 These types of
explanations of human behavior have been much criticized; they are of interest
here primarily as examples of the kinds of stories we tell in support of
monogamy.
The basic story of adaptive monogamy is quality over quantity. Due to the
relatively lengthy human gestation period and childhood,78 the story goes,
75. Martha C. Nussbaum, Platonic Love and Colorado Law: The Relevance ofAncient Greek
Norms to Modern Sexual Controversies, 80 VA. L. REV. 1515, 1517-18 (1994). Nussbaum writes:
On October 15, 1993, I found myself on the witness stand in a courtroom in Denver,
Colorado, telling Colorado District Judge H. Jeffrey Bayless about Plato's Symposium.
Because I had a very short time to testify as an expert witness, I focused above all on
the speech of Aristophanes, which I had elsewhere argued to be one of the speeches in
which Plato expresses views that he wishes his reader to take especially seriously. I
told the court the story of how human beings were once round and whole-but now, cut
in half for their overambitiousness, they feel a sense of lost wholeness and run about
searching for their "other half." There are, Aristophanes tells us, three types of search,
corresponding to three original species of human beings. There are males whose other
half is male, females whose other half is female, and people whose other half is of the
opposite sex. The speech describes the feelings of intimacy and joy with which the lost
other halves greet one another, and describes the activity of sexual intercourse as a
joyful attempt to be restored to the lost unity of their original natures. This is so no less
for the same-sex than for the opposite-sex couples: in all cases, lovemaking expresses a
deep inner need coming from nature, and in all cases the couples, so uniting, have the
potential to make a valuable civic contribution.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
76. For a review of the scientific accounts that men are inclined to spread their seed as far and
wide as possible, see Katharine K. Baker, Biology for Feminists, 75 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 805, 807-
13(2000).
77. See, e.g., SARAH HRDY, MOTHER NATURE: A HISTORY OF MOTHERS, INFANTS, AND
NATURAL SELECTION (1999); DESMOND MORRIS, THE NAKED APE: A ZOOLOGIST'S STUDY OF THE
HUMAN ANIMAL (1967); MATT RIDLEY, THE RED QUEEN: SEX AND THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN
NATURE (1993); ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: THE NEW SCIENCE OF EVOLUTIONARY
PSYCHOLOGY (1994).
78. These features of humans are said to allow the development of "better brains," which are
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women want the support and protection of men during this vulnerable period of
child-bearing and child-rearing. 79 In addition, pairing with one provider helps
females ensure the health, safety, and development of their offspring.8 ° Thus, it
is advantageous for females "to develop a pairing tendency."
81
The male interest in monogamy is less clear, but writers offer three types of
explanations of male monogamy.82  The first type focuses on the males'
relations with each other, interpreting monogamy's equal distribution of the
sexual resources (i.e., women) as advantageous to cooperative hunting behavior
among males,83 or as the result of democratic progress by the less wealthy men
who have a harder time obtaining a wife under a polygamous system. 84 The
second type of explanation yokes the males' interests directly to the offspring,
whom the males may want to protect or nourish in order to increase their chance
of survival. 8
5
The third type of explanation focuses on male-female relations. Here, the
males may stay close to home to make sure no other male is impregnating the
female, and thereby diverting her resources or those of the primary male. 86 Or,
the males may be understood to develop pairing tendencies in order to be more
necessary to survival through hunting. MORRIS, supra note 77, at 63.
79. Id.
80. "Children with two parents may have had an educational edge over children with only
one." WRIGHT, supra note 77, at 58-59.
81. MORRIS, supra note 77, at 64.
82. Certainly, the different versions of these stories have also been challenged. For example,
Robert Wright roundly criticizes Desmond Morris's version of the pairbonding thesis in order to
make room for his own thesis about political compromises among men leading to monogamy. See
WRIGHT, supra note 77, at 55-58. The disagreements over the most compelling story are not
central to my point, however, which is that the scientific study of human behavior has produced a
wide array of explanations and justifications for human monogamy.
83. MoRRIs, supra note 77, at 64. Morris argues that, "if the weaker males were going to be
expected to co-operate on the hunt, they had to be given more sexual rights. The females would
have to be shared out, the sexual organization more democratic, less tyrannical." Id. To facilitate
this sharing of the women, "[e]ach male... would need a strong pairing tendency." Id.
84. RIDLEY, supra note 77, at 199 ("Once monogamous men had a chance to vote against
polygamists (and who does not want to tear down the competitor, however much he might also like
to emulate him?), their fate was sealed."); WRIGHT, supra note 77, at 98 ("[T]he most fortunate
men still get the most desirable women, but they have to limit themselves to one apiece."). For an
example of this type of reasoning reflected in an economist's predictions, see Christopher Westley,
Matrimony and Microeconomics: A Critique of Gary Becker's Analysis of Marriage, 1 J. MARKETS
& MORALITY, Spring 1998, at 72 (arguing that men might resort to violence in the face of
shortages of women and a consequent dowry system under legalized polygyny ).
85. RIDLEY, supra note 77, at 214 (citing a theory that male gibbons tend to be monogamous
to prevent infanticide by other males).
86. See RIDLEY, supra note 77, at 213-14 (drawing on the behavior of non-human animals to
explain male protection of the home base as a way to monitor the females and prevent them from
engaging in sexual relations with other males). Even on its own terms, of course, something does
not quite make sense in this story: in order to assure their paternity, men would not need to be
monogamous themselves, they would merely need to ensure that the women they impregnated
behaved monogamously. They would actually need to ensure only that the women they
impregnated had sex only with them during the relevant time period.
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sexually successful with the females who presumptively prefer males who will
pair. 87 This account presents sociobiological explanations of human love and
jealousy. 88 Under a refinement of this theory, males pair up because monogamy
creates domestic bliss that is beneficial to offspring. Sarah Hrdy writes,
"Monogamy reduces inherent conflicts of interest between the sexes. Her
reproductive success becomes his, and vice versa, promoting harmonious
relations between genetically distinct individuals striving towards common
goals." 89 In sum, "[W]hen it works, children benefit." 90 Hrdy is clearly pleased
to offer this explanation, because, she observes, "Sociobiology is not a field
known for the encouraging news it offers either sex."9 1 But Hrdy offers an
abundance of sanguine stories. For "over evolutionary time, lifelong monogamy
turns out to be the cure for all sorts of detrimental devices that one sex uses to
exploit the other."
92
Because compelling counternarratives about nonmonogamy are also told
87. WRIGHT, supra note 77, at 63 (observing that, in light of the possibility of male duplicity,
"a woman's genes would be well served by her early and careful scrutiny of a man's likely
devotion"). The females develop finely honed skills for detecting the tendency to fidelity, thus
causing the males to become more faithful, and so on. Id. Of course, this may also lead the males
to develop better techniques for deception. At this point, the monogamy story begins to unravel,
and stories are told about the potential adaptiveness of human duplicitousness in sexual behavior.
88. With regard to love, "natural selection appears to have taken this cost-benefit calculus [of
children benefiting from two parents well bonded] and transmuted it into feeling-in particular, the
sensation of love." WRIGHT, supra note 77, at 59; see also MORRIS, supra note 77, at 64 ("The
naked ape had to develop the capacity for falling in love, for becoming sexually imprinted on a
single partner, for evolving a pair-bond."). With regard to jealousy, each sex has the interests
portrayed above in gaining the exclusive attentions of another. Sociobiologists have traditionally
understood jealousy as gendered. For example, drawing on the evolutionary account of
monogamy as the result of female desire for stability and male desire for sexual access, Martin
Daly and Margo Wilson hypothesized that male and female jealousy would differ: Males would
fear sexual infidelity and females would fear emotional infidelity. In their study of male versus
female responses to imagined sexual and emotional infidelity, Daly and Wilson found the answer
they expected: Males exhibited increased physiological responses to the idea of sexual infidelity
whereas women responded relatively more intensely to the idea of emotional infidelity. See
WRIGHT, supra note 77, at 66-67 (citing Martin Daly, Margo Wilson & S.J. Weghorst, Male
Sexual Jealousy, 3 ETHOLOGY AND SOCIOBIOLOGY 11 (1982)). Subsequent research has challenged
this thesis, offering alternative explanations such as greater male excitement in response to sexual
imaginings, relative to emotional imaginings, regardless of the infidelity component of the fantasy.
See Christine R. Harris, Psychophysiological Responses to Imagined Infidelity: The Specific Innate
Modular View of Jealousy Reconsidered, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1082 (2000). Other
research has suggested that differential excitement correlates with the subject's beliefs about the
likely coincidence of sexual and emotional infidelity. See, e.g., David A. DeStefano & Peter
Salovey, Evolutionary Origins of Sex Differences in Jealousy?: Questioning the "Fitness" of the
Model, in EMOTIONS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: ESSENTIAL READINGS 150 (W. Gerrod Parrott ed.,
2001). Regardless of the results as to sex differences, the notion of a selfish gene offers a view of
jealousy as hardwired and adaptive. Even if jealousy "has outlived its [genetic] logic" in the day
of contraception, this story supports the conclusion that "the basic impulse toward jealousy is very
hard to erase." WRIGHT, supra note 77, at 67.
89. HRDY, supra note 77, at 231.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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from an adaptive perspective,93 the accounts outlined here are particularly
interesting for their dogged pursuit of an "encouraging"-which is to say,
monogamous-explanation of human sexual behavior. One can almost hear the
sighs of relief emitted by evolutionary theorists when they can conclude that
humans are basically monogamous,94 and even better yet, when they can supply
explanations of why this trait is part of human evolutionary "success." Thus,
Matt Ridley observes, "The nature of the human male, then, is to take
opportunities, if they are granted him, for polygamous mating, and to use wealth,
power and violence as means to sexual ends in the competition with other men-
though usually not at the expense of sacrificing a secure monogamous
relationship." 9 5  Fortunately, it seems, the male interests in keeping the
monogamous relationship secure-though less obvious than the female
interests-outweigh his polygamous drive. And this is part of what makes
humans special: "Even in the most despotic and polygamous moment of human
history, mankind was faithful to the institution of monogamous marriage, quite
unlike any other polygamous animal."9 6
B. Monogamy's Reality
This foray into the romantic and scientific story of monogamy leads us back
to the data. The numbers on actual relationship behavior illustrate the gap
between theory and practice.
1. The Failures of Supermonogamy
The frequent failure of supermonogamy-the idea of one partner ever-is
reflected in our high divorce rates. Rates of divorce in the United States have
increased dramatically during the twentieth century, 97 and studies indicate that
93. See supra note 76.
94. RIDLEY, supra note 77, at 212 ("Even in the polygamous societies of pastoralists, the
great majority of marriages are monogamous ones.").
95. RIDLEY, supra note 77, at 206.
96. Id. at 207. Ridley does not want his readers to think that he is endorsing adultery:
By describing adultery as a force that shaped our mating system, I am not "justifying"
it. Nothing is more "natural" than people evolving the tendency to object to being
cuckolded or cheated on, so if my analysis were to be interpreted as justifying adultery,
it would be even more obviously interpreted as justifying the social and legal
mechanisms for discouraging adultery. What I am claiming is that adultery and its
disapproval are both "natural."
Id. at 219.
97. Weis, supra note 38 (citing E. Berscheid, Emotion, in CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS 110-68 (H.
H. Kelley et al. eds., 1983)). Weis reports that the rate of divorce has leveled since 1980. Id.
(citing U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS:
MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS (1985)); see also P.C. Glick, Marriage, Divorce,
and Living Arrangements: Prospective Changes, 5 J. FAM. ISSUES 7 (1984); A.J. Norton & J. E.
Moorman, Current Trends in Marriage and Divorce Among American Women, 49 J. MARRIAGE &
THE FAMILY 3 (1987); Shostak, supra note 52, at 355).
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forty percent of Americans get divorced98 and that seventy percent of those who
divorce remarry. 99 Various commentators have argued that serial monogamy
may be seen as a form of polygamy, 10 0 but whether rightly called "polygamy,"
serial monogamy belies the fantasy of one man and one woman forever bound in
blissful supermonogamy. In order to conclude that the ideal of simple
monogamy is frequently not achieved, as I do in the next Section, it is not
necessary to resolve the question of whether serial monogamy is more like
simple monogamy or like polygamy.
2. The Failures of Simple Monogamy
First, in light of the above discussion, it is worth noting that serial
monogamy may lead to a kind of simultaneous parental nonmonogamy from the
perspective of children. That is, parental recombinations over time may lead to
plural parents in the form of blended families. A child may have a mother, a
stepfather, a father, and a stepmother. So while the parents are creating
horizontal relationships of only two at a time, the children may be acquiring
horizontal parenting structures of more than two. Certainly in some cases serial
monogamy leads to rejection by one parent of the entire family, including the
children, 10 1 but in other cases serial monogamy is cumulative relationship-
building, at least from the children's perspective. Moreover, many couples must
remain in constant contact even after divorce because of their mutual
commitment to their children. 10 2 The prevalence of divorce and remarriage
10 3
creates this sort of structural and psychological deviation from the fantasy of the
traditional monogamous marriage. 
104
98. Weis, supra note 38.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Potter v. Murray City, 585 F. Supp. 1126, 1142 n.7 (D. Utah 1984) (noting that
plaintiff, fired from his job as a police officer for practicing polygamy, had sought the admission
during discovery that "the high rate of divorce in the United States has often turned today's
American familial relationships into a form of serial polygamy"), aff'd, 760 F.2d 1065 (10th Cir.
1985) (affirming district court's rejection of plaintiff's free exercise and privacy-based challenge to
his termination); DAVID G. MAILLU, The Whiteman's Polygamy, in OUR KIND OF POLYGAMY 29
(1988).
101. See Judith P. Stelboum, Patriarchal Monogamy, in THE LESBIAN POLYAMORY READER:
OPEN RELATIONSHIPS, NON-MONOGAMY, AND CASUAL SEX 39, 44 (Marcia Munson & Judith P.
Stelboum eds., 1999) (positing that "[s]erial monogamy, facilitating the rejection of one person for
another, has resulted in the abandoning of children")
102. See, e.g., Joyce Davis, Enhanced Earning Capacity/Human Capital: The Reluctance To
Call It Property, 17 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 109, 131 (1996) ("The approximately sixty percent of
divorcing couples who are parents of minor children cannot simply walk away from each other and
begin their lives anew. Their parental relationship necessitates, or at least contemplates, an on-
going relationship between them."); Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage,
104 COLUM. L. REv. 75, 111 n.161 (2004).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 97-99.
104. Such a deviation also occurs in alternative parenting relationships of more than two,
such as two lesbian mothers and a male biological father who is involved in the child's life, an
example discussed by Martha Ertman. See Ertman, Private/Private Distinction, supra note 26, at
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Second, and more importantly here, adultery occurs often enough to
undermine even the idea of simple, serial monogamy-the idea that people have
one sexual partner at a time.10 5  "Researchers [of adultery in America] have
reported lifetime prevalence rates from as low as 20 percent... to nearly 75
percent .... ,106 The most comprehensive study of American sexual behavior to
date offers figures on the low end of that scale. The National Health and Social
Life Survey, released in 1994, claims that approximately twenty percent of
married women and thirty-five percent of married men have had adulterous
sex, 10 7 and there is reason to think that levels of adultery among those studied
are even higher. 10 8 The American data on adultery are consistent with those of
other major western nations. Dr. Judith Mackay, Senior Policy Advisor for the
World Health Organization, reports that "40% of sexually active 16-45 year old
Germans admit to having been sexually unfaithful, compared with 50% of
Americans, 42% of British, 40% of Mexicans, 36% of the French, and 22% of
the Spanish." 10 9 Bear in mind that these figures reflect only those subjects who
admit to infidelity.
Not just a private dalliance, adultery is a regular player on the public stage.
From presidents and politicians to actors and artists, those in the public eye
dramatize the prevalence of nonmonogamy.110 And where public figures
succeed at monogamy, they may admit that this has not been their unswaying
desire. Thus President Jimmy Carter, who managed to avoid the notorious
adultery recently associated with President Bill Clinton, famously admitted to
lusting "in his heart." '  Such an admission seems surprising in light of the
widespread "normative consensus" among Americans about this form of
extramarital sex: "A series of national surveys indicate that [adultery] has been
124-25.
105. See, e.g., Linda Fitts Mischler, Personal Morals Masquerading as Professional Ethics:
Regulations Banning Sex Between Domestic Relations Attorneys and Their Clients, 23 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 20 (2000); Martin J. Siegel, For Better or for Worse: Adultery, Crime & the
Constitution, 30 J. FAM. L., 45, 55 (1991) (noting that "[h]alf of all husbands report having
committed adultery" and that "[slomewhere between a third to forty percent of all wives say they
have been unfaithful"); see also id. at 55 nn.68-73.
106. Weis, supra note 38, at 1508 (citations omitted).
107. Id. at 1507.
108. The validity of the National Health and Social Life Survey has been called into question,
particularly with regard to its data on counter-normative behaviors, because some of the subjects
were interviewed in the presence of another person such as a family member. See id. at 1500-01
(citing I.L. Reiss, Is This the Definitive Sexual Survey?, 32 J. SEX RES. 77 (1995) (reviewing E.O.
LAUMANN, J.H. GAGNON, R.T. MICHAEL & S. MICHAELS, THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF
SEXUALITY: SEXUAL PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES)).
109. Judith Mackay, Global Sex: Sexuality and Sexual Practices Around the World, Fifth
Congress of the European Federation of Sexology, Berlin, http://www2.hu-berlin.de/sexology/
(June 30, 2000).
110. See, e.g., Laura Kipnis, Adultery, in INTIMACY 9, 34-35 (Lauren Berlant ed., 2000)
(discussing President Clinton's extramarital affairs); Mischler, supra note 105, at 18 n.84.
111. See Joy Singer, For Better or for Worse: How the Law and Politics of Gay Marriage
Affects Polys, LOVING MORE MAG., Winter 1996, at 4, 5. "Joy Singer" is a pseudonym.
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consistently disapproved by 75-85 percent of the adult American population."
112
Considered more closely, however, Carter's admission speaks directly to the
quandary of compulsory monogamy. The desire for nonmonogamy is so
widespread, and the pressure to resist that desire so great, that for a politician to
acknowledge it is for him to identify with Everyman (and likely Everywoman),
and, at the same time, the politician's resistance to nonmonogamous desire is the
fulfillment of the fantasy that everyone must feel obliged to strive for, in spite of
that fantasy's frequent disappointment.
This Part of the article has outlined the norm of monogamy from two
perspectives: the ideals of simple monogamy, one partner at a time, and of
supermonogamy, one partner ever. The discussion has highlighted, through
statistics and vivid examples, the contours of these desires as well as the frequent
gap between their ideal and their reality. The purpose of this Part has not been to
portray monogamy generally as a failure; though common, monogamy's failures
are far from universal. The purpose has also not been to portray all aspects of
monogamy; the aspirations and purported goods of monogamy have been
discussed well and often by others. Rather, this Part has meant to frame the
following discussion of nonmonogamy by calling attention to the pervasiveness
of the fantasy of monogamy, by highlighting some of its forms and failures, and
by acknowledging that its boundaries are policed by law and norms. The ideal
of monogamy as satisfying and desirable, as the only path for true love-and of
jealousy as a necessary, even defining, part of love-is so pervasive as to blind
us, at times, to its operation as law.
III. CONTEMPORARY POLYAMORY
Relationships among more than two partners may strike many people as
",preposterous."1 13 As just discussed, however, monogamy often fails to achieve
112. Weis, supra note 38, at 1507; see also Lynn D. Wardle, Parental Infidelity and the "No-
Harm" Rule in Custody Litigation, 52 CATH. UNIV. L. REv. 81, 95 n.57 (2002) ("According to the
Washington Post/Kaiser/Harvard Survey Project in 1998, eighty-eight percent of Americans
believe that adultery is immoral, while only eleven percent find it morally acceptable.").
113. See, e.g., Chambers, supra note 19, at 59 (emphasis added) ("First, [opponents of
alternatives to heterosexual monogamous relationships] see them all as preposterous, as something
barely imaginable in the world in which they live. Marriage just is the union of one man and one
woman. And, second, they see these forms of union as moral equivalents, each repellant, each the
appropriate province of the law to discourage or prohibit."); see also Barbara Bergmann, Becker's
Theory of the Family: Preposterous Conclusions, 1 FEMINIST EcoN. 1 (1995) (characterizing as
"preposterous" Gary Becker's theory of how polygamy might benefit women). For more
discussion of Becker's theory, see infra text accompanying notes 322-31. "Preposterous" could be
understood as akin to "inversion," an early term for homosexuality, in that preposterous means, in
one sense, "contrary to the order of nature... monstrous," as well as the now-rare, first sense of
"having or placing last that which should be first; inverted in position or order." OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY (1993).
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its goals. The failure of one model does not, in itself, make other models viable.
But monogamy's frequent failure may give us reason to pause before dismissing
as absurd the possibility of alternatives. 114 And as polyamory is not frequently
in the public eye, we are rarely exposed to its reality.
This Part discusses the scope, terms, and structures of polyamory today.
Since such skeletal information does little to enrich our understanding of a
practice, this Part also portrays several polyamorous relationships. These
portraits aim to capture something of the feeling and experience of living inside
these relationships by weaving together structural aspects and mundane details.
How much anyone can understand another's experience is a question beyond the
scope of this article, but despite the sage advice that you have to "go there t[o]
know there," 1 15 this Part proceeds from the premise that words allow at least the
possibility of seeing the world through the eyes of another. Finally, this Part
discusses the ethical vision of polyamory, setting forth five ideas that I derive
from writings by its practitioners.
Before proceeding to discuss polyamory, however, I want to address a
certain confusion surrounding the term "polygamy." Charles Krauthammer has
identified a key split in the responses to polygamy:
[I]f marriage is redefined to include two men in love, on what possible
principled grounds can it be denied to three men in love?
This is traditionally called the polygamy challenge, but polygamy--one
man marrying more than one woman-is the wrong way to pose the
question. Polygamy, with its rank inequality and female subservience,
is too easy a target. It invites exploitation of and degrading competition
among wives, with often baleful social and familial consequences. (For
those in doubt on this question, see Genesis: 26-35 on Joseph and his
multimothered brothers.)
The question is better posed by imagining three people of the same sex
in love with one another and wanting their love to be legally recognized
and socially sanctioned by marriage. 116
The distinction Krauthammer draws here is instructive. American ideas of
114. There are of course many alternatives to monogamy, including singleness and
committed friendship, as well as polyamory. See, e.g., The Alternatives to Marriage Project, at
http://www.unmarried.org/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2004) ("The Alternatives to Marriage Project
(AtMP) is a national nonprofit organization advocating for equality and fairness for unmarried
people, including people who choose not to marry, cannot marry, or live together before
marriage."). As discussed in the Introduction, this article focuses largely on polyamory and on the
sexual exclusivity axis of monogamy.
115. ZoRA NEALE HURSTON, THEIR EYES WERE WATCHING GOD 183 (Perennial Library 1990)
(1937). As Hurston's character Janey spoke these words towards the end of a revealing work of
fiction, however, the paradox of their content and context suggests they may be somewhat tongue-
in-cheek.
116. Charles Krauthammer, When John and Jim Say "I Do, " TIME, July 22, 1996, reprinted
in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON, supra note 10, at 282-83.
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multiparty relationships are shaped by this country's historical experience with
Mormon polygamy, and I would go so far as to say this is what most Americans
think of first when they think of polygamy. 117  In addition, the image of
polygamy as a Muslim practice undoubtedly adds to its negative public image,
historically and also particularly in the wake of September 11, 2001.118
Arguably, one reason Americans oppose multiparty relationships is that these
relationships evoke the image of a man sanctioned by a patriarchal religious
society to have many wives as emblems of his power or chosen status. There is
some disagreement among scholars as well as polygynists as to whether this
model is necessarily bad for women, as discussed later, 119 but certainly it is
widely thought to be so. 120 Thus, as Congressman Barney Frank has said about
why people oppose plural marriage, "First, it's almost always polygamy and not
polyamory. So a lot of women don't like it."'
121
Frank's comment highlights a common problem of terminology. The term
"polygamy" is often used to mean two different things: 1) marriage to more than
one person, regardless of sex; and 2) the marriage of one man to more than one
woman. As noted above, 122 the latter-one man with multiple wives-is
specifically called "polygyny." Polygyny is the opposite of "polyandry," one
woman with multiple husbands. 123 The elision of polygamy and polygyny is
exemplified, with some acknowledgement of the confusion, by the Oxford
English Dictionary definition of "polygamy": "Marriage with several, or more
117. Brigham Young first openly declared polygamy to be the doctrine and practice of the
Mormon church in 1852, twenty-two years after the establishment of the church, and five years
after the Mormons had settled in Utah. See IRWIN ALTMAN & JOSEPH GINAT, POLYGAMOUS
FAMILIES IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 28 (1996). The incorporation of polygamy into Mormon
theology was based on a revelation Joseph Smith reported having on the subject in 1843. See id. at
27-28. The official Mormon church, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints ("Church of
LDS"), has denounced the practice since 1890. Altman and Ginat reported in 1996, however, that
"approximately 20,000 to 50,000 Americans are currently members of Mormon fundamentalist
religious groups and believe in the practice of plural marriage, or polygamy." Id. at 2.
118. See, e.g., infra note 121 (quoting Barney Frank on this point).
119. See infra text accompanying notes 322-31.
120. See, e.g., Mary Lyndon Shanley, Just Marriage: On the Public Importance of Private
Unions, in JUST MARRIAGE (forthcoming Oxford Univ. P. 2004) (manuscript at 16, on file with
author) (noting that "[m]any people are convinced that polygamy is profoundly patriarchal").
121. Meeting with OutLaws, supra note 19. The second reason Frank offered was that it
suggests "promiscuity, unfaithfulness, foreignness." Finally, he noted that the animosity is likely
to be greater in the wake of the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, because
the "world's leading polygamists" are Muslims. Id.
122. See supra Part I.
123. See, e.g., William Safire, A Polyandry Solution, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2001, at A17. It is
through the heterosexual assumption of marriage as including at least one man and one woman that
the term "polyandry" (many men) could come to mean a group including any women at all; in
other contexts, the term has been employed more literally to mean simply multiple men. See ALAN
HOLLINGHURST, THE SWIMMING-POOL LIBRARY 20 (1988) ("This naked mingling, which formed a
ritualistic heart to the life of the club, produced its own improper incitements to ideal liaisons, and
polyandrous happenings which could not survive into the world of jackets and ties, cycle-clips and
duffel-coats."). A parallel point could, of course, be made about "polygyny."
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than one, at once; plurality of spouses; the practice or custom according to which
one man has several wives (distinctively called polygyny), or one woman several
husbands (polyandry), at the same time. Most commonly used of the former."124
To avoid this confusion, the article uses the term "polygamy" to mean several
spouses, regardless of sex. It is, however, significant that polygamy commonly
refers to a man with many wives. I agree with Frank that this tendency to
conflate polygamy and polygyny is one reason that people object to the idea of
multiparty relationships. To pry these concepts apart, this article offers several
examples of multiparty relationships that are not structured by institutionalized
patriarchy.
A. Terms and Models
No studies or surveys estimate the number of people currently engaged in
polyamory, but the national organization Loving More reports a rate of 1,000
hits per day on its website and a circulation of 10,000 readers for its eponymous
magazine. 125  Loving More provides the following general definition of
polyamory:
Polyamory (many loves) is a relatively new word created for
relationships where an adult intimately loves more than one other adult.
This includes forms like open couples, group marriage, intimate
networks, triads and even people who currently have one or no partners,
yet are open to the possibility of more.... People who describe
themselves as polyamorous (or poly) also usually embrace the value of
honesty in relationships. They do not want to have affairs or cheat on a
loved one and are dedicated to growing beyond jealousy and possession
in relationships. 
12 6
This explanation conveys at least four things about polyamory. First, the word is
"relatively new." 127 Like "homosexuality," it is a mixture of Greek (poly) and
124. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1382 (1993) (final emphasis added).
125. John Cloud, Henry & Mary & Janet &... • Is Your Marriage a Little Dull?: The
"Polyamorists" Say There's Another Way, TIME, Nov. 15, 1999, at 90. The number of reported
subscribers to Loving More Magazine suggests that a not insignificant number of people are
practicing or considering polyamory, since there are presumably also people who have no
connection with the organization but engage in the practice.
126. LOVING MORE, ABOUT POLYAMORY, http://www.lovemore.com/aboutpoly (last visited
Apr. 24, 2004).
127. Marcia Munson and Judith Stelboum offer a brief account of historical antecedents to
the term polyamory:
In the 1980s, the term "non-monogamy" was used to describe multiple concurrent
sexual involvements. In the 1970s, after the release of Nena and George O'Neil's book
Open Marriage, people referred to "open relationships." in the 1960s, the term "free
love" described the uninhibited, outside-of-marriage sexual connections suddenly made
possible with the invention of the birth control pill, and the new ability of medical
science to treat all known sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). In the 1950s, sex
outside of a monogamous couple relationship had simply been referred to as
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Latin (amor). 128  Second, the hybridity of the word points to a feature of
polyamory represented in this definition: the wide variety of relationships that
fall within its ambit. 129  Third, the reference to polyamorous "people who
pcurrently have one or no partners" suggests that people not only practice
polyamory, people can be "poly."'130 Finally, the last two sentences point toward
the philosophical interests of many of polyamory's practitioners: polys have
well-articulated views of relationships and beliefs about interpersonal ethics.
131
There are different definitions and innumerable models of polyamory.
132
The primary definitional disputes about polyamory involve the delineation of its
boundaries with regard to sex and to love. 133  In order to be poly, must a
relationship involve sex among more than two, love among more than two, both,
or neither?
With regard to sex, there is a dispute as to whether polyamory necessarily
involves sexual relationships among more than two people. For instance, Martha
Ertman has recently defined polyamory as incorporating all "relationships that
include more than one participant" regardless of whether the participants are
sexually involved with one another. 134 By privileging a very general definition
,,cheating."... Women who cheated were "loose." Men, less likely to acquire STDs
from heterosexual intercourse [than women], and not at all likely to become pregnant,
were said to be "sowing wild seeds" when they had multiple sexual involvements.
Marcia Munson & Judith P. Stelboum, Introduction to THE LESBIAN POLYAMORY READER: OPEN
RELATIONSHIPS, NON-MONOGAMY, AND CASUAL SEX, supra note 101, at 1-2; see also DEBORAH
M. ANAPOL, POLYAMORY, THE NEW LOVE WITHOUT LIMITS 5 (1997) ("The term polyamory was
first proposed by Church of All Worlds founders Oberon and Morning Glory Zell to replace the
awkward expression responsible nonmonogamy. Cyberspace conversations via the Internet and
the World Wide Web popularized its use all around the world over the last several years and
helped bring it into general usage."). A sketch of historical antecedents to the concept of
polyamory could extend further back, possibly including, for instance, the late-nineteenth-century
utopian Oneida community. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 40, at 146.
128. "Homosexuality" comes from the Greek for same (homo) and the Latin for sex (sexus).
See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 115,334, 345 (2d ed. 1989).
129. See infra text accompanying notes 150-63.
130. Not all polys agree with this proposition. See, e.g., Elise Matthesen, alt.polyamory
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), at http://www.faqs.org/faqs/polyamory/faq/ (last updated Apr.
25, 2004) ("[A]ccording to the philosophy of some folks, people aren't polyamorous, although
behavior can be. Some people find that approach useful, and others prefer to think of
'polyamorous people."'); see also infra Part IV. Moreover, the level on which someone is or is not
poly is a matter of some dispute. See id.
131. See infra Section III.C.
132. For detailed descriptions of particular relationships, see infra Section III.B. For a vivid
fictional account of three different forms of triads, see Tara Ayres and Doug Holtz's play, Loving
More (manuscript on file with author), which was performed by the Mercury Players Theatre at the
Bartell Theatre in Madison, Wisconsin, during December 2003. See also Lue Allen, Howdy,
Partners: A New Play Argues for Multiple Lovers, ISTHMUs, Dec. 12, 2003, at 24 (reviewing
Loving More).
133. On the meaning of the term "love" in these debates, see infra text accompadying notes
143-46.
134. "While polyamory literally means 'many' and 'love,' the term does not impose
additional conditions such as sexual relations." Ertman, Private/Private Distinction, supra note
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of polyamory-"all forms of multi-partner relating"-Maura Strassberg also
appears to join with those polys who consider sex to be an unnecessary part of
the equation. 135
Among polys, there seem to be two impulses pushing towards the inclusion
of nonsexual intimate relationships within the definition of polyamory. First,
many polys oppose hierarchy and strict definitions. 136 Like that of "queers," 137
the sensibility of many polys rebels against line-drawing and exclusion. 138 Polys
are therefore inclined to include everyone within polyamory who wants to be
included. Second, polys who oppose hierarchy or who have alternative
definitions of sexuality may not want to define their nonsexual relationships as
categorically different from their sexual relationships. They may not want to
privilege certain relationships along the axis of sex. Thus, they may want to put
all their loving relationships under the umbrella of polyamory.
By contrast, some writers posit that the term polyamory must incorporate
sexual nonexclusivity. Deborah Anapol writes that "[o]ne thing [polyamorous]
relationships have in common is that they are both sexual and loving .. ,139
According to Marcia Munson and Judith Stelboum, "The term 'polyamory'
literally means 'many loves.' While loving several people simultaneously is the
reality of most people's lives, the term polyamory usually implies sexual
involvement with more than one person."' 140  For some polys, including sex
within the term polyamory may be an important aspect of the term's signaling
26, at 124-25. Ertman also writes:
The term [polyamory] also includes arrangements with combinations of people who
organize their intimate lives together, regardless of the extent of the arrangement's
sexual elements. Thus, if a lesbian couple has a child by alternative insemination, using
a gay man as a known donor to father the child, and the donor remains involved in the
child's life, the arrangement is polyamorous. These three individuals love one another,
or are bonded by the love for the child. The lesbian couple's relationship is romantic
and sexual, and similar to marriage in that the couple lives together and jointly parents
the child. The two biological parents, in contrast, are neither romantic partners nor
even involved in the way that cohabitants and co-parents are.
Id. at 124.
135. Strassberg, supra note 8, at 444 (quoting Loving More's definition of polymory, at
http://lovemore.com/terms (last visited Apr. 24, 2004)). Strassberg asserts that "the fundamental
value of polyamory is relationship, particularly loving relationships," id. at 454, and supports this
proposition with the assertion, without qualification, that "[tihe focus of polyamory is on 'having
and maintaining loving relationships that may or may not be sexual,"' id. (quoting Loving More,
http://Iovemore.com/faq, at question #1).
136. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
137. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Queering Law?: A Queer Theory of Same-Sex Marriage 5-7
(May 28, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
138. See infra note 153.
139. ANAPOL, supra note 127, at 6 (emphasis in original).
140. Munson & Stelboum, supra note 127, at 1. Cf Matthesen, supra note 130 ("Polyamory
means 'loving more than one.' This love may be sexual, emotional, spiritual, or any combination
thereof, according to the desires and agreements of the individuals involved .... ). But see
Matthesen, supra note 130 (reporting one woman's opinion that polyamory "need not involve sex
(although it often does)").
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function: just as a straight person may not want to proposition or fall in love with
a gay person, a poly person may wish to avoid propositioning a person who is
not open to sexual nonexclusivity. 14 1 And some polys may feel that a definition
of polyamory that does not contain sex is a kind of whitewashing or watering-
down of this nonnormative practice.
142
When love is considered, the dispute is inverted; must polyamorous
relationships include multiparty love, or can they be primarily or exclusively
about sexual nonmonogamy? "Love" is used loosely in these discussions
because the focus of the dispute is negative; the question is whether a
relationship can be poly without any love. For example, this issue is often
framed in terms of whether polyamory includes "swinging," or casual sex-that
is, sexual involvement with multiple parties not necessarily based on love or
intimacy. 143 In this context, then, "love" should be understood to mean some
kind of emotional or intimate attachment beyond the sexual connection. On the
one hand, Deborah Anapol emphasizes the role of sex and love together "with no
separation between the sex and the love." 144 She uses the term "sexualoving" to
demonstrate the unity of the two, and insists that "we're not talking about casual,
indiscriminate sport sex." 145  On the other hand, Marcia Munson and Judith
Stelboum say that "'polyamory' includes many different styles of multiple
intimate involvements, such as polyfidelity or group marriage; primary
relationships open to secondary affairs; and casual sexual involvement with two
or more people."' 146  With regard to both sex and love, then, polyamory may
141. See infra text accompanying notes 401-03.
142. Such a view might be compared to that of queers who criticize certain choices to
desexualize the gay rights movement, see, e.g., WARNER, supra note 4, at 39-40 ("[W]e (or some
of us, acting in the name of homosexuals) try to clean ourselves up as legitimate players in politics
and the media. As a movement we resort to a temporary pretense: 'We're gay,' we say, 'but that
has nothing to do with sex.' And then, too often, this stopgap pretense is mistaken for the desired
utopia. No more sex! Free at last!"), and to that of lesbians who reacted against Adrienne Rich's
formulation of the "lesbian continuum" as including straight women who resisted patriarchal
society in a variety of nonsexual ways, because these lesbians felt that Rich's lesbian-continuum
idea trivialized the role of sex in lesbian lives and self-naming, see supra note 35 and
accompanying text; see also Rich, supra note 1, at 648 ("I mean the term lesbian continuum to
include a range-through each woman's life and throughout history-of woman-identified
experience; not simply the fact that a woman has had or consciously desired genital sexual
experience with another woman."); see also id. at 651 ("If we consider the possibility that all
women... exist on a lesbian continuum, we can see ourselves as moving in and out of this
continuum, whether we identify ourselves as lesbian or not.").
143. The conflict over whether swingers "count" as poly can be seen in the slightly defensive
or conflicted tone of some of the articles in Loving More. The author of one article, for example,
tries to defend her open marriage as "poly enough," although she and her husband have never
engaged in what she calls "poly activity": that is, they have never had secondary or additional
primary partners. See Jasmine Walston, Am I Poly Enough?, LOVING MORE MAG., Fall 1998, at
28, 28-29.
144. ANAPOL, supra note 127, at 6 (emphasis omitted).
145. Id.
146. Munson & Stelboum, supra note 127, at 2; see also Kevin Lano & Claire Parry, Preface
to BREAKING THE BARRIERS TO DESIRE: POLYAMORY, POLYFIDELITY, AND NON-MONOGAMY-NEW
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therefore be understood to have a narrower definition and a broader definition.
Another dispute about the boundaries of polyamory concerns whether
traditional polygyny, as practiced by, most prominently, fundamentalist
Mormons, "counts" as polyamory. The sex-based hierarchy of traditional
Mormon polygyny seems incompatible with the typical poly dedication to
principles of equality and individual growth, causing some polys and
commentators to exclude Mormon polygyny from the umbrella of polyamory.
147
In this article, one of the relationships profiled is a Mormon-type polygynous
union, which none of the participants calls "polyamorous" but which blends
elements of traditional hierarchy with modem feminist ideas of female solidarity,
satisfaction, and work outside the home, according to the accounts given by the
female participants.148 By including this relationship, I do not mean to resolve
the question of whether this relationship "counts" as polyamorous, but mean
merely to present it as a lesser-known type of the polygyny that most people
picture when they think of multiparty relationships.
Because the number of people in poly relationships has no theoretical limit,
the models of poly relationships are also theoretically limitless. Some of the
more typical models have specific names. 149 Definitions of these models often
rely on the terms "primary relationship," 150 "secondary relationship,"' 15 1 and
occasionally "tertiary relationship,"' 152 although some polys object to the
APPROACHES TO MULTIPLE RELATIONSHIPS, at v, vi (1995) ("It is a point of contention in the poly
community as to whether 'swinging' can be regarded as responsible non-monogamy-we think it
can, provided that the choices made are negotiated and consenting.").
147. See, e.g., Strassberg, supra note 8, at 440-41 (describing some polys' rejection of
traditional patriarchal polygamy); Maura Strassberg, The Crime of Polygamy, 12 TEMP. POL. &
Crv. RTs. L. REv. 353, 355 (2003) (noting that some poly commentators exclude polygyny "from
the polyamory umbrella due to its sexism and heterosexism").
148. See infra Section III.B.3.
149. For further discussion of polyamory's many terms, particularly those describing sexually
exclusive groups, see Strassberg, supra note 8, at 444-65.
150. See, e.g., ANAPOL, supra note 127, at 7 ("Primary relationship. Lovers who are in a
long-term, committed, marriage-type relationship are primary partners. Usually primary partners
live together and share finances, parenting and decision making. Primary partners are not
necessarily legal married, but they are bonded together as a family."); Matthesen, supra note 130
("Primary-word often used in a hierarchal multi-person relationship to denote the person with
whom one is most strongly bonded. In some cases this bond or commitment takes the form of
legal marriage. As bigamy is not legal, the option of having two (or more) legally wedded
primaries simultaneously is not currently practicable, though non-legal ceremonies may certainly
be performed. In some cases 'primary' refers to the lover with the most seniority."). On the
curious set of state laws that define bigamy merely by extramarital cohabitation, see infra note
158.
151. See, e.g., ANAPOL, supra note 127, at 7 ("Secondary relationship. Secondary partners
may also have a long-term, committed sexualoving relationship. But usually they live separately,
have separate finances and see themselves as close friends rather than immediate family.
Secondary partners may take on roles in each other's families similar to those of cousins, aunts and
uncles in an extended family of blood relations."); Matthesen, supra note 130 ("Secondary-
follows from primary, in a hierarchal relationship, denotes a person with whom one is involved
without the emotional, legal, or economic complexities and commitments of primary bonding.").
152. See, e.g., ANAPOL, supra note 127, at 8 ("Tertiary relationship. Lovers who spend time
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hierarchy implied by these terms. 153  For example, according to Deborah
Anapol, an "intimate network" comprises "several ongoing secondary
relationships .... Sometimes all members of the group eventually become
lovers. Sometimes individuals have only two or three partners within the group.
The group can include singles only, couples only[,] or a mixture of both."' 154
The term "line marriage" identifies "a different form of familial immortality than
the traditional one of successive generations of children"; rather, a line marriage
is "a marriage that from time to time adds younger members, eventually
establishing an equilibrium population (spouses dying off at the same rate as
new ones are added)."' 155
A term such as "polyfidelity" clarifies the type of commitment among the
parties, and is defined as "[a] lovestyle in which three or more primary partners
agree to be sexual only within their family. Additional partners can be added to
the marriage with everyone's consent." 156 The idea of polyfidelity brings us to a
distinction between two aspects of polyamorists' transgression of monogamy,
what I call the "exclusivity" axis and the "numerosity" axis.
Criminal law helps us to see the distinctiveness and the importance of these
two axes. "Exclusivity" refers to whether someone has sex with people outside a
relationship. As in the common phrase "open relationship," exclusivity concerns
whether a relationship is "open" or "closed." In the legal realm, adultery statutes
target violations of the exclusivity norm. 157 By contrast, "numerosity" concerns
how many people are in a relationship. From the perspective of monogamy, the
basic question here is whether a relationship involves two individuals or more
than two individuals. Thus, bigamy statutes target violations of numerosity
norms. 158  Within polyamory, exclusivity and numerosity define aspects of
together only once in a while or for a brief time are tertiary partners. Their contact may be very
intimate, but they are not an important part of each other's day to day life.").
153. Matthesen, supra note 130 ("Some people also don't like the terms primaries and
secondaries or the concepts behind the terms, preferring to have 'a circle of equals' as one poly
person called it. Stef contributed the term 'Non-hierarchical Polyamory' for this kind of
arrangement."); cf ANAPOL, supra note 127, at 8 ("While noting that "some polyamorous people
object to the whole concept of hierarchies of commitment and rankings of love (as in the old
Chinese practice of 'number one wife'), varying levels of affinity can occur naturally. This
diversity of form, along with the realization that identical forms may result from radically different
dynamics, automatically creates a social environment different from our familiar homogeneous,
avowedly monogamous culture.").
154. ANAPOL, supra note 127, at 8.
155. Matthesen, supra note 130 (attributing the term to Robert A. Heinlein).
156. ANAPOL, supra note 127, at 9. This is the type of polyamory on which Maura Strassberg
focuses her work. See supra note 8.
157. See supra note 50.
158. See supra note 51. Curiously, while both adultery and bigamy laws require the party at
issue to be married, some bigamy laws do not require an additional marriage or even attempted
marriage. In five states, the crime of bigamy covers mere extramarital cohabitation by a married
person. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-201 (2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-20 (2003); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-6-1 (2002); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN § 25.01 (Vernon 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-
101 (1999).
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individual relationship models, such as polyfidelity, which might be understood
as a sexually exclusive model analytically distinct from monogamous
relationships primarily in the number of the participants.
Some relationship models are specifically defined by the number of
participants. For example, an "open marriage" is a "nonexclusive couple
relationship[]" in which the two "partners have agreed that each can
independently have outside sexualoving partners."'159 A poly "triad" involves
"[t]hree sexualoving partners who may all be secondary, all be primary, or two
may be primary with a third secondary. It can be open or closed. A triad can be
heterosexual or homosexual, but is often the choice of two same sex bisexuals
and an opposite sex heterosexual."' 160 Two different types of triads are further
distinguished by the types of bonds among the three partners: "vees" and
"triangles," each of which may be diagrammed as the figure that names it:
Vee-Three people, where the structure puts one person at the bottom,
or "hinge" of the vee, also called the pivot point. In a vee, the arm
partners are not as commonly close to each other as each is to the pivot.
Triangle (or equilateral triangle)-relationship where three people are
each involved with both of the others. Sometimes also called a triad.
161
As these examples indicate, diagrams may help to demonstrate the possible
polyamorous configurations. 162 These are just a few of the poly models with
specific names, 163 which are in turn only a small sample of the possible models.
B. Relationships
This Section depicts several models of polyamory through four accounts of
contemporary relationships. April Divilbiss, Shane Divilbiss, and Chris Littrell
are in a polyandrous relationship; the details of their relationship became public
during their unsuccessful lawsuit in 1999 to keep April's daughter in their home
after she was removed by court order. Eddie, Adam, Amber, and Mike form an
open four-person partnership, which Eddie was kind enough to take the time to
discuss with me at length. Elizabeth Joseph has written about her positive
experience as a career woman in a Mormon polygynous marriage. And Dossie
159. ANAPOL, supra note 127, at 8. Whether a sexually nonexclusive couple falls within the
definition of polyamory is a question taken up in Part IV.
160. Id. at 9; see also Matthesen, supra note 130 ("Triads-three people involved in some
way. Often used in a fairly committed sense, in some cases involving ceremonies of commitment,
but also used simply to mean 'three people who are connected.' Example: 'Jodine, Mischa and
Mickey are a FMM triad living in Excelsior."').
161. Matthesen, supra note 130.
162. See, e.g., RYAM NEARING, Forms Responsible Nonmonogamy Can Take, in THE
POLYFIDELITY PRIMER (PEP Publishing 3d ed., 1992), reprinted in ANAPOL, supra note 127, at 9.
163. See, e.g., Matthesen, supra note 130 ("Quads, pentacles, sextets and more: There are
polyfolk who exist in multiple arrangements with more than three members. Geometry can get
complicated, and creative nomenclature abounds.").
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Easton has struggled to keep her relationships open to other sexual, loving
experiences since she left an abusive partner several decades ago.
1. A Woman with Two Husbands: April Divilbiss
A 1999 Tennessee juvenile court case involved a custody dispute between a
polyandrous threesome-a polyfidelitous vee-and the grandmother of their
child. 164 The facts of the case, as well as relevant documents, became widely
available because Loving More Magazine sponsored a campaign to raise money
for the attorney's fees of the mother, April Divilbiss. 1
65
In 1995, when April became pregnant, her child's biological father moved
out of town with no forwarding address. 166  In 1996, April, newly a mother,
married Shane Divilbiss, and Chris Littrell was the best man at the wedding. 16
7
By January 1997, April Divilbiss and Chris Littrell had fallen in love. 168  On
Valentine's Day, April told Shane that she and Chris were in love. 169 Shane and
Chris went to a restaurant and discussed the situation. 170 They realized that
neither of them wanted to lose April, so in March 1997, all three moved in
together. 17 1 April slept with Chris and Shane separately, and Chris and Shane
were not sexually involved with one another. 172 According to one article, they
tried a threesome once, but Chris ended the attempt. 173
In November of 1998, when April's daughter was three, MTV aired a
program about polyamory, and the triad went on television and talked about their
relationship, saying that they considered themselves all married. 174 The day
after the program aired,175 the child's paternal grandmother, with whom she
sometimes spent weekends, filed for removal of the child and for custody, on the
164. In the Matter of A.M., No. K1719 (Juv. Ct., Memphis and Shelby County, Tenn., Apr.
16, 1999) (decision on file with author).
165. Court documents and information about the fundraising campaign have subsequently
been removed from the Loving More site. However, copies of documents from the Loving More
website about the Divilbiss case are on file with the author. For much of the information that
follows, see also Cloud, supra note 125.
166. Transcript, In the Matter of A.M., No. K1719 (Juv. Ct., Memphis and Shelby County,
Tenn., Apr. 16, 1999) (Lane, J.) (conducting direct examination of Donna Olswing, the child's
paternal grandmother).
167. Cloud, supra note 125, at 91.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 90. ("No, the two guys don't go for each other; the triad tried a menage a trois
once but stopped because Chris thought it was icky. Instead, they lived as man and wife and man,
with April taking turns.").
174. Transcript, In the Matter of A.M (No. K1719). The program was called "Sex in the
'90s: It's a Group Thing." Cloud, supra note 125, at 90.
175. See Jim Gerard, Three's Company; So Is Four or Five, SALON, July 17, 1999, at
http://www.salon.com/healthlsex/urge/1999/07/17/polyamory/print.html.
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grounds of April's immoral lifestyle. 176 The judge saw a video of the program
and subsequently removed the child from April's care without regard to findings
and procedures that April's lawyer claimed were required by the state. 177 In the
months leading up the hearing, there seemed to be some optimism among those
involved that the case could be a kind of Stonewall 178 for the poly movement.
On April 16, 1999, the case was heard in the Juvenile Court of Memphis.
179
Prior to the hearing, four court-appointed experts reached the conclusion that the
child had not been negatively influenced by her mother's lifestyle.' 8 ° But the
presiding judge, the Honorable Herbert Lane, rejected their findings, as well as
April's constitutional claims. 181 After viewing the MTV program during a
recess, he brought the trial to a close without permitting April to testify. 182 He
said he understood the case already:
COURT: What I have got here is a young lady who has decided to have
an alternative life style and the issue becomes is that life style, in fact,
detrimental to this child. You know, parents oftentimes are called upon
to make great sacrifices for their children. And when she was faced
with that, when some guy came to her and said I'm in love with you too
although you are married, you know, most people would have said,
well, hey, I'm married; forget it. But, no, she decides, well, why not.
I'll just-I'll have both of them. I can have my cake and eat it too.
Well, parents can't do that. Parents have to set the correct examples for
the kids. And part of the statute says that you have to be concerned
with the moral upbringing of the child.183
He said the court must intervene on behalf of the child's best interests:
COURT: So here is how we are going to resolve this, folks: Custody of
176. Transcript, In the Matter ofAM (No. K1719).
177. See Respondent Natural Mother's Motions for an Immediate Hearing, In the Matter of
A.M., No. K1719 (Juv. Ct., Memphis and Shelby County, Tenn., Apr. 16, 1999).
178. Gerard, supra note 175. The Stonewall riots, which took place when New York City
police tried to close down the Stonewall Inn in Greenwich Village on June 27, 1969, are now
popularly imagined to have been the birth of the lesbian and gay rights movement. Introduction:
Stonewall at 25, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 277, 278 (1994).
179. See Transcript, In the Matter of A.M (No. K1719).
180. Asa Hoke, Asa's Updates (Apr. 22, 1999) (on file with author); see also Cloud, supra
note 125, at 91.
181. April filed a motion to dismiss alleging violations of her rights under the First, Fourth,
Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as Article I, § 8 of the Tennessee Constitution; a
motion to dismiss the complaint "for wrongful deprivation of child without due process"; and
"alternatively," a motion "to return child immediately as a result of findings of no harm."
Transcript, In the Matter of A.M (No. K 1719).
182. Id.
183. Id.
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the child is going to be placed with the Department of Children's
Services with an extended visit in the grandmother's home until such
time as the mother resolves her situation. 
184
Despite April's attorney's protests that April, Shane, and Chris were not all
sleeping together, the judge concluded:
COURT: Now I am not about to put that child back into a situation
where all three of these people are in the same bed. She has got a legal
husband. Make a choice. It is just that simple.185
April did not appeal the decision.
The editors of Loving More Magazine offered me a number of explanations
for April's decision not to appeal. Brett Hill, a coeditor of Loving More
Magazine, said that they ran out of money and that the ACLU and other gay
rights organizations "would not touch" the case. 186 Ryam Nearing, Loving More
Magazine's other coeditor, wrote to say that money was not a problem, but that
the mother eventually gave up the legal fight and allowed her child to remain
with the biological grandmother. 18 7
2. A Four-Partner Family: Eddie Simmons
Eddie Simmons is part of a four-person partnership: "My family consists of
myself, two other men, and a woman." 188 The woman and one of the men-
Amber and Adam-have the oldest relationship of the group. At the beginning
of their relationship twenty years ago, Adam told Amber that he was bisexual
and hoped to have a relationship with a man as well. According to Eddie, at that
time there was "no word 'polyamory' yet," though "these relationships have
always been there."' 189 Fifteen years ago, Eddie, who is also bisexual, met Adam
and Amber through the bisexual community in the city where they live; they
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. E-mail from Brett Hill, Editor, LOVING MORE MAG., to the author (Nov. 26, 2000) (on
file with author).
187. E-mail from Ryam Nearing, Editor, LOVING MORE MAG., to the author (Nov. 28, 2000)
(on file with author).
188. Telephone Interview with Eddie Simmons (Nov. 28, 2000) [hereinafter Simmons
Interview]. Eddie is open about his relationships and kindly took the time to speak freely with me
about his family. He asked that I change the names in this piece, however, because other members
of his family are open to varying degrees to their families and coworkers. The names in this
Subsection are therefore fictional, though the individuals represented are not. The difficult issues
surrounding the dilemma of whether to come out as poly are the focus of the fifteenth issue of
Loving More magazine. For an overview, see the editors' introduction. Ryam Nearing & Brett
Hill, About This Issue, LovING MORE MAG., Fall 1998, at 2, 2.
189. Simmons Interview, supra note 188.
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have been together as a family since that time. Eddie, Adam, and Amber had no
intention of expanding their family, but about three and a half years ago, they
met a doctoral candidate named Mike who "adored the concept of our family"
and wanted to become a part of it. 190 Mike first became "involved" with Eddie,
then with Adam, and then Amber "got to know him."
191
"There are many flavors of polyamory," Eddie says; "mine is only one."'192
On the emotional level, "each of us [has] a relationship to the other three" and
"each two has a relationship that is distinctly ours."' 193 Eddie, Adam, and Amber
also have some history that Mike is not yet a part of, so to an extent, there are
threes that also have distinct emotional relationships. On the sexual level, Eddie,
Adam, and Mike all sleep together in various combinations, and they "all have
outside sexual relationships that we disclose to each other."' 194  Eddie
emphasized the importance of disclosing to outsiders that "they are not getting
involved with someone with whom they are going to have a monogamous
relationship."' 195 In Eddie's words, Amber "is not poly, and is not bi," but "she
does not need the person she's with to be the same way." 196 On the legal level,
Adam and Amber are married, "which was something they did to get health
insurance basically."'197 No one else in the family has legal ties, and no one else
could be married under current U.S. marriage laws. For a while, Adam and
Eddie considered having a "commitment ceremony." 198 Eddie laughs, "My dad
imagined that we were about to do something illegal, but of course we can't get
married anyway. His brain kind of tipped over. We can't do polygamy because
it's not legal." 199
Though the "media loves sex," Eddie (like many other polys20 0) reports that
one of the biggest issues for polys is scheduling. Eddie says, "If you want to get
rid of the press in a hurry, tell them that the big issue in your relationship is time
management." 20 1 Eddie's family's approach to time management has changed
over the years: "It's looked very different at different times."20 2  Currently,
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. On a relevant variation in the legal definition of bigamy, see supra note 158.
Eddie's family has also had other law-related concerns about the arrangement. When his parents'
lawyer found out about the relationship, he "blew his top." The lawyer said that Eddie's parents
need "to protect [their] son's inheritance" from the "golddiggers." Id.
200. See, e.g., Terry Brussel Gibbons, Love on Schedule, LoVING MORE MAG., Summer 1997,
at 18. The theme of this issue of Loving More Magazine is "Time Enough for Love?"
201. See Simmons Interview, supra note 188.
202. Id.
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Eddie, Adam, and Amber live in the same apartment house-with Eddie in the
apartment directly above Adam and Amber-and Mike lives in a nearby suburb.
Eddie sees Adam and Amber "several times a week"; he and Amber "go out to
lunch or coffee"; and he and Adam "have some time together on Sunday
afternoon and evenings." 20 3 Adam sleeps with Eddie on Sunday night and other
times "depending on what's going on." 204 Mike and Adam spend Thursday
evening and nights together, and they often have supper on Wednesday night.
Sometimes they all "do things as a family on Saturday, or sometimes
Sunday." 20 5 Noting that poly relationships are a lot of trouble, Eddie observes,
"In my experience, [all] relationships are very hard work if they're going to
last." 206 In addition, he found monogamy to be not a "panacea" but a "bore." He
is quick to say that is "strictly a statement for myself."
20 7
Eddie says the reason the relationship has worked is that they are all people
"who are a little older," have different relationships and histories, and have "a
clear sense of self."'20 8 They are all "process queens."' 20 9 Therapy forms an
important part of their lives. They are all in therapy, and they do family therapy.
They all "come from a perspective that that's a good thing to do, not just
something you do because you're in some kind of crisis."2 10 He talks about
having met another poly family years ago who had one HIV-positive family
member, and being impressed with the "amount of human resources they
had."'2 11 Eddie feels that two-parent families are not "a very good model" for
raising children, and something like a kibbutz model would be better. He
considers himself lucky: "I live in a city where there is an active poly
community."
2 12
3. A Mormon Wife: Elizabeth Joseph
Elizabeth Joseph is a lawyer who lives in Big Water, Utah, with her husband
Alex and his eight other wives. 2 13 She writes, "Polygamy, or plural marriage, as
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. The term "process queen" describes someone committed to discussing and working
out conflicts with other people-it comes from the use of the word "process" as a verb. The term
is often used in a tone of fond self-mockery.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. The sources for this Section are an article that Joseph published in the New York Times
in 1991, Elizabeth Joseph, My Husband's Nine Wives, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1991, at A31, and an
article that appeared in Redbook several months later, Mary-Lou Weisman, The Tenth Wife,
REDBOOK, Nov. 1991, at 90. My description of Joseph's polygynous family, like the other
accounts of individual relationships in this Section, is written in the present tense, based on the
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practiced by my family is a paradox. At first blush, it sounds like an ideal
situation for the man and an oppressive one for the women. For me, the opposite
is true."2 14  She depicts her situation as bridging old and new: "While
polygamists believe that the Old Testament mandates the practice of plural
marriage, compelling social reasons make the life style attractive to the modem
career woman." 2 15  In Joseph's eyes, monogamous women must make
compromises to have it all:
Pick up any women's magazine and you will find article after article
about the problems of successfully juggling career, motherhood, and
marriage. It is a complex act that many women struggle to manage
daily .... In a monogamous context, the only solutions are
compromises. The kids need to learn to fix their own breakfast, your
husband needs to get used to occasional microwave dinners, you need
to divert more of your income to insure that your pre-schooler is in a
good day care environment. 216
By contrast, she sees polygamy as providing "a whole solution." 217 While it
"offers men the chance to escape from the traditional, confining roles that often
isolate them from the surrounding world," more importantly to Joseph, "it
enables women, who live in a society full of obstacles, to fully meet their career,
mothering and marriage obligations. '" 21
8
Joseph describes the structure of her life in terms both warm and functional.
She writes, "When I leave for the 60-mile commute to court at 7 A.M., my 2-
year-old daughter, London, is happily asleep in the bed of my husband's wife,
Diane. London adores Diane." 219 "When London awakes," Joseph continues,
"about the time I'm arriving at the courthouse, she is surrounded by family
members who are as familiar to her as the toys in her nursery." 220 According to
an article by Mary-Lou Weisman published in Redbook, eight of the nine wives
work full-time, and the ninth, Leslie, works part-time and gets paid by the others
to babysit.221 Elizabeth Joseph shares a home with another wife, Delinda, and in
the evenings they usually eat "a simple dinner" together with their three kids:
"We'd rather relax and commiserate over the pressures of our work day than
state of her family at the time of the articles describing that family. A recent local news story
indicates that Joseph's husband died in 1998 and that Joseph and the other wives went their
separate ways; Joseph has been living as a single mother. Dawn House, Sister Widows: Wives of
Dead Polygamist Rebuild Their Lives, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 24, 2002, available at
http://www.polygamyinfo.com/plygmedia%2002%2029trib.htm.
214. Joseph, supra note 213, at A31.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Weisman, supra note 213, at 92.
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chew up our energy cooking and doing a ton of dishes." 222 Joseph says with an
air of solemnity, "Mondays, however, are different. That's the night Alex eats
with us." 223 She describes these evenings as "special," with the kids "excited"
and "on their best behavior," because these occasions come "only... once a
week. ,,2 24
The sex, Joseph says, is by appointment rather than schedule. "If I want to
spend Friday evening at his house, I make an appointment. If he's already
'booked,' I either request another night or if my schedule is inflexible, I talk to
the other wife and we work out an arrangement." 225 She observes, "One thing
we've all learned is that there's always another night." 226 She says the situation
meets her needs:
Most evenings, with the demands of career and the literal chasing after
the needs of a toddler, all I want to do is collapse into bed and sleep.
But there is also the longing for intimacy and comfort that only he can
provide, and when those feelings surface, I ask to be with him.227
According to Weisman's Redbook article, there has been group sex in which
"some, but not all, of the wives participated. 228 Diane reported that group sex
was initially "'threatening,' but then, in addition to pleasure, she found that the
activity had the unanticipated effect of reducing sexual jealousy among the
women involved. ' 229 Joanna, another wife, told Weisman that "group sex is
now 'pretty much a thing of the past,"' and Weisman reports that the initial
sexual jealousy among the wives has dissipated "now that everyone's an old
married couple." 230 Weisman observes that "jealousy constellates around issues
other than sex," such as looks, fertility, brains, income, and youth.231
Despite any sexual or nonsexual jealousy, the wives appear to cherish their
relationships with one another. Joseph describes with great satisfaction the
simplicity and comfort of her home with Delinda. 232 According to Weisman,
"Female friendship is the great reward that lies at the heart of polygamy." 233
Joanna observes, "'Women in monogamous relationships tell me that they find it
222. Joseph, supra note 213, at A31.
223. id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Weisman, supra note 213, at 102.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Joseph, supra note 213, at A31.
233. Weisman, supra note 213, at 104. Nineteenth-century writings in support of Mormon
polygamy also celebrated this aspect of the relationships. See, e.g., Iversen, supra note 44, at 516-
18 (reporting that "throughout the polygamy literature, one finds extraordinary stories and
examples of cooperation among women").
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difficult to maintain their female friendships."' 234  By contrast, Weisman
presents the friendship between Joseph and Delinda as "an extreme expression of
the kind of love that can exist between wives." 235  Weisman offers as an
example Delinda's decision to make a baby for Joseph, who was having trouble
conceiving. This is how Joseph became the mother of London: Delinda
conceived the child with Alex. "Lindi says she has no difficulty thinking of
London as Eli[zabeth]'s child. 'Giving London to Eli was the proudest thing I
did,' she says." 2
36
Alex is a former fundamentalist Mormon who broke off to start his own
church.237 According to Weisman, "Whatever their religious backgrounds, the
invisible cord that binds these women to one another and to Alex in what some
would call unholy matrimony is their extraordinary conviction that he is not just
a husband-he is a god."'238  Joseph's article, by contrast, says little about
religion. While some wives have apparently not liked the family arrangement
(Alex has been divorced eight times, which Weisman notes "puts him about even
with the national divorce rate"239), the current nine wives report satisfaction with
sharing him. "Eli recalls with a shudder the taste of monogamy she got when
she went away with Alex on a two-week trip. 'Little things about him began to
grate on my nerves. We ran out of things to talk about."' 240 Although none of
the wives has ever been in a monogamous relationship, "they are convinced that
monogamy is monotony." 241 Weisman concludes that "[a]ll nine wives are
equally convinced that polygamy is God's gift to modem woman."2 42 In her
account, Joseph is more sanguine, saying, "Plural marriage is not for everyone.
But it is the life style for me." 243
4. An Ethical Slut: Dossie Easton
Dossie Easton, coauthor of The Ethical Slut,24 4 describes her poly
awakening and her current struggles to live a polyamorous lifestyle by
234. Weisman, supra note 213, at 104.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. According to Weisman, Alex Joseph was born into the Greek Orthodox faith, then
joined the Church of LDS as a young adult. Four years later, he joined the Fundamentalist
Mormons, who still practice polygamy despite the teachings of the official Church of LDS. See
supra note 117. Later, he broke off from the Fundamentalists and "founded his own church"
because "he did not like the way they oppressed their wives and children." Weisman, supra note
213, at 92.
238. Weisman, supra note 213, at 100.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 104.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Joseph, supra note 213, at A31.
244. DosSIE EASTON & CATHERINE A. LISZT, THE ETHICAL SLUT: A GUIDE TO INFINITE
SEXUAL POSSIBILITIES (1997).
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explaining her thoughts during one painful night with her primary lover, whom
Easton does not name but calls her "most beloved partner"245 or simply her
"lover." 246 The night before, Easton had sex with her longtime friend, coauthor,
and occasional sexual partner, Catherine. On this night, Easton's primary lover,
with whom she is in an expressly nonmonogamous relationship, is struggling to
deal with her emotions about Easton's liaison with Catherine. "My lover is late
coming home," Easton writes, "I hope she is all right-this morning she left in
tears." 247 Easton explains, "I am asking my lover to go through the fire for
reasons most of the rest of the world consider frivolous if not downright
reprehensible-I am asking my lover to suffer because I hate monogamy."
248
Easton rejected monogamy after a brutally possessive relationship:
I have hated monogamy for twenty-seven years, since I left my
daughter's violent father, fighting my way out of the door, bruised and
pregnant, promising anything, promising I would call my parents for
money, lying. After I escaped Joe he sent me suicide threats, and
threatened murder-one time he almost found us and set fires around
the house he thought we were still in.
Joe was very possessive. Initially I found this attractive, proof positive
that he really cared about me....
... He would beat me, screaming imprecations, "You slut!" when
another man looked at me.249
Although she was "perfectly faithful" to Joe, Easton says, "After I left, I decided
he was right-I am a slut, I want to be a slut, I will never promise monogamy
again.... I will never be a piece of property again." 250  She describes her
response to this experience in political and philosophical terms:
Joe made a feminist of me. A feminist slut. This was in San Francisco
in 1969, so I decided to invent a new lifestyle.... I vowed to remain
single for five years in order to figure out who I am when I am running
my own life. I made a life creed out of looseness. 251
Despite her commitment to nonmonogamy, Easton still has doubts about her
choices, particularly during this difficult night with her lover: "Why did I insist
on doing this? I'm in no way perishing from unfulfilled lust. I actually wasn't
245. Id. at 11.
246. Id. passim.
247. Id. at 9.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 9-10.
250. Id. at 10.
251. Id.
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even particularly horny, or salivating for Catherine and Catherine only."252
Catherine and Easton have had a sexual relationship as long as they have known
each other; "that is part of how we write books, and how we are the dearest of
friends." 253 Easton writes that she and Catherine "have been patiently waiting to
resume that relationship when my newfound and most beloved partner was
ready." 254 Easton's optimism that her lover was ready stemmed from her lover's
growing comfort with nonmonogamy:
My lover has already conquered the terrors of group sex-tomorrow we
will have another couple over for dinner and my birthday spanking,
which she herself arranged with no egging on from me. She never was
embarrassed at orgies, much to her own amazement. Within the last
year she has had more new sexual experiences than possibly she had in
the previous forty-eight years, and taken to it all like a duck to water.25
5
Thus, Easton's lover seemed to be adjusting to nonmonogamy.
But this situation-"her lover having a date with one other person" 256-was
possibly too much for Easton's lover. "She has trouble accepting me having sex
that doesn't include her, has trouble feeling left out, has trouble that we are doing
it in our home this time, not neutral territory." 257 Again, while waiting for her
lover to express herself, Easton wonders if she has made a mistake, asking
herself, "how could I hurt her like this? '2 58 She further reflects on her reasons
for choosing nonmonogamy:
When I decided to create my new way twenty-five years ago, I figured
that I would never again take my security from my relationship,
particularly not from the sexual exclusivity of my relationship. Joe had
cheated on me, I knew that, it didn't even bother me very much. I sort
of expected it. I resented those cultural values that said that my sense
of security and self-worth were contingent on the status of whatever
man I managed to attract to me, as if I had no status of my own. So I
vowed to discover a security in myself, the stable ground of my very
own being, something to do, I thought, with self-respect and self-
acceptance.
259
Easton found love and support in the communal atmosphere of San Francisco of
1969. "I figured I would get my support from my extended family, my kinship
network that consisted of everybody that I was connected to, through friendship,
252. Id. at 10-11.
253. Id. at 11.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 11-12.
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communal living, coparenting, and/or sex. And it worked." 260
When her lover is finally ready to talk, the process is painful. "I listened,"
Easton says, "This time I listened, without interrupting, trying only to let her
know that I love her, I feel her pain, I am here for her-this is very painful. She
is furious with me and I am not giving myself permission to defend myself, and I
hurt." 261 Easton explains:
This story has no tidy ending-we talked for hours, or maybe I listened,
and I heard how difficult it was for her, how she felt invaded, how she
felt her home was not safe, how she feared that my other lover would
not like her, how she felt attacked by her and me both, how very much
she feared I was abandoning her. We came to no pat little answers that
make good stories for books-we just poured out anguish, and went to
sleep exhausted. We woke up the next morning feeling better, but still
not over it-the issue resurfaced occasionally for the next couple of
days. The birthday party helped, a subsequent date with Catherine and
her girlfriend and my lover and me helped, although it was difficult.
262
Easton's conclusion is tentative: "My lover and I are still in love, and still
working on it. We are committed to this relationship, and to working through
our differences with compassion for each other and ourselves. I am from time to
time terrified that she will leave me, just because I hate monogamy." 263
C. Theory
As the preceding narratives suggest, polyamory is not only a practice. For
some, it is a theory of relationships. In an effort to organize and explain the
contours of that theory, this Section sketches five principles espoused by
contemporary polys. These principles, which I have extracted from a range of
poly writings and comments, are presented by polys as both aspirational and
descriptive. That is, experienced polys tend to present these principles as tools
for making polyamorous relationships work (aspirational), based on their
experience in and around functioning polyamorous relationships (descriptive).
And the principles are aspirational in another way. They are offered by polys
not only as functional tools for creating and sustaining intimacy among multiple
people; they also represent an ethical vision of how those relationships should be
conducted.
To my knowledge, there are no studies of the content of contemporary
polyamorous relationships. For this and other reasons, such as the wide variety
of poly relationships, my purpose in presenting these principles is not to say that
poly relationships all successfully embody these ideas. Rather, my purpose is to
260. Id. at 12.
261. Id. at 13.
262. Id. at 13-14.
263. Id. at 14.
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show the seriousness with which some polys have considered the ethical and
practical questions of how multiparty relationships should be conducted, and to
convey some of the answers they have developed thus far.
These five principles come from no one source but instead represent my
attempt to synthesize the content of many sources. The principles are self-
knowledge, radical honesty, consent, self-possession, and privileging love and
sex. These principles are of course not unique to polys; on the contrary, most of
them are embraced by many monogamous couples. The poly privileging of
more loving and sexual experiences over other activities and emotions, such as
jealousy, is the most particular to polyamory, and the other principles have
particular applications, meanings, and significance in the poly context. This
Section considers each principle in turn.
1. Self-Knowledge
Self-knowledge is portrayed by polyamorists not only as valuable, but as
necessary. In her foundational book, Polyamory, the New Love Without Limits:
Secrets of Sustainable Intimate Relationships, Deborah Anapol outlines "Eight
Steps to Successful Polyamory," the first of which is to "Know yourself."
' 2 64
This dictate operates on two levels. The first level involves understanding one's
own sexual identity. This no doubt comprises knowledge of one's "sexual
orientation" as we typically use the term-as in heterosexual, bisexual, or
homosexual-but also, more importantly, it encompasses self-knowledge about
one's sexual identity with regard to monogamy. As discussed in Part IV, some
polys embrace the view that you either are poly or you are not,265 whereas other
poly writings characterize monogamy and polyamory more as choices or
constructed identities. 266  Regardless, whether they understand "poly" and
"mono" identities as hardwired or chosen, polys call for an interrogation of one's
own identity.
Polys also value self-knowledge as the core structural component, and the
daily substrate, of healthy, successful relationships. Understanding oneself and
listening to one's own feelings are vital to the process of working through the
"baggage" of living in a monogamous world. Anapol instructs, as another of her
eight steps to success, "Let jealousy be your teacher."267 Rather than deny the
existence of emotions like jealousy, polys encourage an honest interrogation of
these feelings. Individuals in any form of relationship may of course aspire to
and attain self-knowledge. But polys, in order to do all that "processing," have a
264. ANAPOL, supra note 127, at 32. The other steps that Anapol identifies are as follows:
heal yourself, replace guilt and shame with self-acceptance and love, open yourself to sexual
energy, let jealousy be your teacher, choose a spiritual path, and look at the big picture. Id. at 31-
48.
265. See infra notes 398-403 and accompanying text.
266. See infra notes 361-66, 403 and accompanying text.
267. ANAPOL, supra note 127, at 43.
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particularly strong need for constant access to their feelings and desires.
2. Radical Honesty
The poly ethic of honesty also operates on two levels: a broader
philosophical position and a daily practice of living. The structural critique may
be understood partly as a reaction to the gap between the fantasy and the reality
of compulsory monogamy. The judge in the Divilbiss case criticized April for
her "immoral" response to a man's attentions: "[W]hen some guy came to her
and said I'm in love with you too although you are married, you know, most
people would have said, well, hey, I'm married; forget it." 268 In response, a poly
might assert instead: "The judge has it wrong. Most people would have said,
'Well, hey, I'm married, so we'll have to keep this a secret.'
269
One theory of polyamory views the entire culture as basically polyamorous
but dishonest about it. In the words of Deborah Anapol, "Lies, deceit, guilt,
unilateral decisions and broken commitments are so commonplace in classic
American-style monogamy that responsible nonmonogamy may sound like an
oxymoron."270 The weak form of this claim is that serial monogamy is in a
sense polyamory. That is, almost no one settles down with the first person she
has sex with, no one is truly supermonogamous, and so everyone is really
polyamorous. The stronger claim, however, is that many people are
polyamorous in the sense that they feign simple monogamy while practicing
nonmonogamy. They lie to their partners and to the world.271 Thus, radical
honesty is a philosophical and practical approach to living that involves
admitting and embracing nonmonogamy. For many polys, honesty is so central
to polyamory that they would object to the use of the term polyamory
independent of honesty, protesting that honesty is a definitional element of
polyamory. For example, one posting on a popular polyamory webpage says, "A
great many people have secret affairs while they're in a supposedly
monogamous relationship. I think those people might have the potential to be
polyamorous, but I do not think they are practicing polyamory." 272
Brad Blanton is a writer praised by some polys for his books on "radical
honesty." 273 His books outline a philosophy of absolute honesty and of honesty
268. For the full quotation, see supra text accompanying note 183.
269. Cf, e.g., Stelboum, supra note 101, at 44 ("In those cultures that regard monogamy as
ideal, non-monogamy is widely practiced, secretly.").
270. ANAPOL, supra note 127, at 3.
271. See MAILLU, supra note 100, at 29-32 (making this point in an argument for structural
polygamy).
272. Matthesen, supra note 130 (quoting a post to the alt.polyamory newsgroup by Stef).
273. See Thomas Burgio, Coming Out Going In: True Confessions of a Polyamorous
Bodyworker, LovNG MORE MAG., Fall 1998, at 13, 13. Blanton's books include BRAD BLANTON,
RADICAL HONESTY: How To TRANSFORM YOUR LIFE BY TELLING THE TRUTH (1997), and BRAD
BLANTON, PRACTICING RADICAL HONESTY: How To COMPLETE THE PAST, LIVE IN THE PRESENT,
AND BUILD A FUTURE (2000) [hereinafter BLANTON, PRACTICING RADICAL HONESTY]. The "About
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as a revolutionary way to improve oneself and the world. Radical honesty,
Blanton tells us, "involves not denying or avoiding anything, particularly anger
that comes from attachment to the one true way we all seem to come up with
every fifteen seconds. It involves clearing our way back to contact with each
other through honesty about what we think and feel and do ... ."274 Many of the
examples of life changes made by participants in Blanton's workshops include
spouses who admit their affairs, prompting the couples either to turn a failed
marriage into a positive honest one275 or to split up and try to find new, more
honest, relations elsewhere.
276
Whether or not they particularly follow Blanton, polys tend to privilege
honesty as the foundation of positive relationships. The Loving More
mission statement names "honesty" and "openness" first among the bases of
relationships. 277  Likewise, Deborah Anapol encourages would-be polys to
"[m]aster the art of communicating," 278 and warns of the dangers of keeping
secrets:
My experience is that neither intentional communities nor intimate
networks can survive, let alone thrive, without a free flow of
information within their boundaries. A withhold is just as destructive in
a group of intimate friends (whether or not they are sexually involved)
as it is in a couple or a nuclear family and for the same reasons. Secrets
and lies destroy intimacy, erode trust, create paranoia, and ultimately
strangle the life out of relationships. And when sex and love are
involved, nothing puts an end to passion more effectively than a
withhold.279
Although radical honesty need not mean radical disclosure, 280 a wide variety of
the Author" page at the back of Blanton's most recent book tells the reader:
I've been married 4 times and divorced 3 times, and am currently separated from my
most recent wife. We were together for 21 years. We are on somewhat amicable terms
and do not know yet whether we will divorce. I am currently sexually and emotionally
involved with several women and they all know about each other, and some of them
know each other. I have 5 kids ranging in age from 7 years old to 31 years old. I love
them with all of my heart. They are the teachers to whom I am most grateful and from
whom I have learned the very most. They continue to teach me.
BLANTON, PRACTICING RADICAL HONESTY, supra, at 343-44.
274. BLANTON, PRACTICING RADICAL HoNEsTY, supra note 273, at 338.
275. E.g., id. at 24.
276. E.g., id at 25 ("A woman diagnosed by physicians with arthritis told the truth to her
husband about an affair she had been hiding for a long time. They eventually split up, but her
'arthritis' went away. Her next relationship was one of more honesty, less pain and illness, and
more creativity in a shared life together.").
277. LOVING MORE, supra note 126; see also text accompanying note 302.
278. ANAPOL, supra note 127, at 37.
279. Deborah Anapol, Privacy: When Are Secrets Lies?, LOVING MORE MAG., Fall 1998, at 9,
10. The author describes a "withhold" as "a judgment, an opinion, an emotional reaction which is
not shared because of 'politeness,' fear of rocking the boat, or simply lack of consciousness." Id.
280. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 293-95 (describing ways of thinking about
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poly writings invokes honesty as a key principle for relationships. 28' As Eddie
Simmons emphasized, a great deal of therapy and communication-the
cherished tools of process queens-sustains his family.282 For one contributor to
Loving More Magazine, expressing her views on honesty is a key reason to be
out as poly: "I love being in situations where it is respected that we are a group
marriage. Those are my favorites. There I can really shine about my life's
primary focus, the legitimacy of polygamy and the absolute need for honesty in
intimate relationships.
'
"
283
Of course, polys are not alone in recognizing the value of honesty. But a
heightened emphasis on communication is highly characteristic of polys, and
openness about nonmonogamy is the most distinctive aspect of poly honesty.
Indeed, the latter commitment prompts polys to describe their honesty as
"radical." Note, however, that if society presumed nonmonogamy, then it might
be radical to embrace and admit openly a commitment to monogamy. In this
way, the radicalness of poly honesty is contingent.
3. Consent
Honesty is also something more than the transmission of information in
polyamorous relationships. In this context, honesty forms the basis of consent.
The ideal of consent-that partners in a relationship or a sexual encounter make
an informed decision to participate in the relationship or the encounter, including
knowing its polyamorous context-pervades poly writing, both implicitly and
explicitly. 284 For instance, Dr. Joy Davidson presents "Negotiating and making
agreements" as one of the key relationship challenges for polyamorous
relationships, emphasizing that "each agreement is a reminder that consent is at
the heart of successful poly relating" and that "consent must be given at an
explicit and detailed level. ' '28 5 From her perspective as a clinical psychologist
privacy and disclosure within a relationship that aim to maintain boundaries between individuals).
281. See, e.g., Janet Kira Lessin, The Perils and Pearls of Polyamory, LOVING MORE MAG.,
Fall 2000, at 26, 27 ("Pearl 6: Always be honest."); EASTON & LISZT, supra note 244, at 61-62.
282. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
283. The Dragon Bear Family, A MultiPlex Perspective on Living Out, LOVING MORE MAG.,
Fall 1998, at 14 (quoting the portion labeled Poohzen's Perspective).
284. See, e.g., EASTON & LISZT, supra note 244, at 21-22; Tibbetts, supra note 27, at I
(defining polyamory as "ethical nonmonogamy (practicing extradyadic relationships with mutual
consent among those involved)").
285. Joy Davidson, Working with Polyamorous Clients in the Clinical Setting, ELECTRONIC J.
OF HUM. SEXUALITY, Apr. 16, 2002, http://www.ejhs.org/volume5/polyoutline.html (identifying,
within a discussion of consent and relationship agreements, the following "issues often taken for
granted in monogamy [that] require exhaustive processing in poly": "Time and Resources: how
much should be expended on whom?[;] Sex: what type of sex is OK, with whom and under what
circumstances? (i.e., male or female, casual, party, bdsm play w/ or w/o genital contact,
penetration, etc.)[;] Safer sex: medical issues, contraception[;] Disclosure: how much
sexual/emotional disclosure about other partners is desired; how much is too much?[;] Relating to
a lover's other partners: to what extent? meet them before sexual activity occurs?[;] Belongings
and personal space considerations: i.e., 'No, your lover can't wear my bathrobe to get in and out of
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who works with polyamorous partners, Singer also emphasizes the importance of
distinguishing between "true consent" and "[c]oerced consent," noting that
"[t]herapists may see clients whose relationships reflect manipulation,
dishonesty, or other dysfunctional patterns that are no more representative of
healthy poly than healthy monogamy." 286 Though individual poly relationships
may not always embody true consent, this ideal is a vital part of the relationship
models to which polys aspire.
Consent is also of vital importance in nonpoly relationships, of course. In a
simple way, the poly emphasis on consent is another part of the poly critique of
the secretive nonmonogamy practiced by some purported monogamists. But the
poly attention to consent runs deeper than that. The prominence of the idea of
consent also stems from the poly emphasis on freedom of choice about
relationship norms and the importance of individual, rather than societal,
relationship expectations. Because no one relationship model provides a
blueprint for the number, shape, or type of bonds among individuals within and
without poly relationships, polys must develop their own models through the
agreement of the partners.
4. Self-Possession
A number of prominent poly writers describe their embrace of polyamory as
fueled by their insights about power and possessiveness in monogamy and by
their desire for autonomy within their relationships. This aspect of polyamory
builds in part on a feminist understanding of monogamy as a historical
mechanism for the control of women's reproductive and other labor.28 7 Judith
Stelboum writes, "Feminist scholars state that the origins of monogamy have
their source in patriarchal thinking. Viewed as the possessions of the male,
women were used for barter and/or procreation.... Legitimacy of a child relates
to acknowledgement of the child's father, not to the child's mother." '2 8 8 In light
of these accounts of the patriarchal origins and functions of monogamy,
the hot tub,' or, 'Yes, it's Ok if you and he make love in our bed.'[;] Integrating new partners with
family and friends: if, when, how?[;] Parity: attaining relative equivalence in extra-dyadic
relationships; addressing the ramifications of lack of parity[;] Veto Power: who has the right to say
'no' to a partner's choice of another?").
286. Id.; see also Strassberg, supra note 8, at 508 (expressing concern that partners in larger
polyfidelitous relationships may be subject to coercive group practices).
287. See, e.g., ANAPOL, supra note 127, at 47 ("Monogamous marriage as we know it today
is based on patterns established in Biblical times governing men's ownership of women. In
Biblical days the law prescribed that women be stoned to death for taking a lover, but men were
allowed as many secondary wives or concubines as they could afford. For most of recorded
history, the absolute authority of the husband over his wife has been taken for granted and male
violence against disobedient wives has been considered natural and right."); see also Robinson,
supra note 40, at 144 (arguing that "institutionalized monogamy has not served women's best
interests. It privileges the interests of both men and capitalism, operating as it does through the
mechanisms of exclusivity, possessiveness and jealousy, all filtered through the rose-tinted lens of
romance.").
288. Stelboum, supra note 101, at 42.
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Stelboum seeks to explain why so many contemporary lesbians adopt
monogamy: "The implications of the historical prerogative of male inheritance
have little relevance for the lesbian community, but the social values and
behavioral modes of the dominant heterosexual community have been firmly
implanted within most of the lesbian population."289 In response, she offers
several purposes of nonmonogamy in lesbian relationships, including as a
political statement against the "confining heterosexual models of monogamy,"
and as "a way for two women to define autonomy within a coupled situation and
avoid the intense bonding typical of some lesbian partners." 290
In an essay aimed at helping couples lessen jealousy in their relationships,
Marny Hall paints a similar portrait of polyamory as a useful way to create
individual space and autonomy within primary relationships. As a general
matter, she observes, new couples make decisions about what parts of their lives
they will share and what they will keep to themselves. "When partners first get
together, they may have different ideas about what is mine, yours, and ours.
Time, money, even how many daydreams to share are up for discussion....
[Ultimately, flor some couples, the 'us' pile is so huge it dwarfs both the 'me'
and 'her' stacks." 291 Couples make similar, though often tacit, decisions about
sex:
Acknowledged or not, many couples also have three sex stacks. There
is ours, yours, and my sex. Private sex may consist of a favorite fantasy
or a vibrator quickie after a girlfriend has gone to work. The erotic
activities in one's private domain are not exactly secret. But just as we
don't divulge the amount we paid for a pair of birthday earrings, we
don't announce every time we [masturbate]. 292
But, she observes, the privacy about certain details of a partner's sexual self does
not typically extend to encounters with other sexual partners. "Yet," Hall asks,
"what if it did? '293 Hall suggests that this approach would require "only [that
we] consciously extend the usual cultural rules about privacy-the ones that
already apply to our fantasies and our vibrator-to other sexual partners." 294
She describes several methods that couples use to create such privacy:
For example, some partners agree to being unaccountable to each other
during certain specified periods of time....
Still other partners prefer the information filter to be partial. In other
words, they prefer to know about the existence of other sexual partners
289. Id. at 44.
290. Id. at 45.
291. Mamy Hall, Turning Down the Jezebel Decibels, in THE LESBIAN POLYAMORY READER:
OPEN RELATIONSHIPS, NON-MONOGAMY, AND CASUAL SEX 47, 53 (1999).
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 54.
Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
[Vol. 29:277
MONOGAMY'S LA W
but want to be spared all the details....
Another couple consciously made information about outside sex
optional. Each kept a brief log of her encounters with other women.
Both partners' record books, which listed only names, places, and dates,
were left on top of the bookcase-available for either to check if she so
desired. One partner never checked the log. After a peek or two, the
other stopped....
Eager to maintain a high level of privacy and intimacy-and avoid the
schlep factor of crosstown apartments-[the partners in one couple] live
in separate flats in the same building [and have been together] for ten
years .... 295
Thus, in these open relationships, the possibility of outside lovers helped
partners resist the pressure (from either heterosexual tradition or the lesbian "U-
Haul Syndrome" 296) to merge into one being, and thus helped them preserve
their own privacy and separateness. In her therapeutic practice, Hall views
polyamory as more than just a means of strengthening or enhancing primary
relationships. She also recognizes its potential to instigate transitions out of
relationships when couples need to move on, as well its potential to create
partnerships of more than two. 2
97
For Dossie Easton and Deborah Anapol, realizations about the strictures of
monogamy came through their experience or study of domestic violence. As
described above, Easton devotes energy and emotion to preserving the
independence made possible by polyamory because an abusive relationship
opened her eyes to the control exerted in monogamous relationships.298 Anapol,
whose doctoral dissertation in clinical psychology focused on domestic violence,
identifies connections between the possessive claims of monogamy and the
cycles of abuse and violence in these relationships:
I married for the second time, trying to fit myself into the traditional
mold with an ambitious, personable husband and a house with a white
picket fence. He too had unfinished business with an old lover, but
while continued friendships were acceptable to him, extra-marital love
affairs were not. I was researching domestic violence for my doctoral
dissertation... and was horrified to realize that the dynamics of
domination, control, jealousy and dependency that I'd observed in
295. Id. at 54-55.
296. Munson & Stelboum, supra note 127, at 3 (explaining the U-Haul Syndrome as "a long-
joked-about tendency of lesbians to move in together on the second date").
297. See Hall, supra note 291, at 55-59.
298. See supra text accompanying notes 244-63.
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abusive marriages I was studying, existed, at a more moderate level, in
my own marriage.
299
These realizations were one factor which led Anapol to reject traditional
monogamy and pursue polyamory as a way to exercise greater personal
autonomy in her relationships.
5. Privileging Love and Sex
A crucial aspect of poly thinking, and the one most particular to polyamory,
is the idea that when it comes to sex and love, more expression and experience
may truly be better than less. One source of this philosophy is the various free
love movements of the 1960s. The science fiction writer Robert Heinlein
famously said, "'Love is that condition wherein another person's happiness is
essential to your own."' 300 One poly writer asserts that, in light of Heinlein's
"foundational premise, jealousy and possessiveness become seen [by our
community] not as symptoms of love, but as a pathology of insecurity." 30 1 This
idea, that more may be better, inspires the name of Loving More, as well as its
mission statement, which explains that the organization has
[A] specific vision of relationships based on honesty, openness, respect
for the individual, love as an infinite resource, the body and sexuality as
sacred, and relationship as a path to personal & spiritual growth. In this
vision, there's room for more love, more intimacy, more possibilities,
and more people.
Accordingly, there is also more responsibility and challenge: a deeply
personal challenge to transform ourselves, our lives, and our world into
a more loving and responsible place. 30 2
Eddie Simmons expressed a similar idea when he talked to me about his
realization some years ago that it is "very important to tell people" you love
them, to tell them "now rather than later." 303  For Eddie, AIDS created the
conditions for that understanding. He knows that he loves many people, and he
tells them so. 304
The practice of "loving more" may also generate more resources of many
kinds. Eddie suggested that he thought polyamory was a positive context in
which to raise children because polyamory provides so many resources for
299. ANAPOL, supra note 127, at 123.
300. Oberon Zell & Morning Glory Zell, Poly Advice: What Are Some of the Usual
Objections Raised Against the Poly Lifestyle?, LoviNG MORE MAG., Fall 1998, at 26, 26 (quoting,
in the portion labeled "Oberon," ROBERT HEINLEIN, STRANGER IN A STRANGE LAND (1961)).
301. Id.
302. LOViNG MORE, supra note 126.
303. Simmons Interview, supra note 188.
304. See id.
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caring. 30 5 Emphasizing the loving care her daughter receives while she is at
work, Elizabeth Joseph describes polygyny as a "whole solution" to the modem
woman's juggling act.306  Expressing a similar sentiment, psychotherapist
Marny Hall highlights the "resource-intensiveness" of three triads that she
interviewed:
When we think of threesomes, the metaphor of the third wheel-the
unwanted extra-immediately comes to mind. After my exposure to
these trios, however, the old metaphor never quite recovered its former
potency. On the contrary, the extra wheel was usually an asset.
Whenever a particular need arose, somebody was on hand to take care
of it. For example, if someone was short of cash that week, someone
else pitched in to cover household expenses. Ditto for emotional
support, sexual energy, child care help, even companionship.
30 7
When a community of people values the expression of love, polys would say, the
benefits accrue to all its members.
Love and sex are of course widely valued. But poly relationships, to a
greater extent than many monogamous relationships, privilege love and sex over
other feelings and activities. Polys privilege love insofar as they tend to
prioritize talking and other forms of creating and sustaining intimacy over other
activities. They therefore devote much time to processing everyone's
feelings. 30 8 As Hall said of the trios she interviewed, "[T]he trios required more
time for discussion about everything from hurt feelings to chores."
30 9
Polys truly seem distinct from most monos when it comes to sexual beliefs
and behavior. Rejecting the law of monogamy that allows one partner's jealousy
to trump another's outside sexual desires and experiences, 310 polys feel that
jealousy should be overcome to make room for more sexual and loving
possibilities. 3 1 1 Rather than assuming that a philandering partner should curb
305. See id.
306. See supra text accompanying note 217. Of course, there are other women with
experience in polygynous marriages who paint a very different picture. See, e.g., Carmen
Thompson & Celeste Fremon, Memories of a Plural Wife, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, Mar. 1, 1999, at
118. Tapestry of Polygamy is a Salt Lake City-based organization "offer[ing] assistance to women
and children leaving polygamy." See A Circle of Survivors: The Women Behind the Tapestry,
GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, Mar. 1, 1999, at 118. The group's members "wear purple ribbons to
symbolize their support of those still trapped in polygynous families." Id.
307. Hall, supra note 291, at 58.
308. See, e.g., supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
309. Hall, supra note 291, at 58.
310. See supra text accompanying note 45.
311. See, e.g., ANAPOL, supra note 127, at 49-52 ("Jealousy can be a potent reminder,....
letting us know we're heading in the wrong direction, for jealousy is the opposite of love....
Nearly everyone in our monogamous society learns early in life that lovers have exclusive rights.
We are conditioned to believe that if our beloved is interested in someone else, we may be
replaced. But this expectation of loss is learned, not hard wired, in both men and women. Imagine
a culture in which your partner's attraction to another signified opportunities for greater pleasure
and intimacy."); RONALD MAZUR, THE NEW INTIMACY: OPEN-ENDED MARRIAGE AND ALTERNATIVE
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her wandering impulse, 312 then, polys more often proceed from the assumption
that the jealous partner should work through his jealousy. As discussed below,
some polys report that they never feel jealous;313 more typically, though, polys
acknowledge jealousy and seek to understand and work through it. As noted
earlier, Anapol advises, "Let jealousy be your teacher." 314 Some poly writers
use the term "compersion" to describe a particular alternative or supplement to
jealousy: "Compersion... [is the] feeling of happiness in knowing that others
you love share joy with each other, especially taking joy in the knowledge that
your beloveds are expressing their love for one another. The opposite of
jealousy." 315  Polys generally aim to develop and expand their compersion,
while understanding, working through, and getting past jealous responses. In
this way, they reject the common belief that jealousy signifies love, and they
invert the standard hierarchy that lets jealousy trump desires for extrarelational
sexual experience.
IV.
THE PARADOX OF PREVALENCE
The previous discussion identified several elements of the puzzle of
polyamory's place outside the political debate over marriage. First, the
expectation of monogamy has a strong hold on this country's fantasies and
institutions. Second, that expectation is widely unfulfilled. Third, for some
people, polyamory exists as a viable relationship form with an articulated set of
ethical aspirations. In light of all this, I return to the question posed at the
beginning of this article: Why is the possibility that same-sex marriage might
lead to multiparty marriage such an effective rhetorical scare tactic for the
opponents of same-sex marriage? In this Part, I argue that the widespread
resistance to the idea of marriage among more than two people is actually the
result of monogamy's frequent failure. In a sense, the threat of polyamory stems
from its apparent prevalence.
LIFESTYLES 101 (1973) (offering a typology of forms of jealousy in order to help people overcome
it and to "work toward eliminating it in relationships"); CELESTE WEST, LESBIAN POLYFIDELITY
112 (1996) ("It is important to emphasize that in polyfidelity jealousy is drained of the fierce
poison of betrayal. Our jealousy is not embittered by broken monogamous vows. Since
polyfid~les are committed to one another's sexual freedom, we can only assume that each woman,
in acknowledging the right to her desires, may possibly act on them." (emphasis omitted)); id. at
136 ("The idea is to accept that your [ealous] feelings aren't so hot [and] to get on with your best
purposes in life. Your attention may jump erratically back to jealousy, especially at first, but the
mind's disc simply cannot hold two tracks at once . .
312. Cf supra text accompanying notes 41-48.
313. See infra text accompanying notes 404-07.
314. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
315. Los Angeles Poly Support, What Is Polyamory?, at http://www.laps.org/whatpoly.html
(last visited Apr. 26, 2004); see also The Polyamory Soc'y, Compersion Index,
http://www.polyamorysociety.org/compersion.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2004) (crediting the San
Francisco Keristan Commune with coining the term).
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Before explaining this argument, I consider in Section A some other
possible reasons for outsiders' response to polyamory. I conclude that these
reasons may contribute in some way to the response, but no one reason
adequately explains it. Drawing on sexuality theory developed around
homosexuality, Section B explains the distinction between universalizing and
minoritizing conceptions of identity, locates polyamory as a universalizing
discourse, and draws lessons from gay politics to explain how common ground
with the mainstream could be a political liability for polyamorists. Section C
presents a strand of poly thinking and writing that is minoritizing, and considers
its implications for disagreements about the definition of polyamory.
A. Possible Factors in the Response to Polyamory
There must be some readers who, before reading this article, already
believed polyamory to be a viable relationship model deserving the same public
respect as monogamous dyads. And there may be a few readers who, not having
heard of polyamory before, now believe that polyamorists deserve legal
recognition and protection in all imaginable contexts, such as marriage, custody,
and employment. 316 But I imagine these readers are few. Rather, I suspect that
most readers have serious reservations about the idea of polyamory as an
acceptable social practice, and would still hesitate to respond, "Why not?" or,
"Who cares?" to conservatives' warnings that same-sex marriage will lead to
legalized polygamy.3 17 While Part III responded to the common perception that
316. In a recent survey, responding polys reported that employment nondiscrimination was
one of their three highest priority legal issues. See infra note 415. One lawyer contributor to
Loving More Magazine suggests that talking about one's poly lifestyle might prompt a hostile
environment sex harassment claim. Rita Risser, Is It Harassment If You Say You're Poly?, 1 BEST
OF LOVING MORE 34 (1997). To prevent harassment claims, she advises that the "safe thing to do is
say nothing and live your life in the closet." Id. at 35. But since most people are not
"comfortable" being closeted, she lays out a "continuum of behavior from acceptable to
unacceptable." Id. Speaking philosophically is most acceptable. She describes the least
acceptable option as follows: "Most unacceptable is to volunteer sexual details, invite a co-worker
to attend a workshop or party, or invite someone to join you and your partner for a threesome in
the hottub." She adds, "It's probably not poly people who do this, but there are a number of cases
with a threesome theme." Id. Based on my research, no federal or state cases support the claim
that the suggestion of a threesome is, by itself, sufficient grounds for a successful harassment suit.
317. Contrast the response to the polygamy analogy-i.e., efforts by gay marriage proponents
to distinguish the two and further efforts by conservatives to align the two-to the widespread
response to Scalia's threat that Lawrence might lead to the invalidation of state laws proscribing
masturbation, Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2490 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See, e.g.,
Jan Glidewell, Let States Unite People and Religions Marry Them, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.),
Aug. 8, 2003, at 1 ("The degree of hysteria with which the recent Supreme Court decision striking
down antisodomy laws is symbolized by the dissenting opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia,
who feared that the decision would legalize, among other horrors, masturbation. Come on.
There's a state where masturbation is illegal? Where?"); Ampersand, Passing Thought on Scalia's
Dissent, at http://www.amptoons.com/blog/week_2003 06 29.html (June 30, 2003) ("You know,
we live in a remarkable age when a member of the Supreme Court-the member who is probably
the most admired by conservatives, who is often credited by left and right alike as one of the
sharpest conservative minds in the nation-writes that the Court shouldn't have ruled Texas' anti-
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polyamory is preposterous and trivial, this Section briefly discusses five further
reasons for the negative response to the practice. Of varying plausibility, each of
these deserves more sustained discussion than what follows. The purpose here is
not to refute these criticisms and concerns. Instead, the purpose is to show why
they cannot fully explain the largely negative response to polyamory.
First, some may think that a monogamous couple is the most efficient unit
for family formation. For instance, some may expect a larger foundational unit
to lead to shirking and excessive grabbing, as in a house of college students
where everyone takes more than he or she contributes, so that important
household work never gets done, dishes pile up, and so on.3 18 To avoid these
dead weight losses, the group may need to engage in a great deal of negotiating
and monitoring, leading to high transaction costs.3 19  Given the poly
commitment to processing everyone's emotions, polyamory may generate
disturbing visions of relationship by committee. But the efficiency arguments
can also go the other way. Polyamorous households can benefit from economies
of scale and specialization of labor. 320  And to someone who enjoys
processing, 321 more conversation may not be a cost but a valued good.
Second, polyamory may prompt an egalitarian objection that the traditional
form of polygamy involves one man dominating multiple wives. 322  From a
feminist perspective, traditional polygyny looks like the archetype of the
Sodomy law unconstitutional because such a ruling might get in the way of state laws outlawing
masturbation. Why is Scalia worried about preserving the states' rights to outlaw masturbation?
Why would anyone worry about that? It's masturbation, for pity's sake! Is there anywhere a less
harmful action, with less reason for government concern, than masturbation?") (emphasis omitted);
Roger L. Simon, Was Antonin Scalia Auditioning For Saturday Night Live... , at
http://rogerlsimon.com/archives/00000242.htm (June 27, 2003) ("Was Antonin Scalia auditioning
for Saturday Night Live... when he wrote in his dissenting opinion to yesterday's rejection of
anti-sodomy laws by the Supreme Court that it might lead to the legalization of
masturbation?! .... Pretty funny, Antonin-you just might open SNL if you keep it up!")
(emphasis omitted); This Week with George Stephanopoulos (ABC television broadcast, June 29,
2003) (statement of Fareed Zakaria) ("George, let me suggest to you this is the same slippery slope
argument[-]how do you rule out things like bigamy or bestiality[?] And it's true, whenever [you]
draw a line there's a danger of slippage. There's also, of course, danger of slippage on the other
side. That is to say, if you say it is all right for state legislatures to make criminal private intimate
acts between two gay men, shouldn't it also be all right for them to make criminal masturbation or
[miscegenation], interracial sex? This is Kennedy's point in, in the Supreme Court majority
opinion and Scalia, to his credit, is honest enough to [say] that, yes, he would like it to be all right
and constitutional for states in America to say interracial sex is in fact banned and criminal. So,
there's, there's a slippery slope on both sides of the argument.").
318. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1396 (1993).
319. Id.
320. See, e.g., Westley, supra note 84, at 71; supra text accompanying notes 214-24; see also
Strassberg, supra note 8, at 503 (asserting that the economic efficiency of polyamorous
relationships can make them financially difficult to exit); cf Ellickson, supra note 318, at 1395
(noting the possible efficiencies of multimember households, including efficiencies of scale,
specialization of labor, and increased dwelling space).
321. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
322. See supra text accompanying note 121.
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oppressive patriarchal family writ large. 323 But economists and legal scholars,
as well as practitioners of polygyny such as Elizabeth Joseph, have made the
opposite claim: polygyny may actually benefit women. 324  Gary Becker has
argued that polygyny benefits women because their potential income is greater
than it would be under monogamy. 325 Carol Rose and others have proposed that
polygynous marriage could give women more market choice, so that no woman
has to marry a "loutish" (lazy) man.326 Relatedly, in light of the widespread
imprisonment and impoverishment of African-American men, Adrienne Wing
has suggested that some African-American women might prefer polygynous
marriages to not finding an appealing husband at all.3 27 Moreover, Bonnie
323. See, e.g., Bergmann, supra note 113; Iversen, supra note 44, at 518 (observing that
"[o]ne cannot truly apply the term 'feminist' to the Mormon plural wives because feminism and
patriarchal religion are incompatible"); Collin O'Connor Udell, Intimate Association: Resurrecting
a Hybrid Right, 7 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 231, 283 (1998); cf SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE
MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA 47-49 (2001) (describing the popularity of comparisons between polygamy and slavery
in nineteenth century novels and political rhetoric). This criticism overlaps with the argument that
polygamy necessarily leads to despotism rather than democracy. See, e.g., Strassberg, supra note
8; Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy and Same-Sex
Marriage, 75 N.C. L. REv. 1501 (1997); Udell, supra, at 283.
324. See supra Section III.B.3.
325. See GARY S. BECKER, Polygamy and Monogamy in Marriage Markets, in A TREATISE ON
THE FAMILY 80, 81-104 (1991). But see Bergmann, supra note 113, at 145 (arguing that Becker's
economic analysis must be "grossly incomplete" because it appears to prove a conclusion that "we
know to be false"-that polygamy is better for women than monogamy); Westley, supra note 84,
at 72 (arguing that Becker ignores various benefits of monogamy such as stability and nurturing
and fails to recognize the potential pitfalls of a polygynous society in which poor men may resort
to violence to obtain wives).
326. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 VA. L.
REV. 421, 432 (1992) (pointing out that, under a system of one-man/one-woman marriage, some
women will end up with "loutish" husbands who do not share in household duties, and observing
that "even though they phrased it somewhat differently, some nineteenth-century Mormons
thought that the [men's] greater propensity for loutishness was a pretty good reason for plural
marriage, where the more cooperative [men] got lots of wives and the less cooperative ones
presumably got none"); see also Julie Dunfey, "Living the Principle" of Plural Marriage:
Mormon Women, Utopia, and Female Sexuality in the Nineteenth Century, 10 FEMINIST STUD. 523,
529 (1984) (reporting nineteenth-century Mormon women's praise of polygyny's potential for
pairing the few "good men" with the many "good women").
327. Adrienne Katherine Wing, Polygamy from Southern Africa to Black Britannia to Black
America: Global Critical Race Feminism as Legal Reform for the Twenty-First Century, 11 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 811, 858 (2001) ("In my view, African Americans today face conditions
in which defacto polygamy can flourish. A disproportionate number of our men are unavailable
for marriage-due to early death, imprisonment, high unemployment, and intermarriage. More of
our young women have obtained higher educations than the young men. Socially, we as Black
women, like most women, have been reared to want men of an equal or higher social status. We
have also been socialized to prefer our own men, to men from other racial/ethnic groups. A wealth
of well employed and educated Black women seek a small pool of 'suitable' men. The net result is
that the few men have a surplus of women from which to select. They can be either de facto
polygamists or womanizers. They can have children with multiple women and support none of
them. Since the Civil Rights movement, more black men than women have taken advantage of the
opportunity to date or marry outside the race, an act that could have resulted in a lynching in the
past. The net result is that only 39% of Black women are married, compared to 60% of white
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Honig has urged that the institution of polygamy can sometimes create
conditions for solidarity among women, whereas monogamy "isolates women
from each other and privatizes them."328 Feminist arguments therefore may cut
both ways. 329  And even if multiparty relationships may sometimes be
detrimental to women, particularly in their traditional polygynous form, this
must not be true in all cases; as discussed earlier, some polyamorists specifically
embrace the practice of nonmonogamy as part of a feminist commitment to self-
possession. 330 In this light, feminist objections cannot entirely ground the
opposition to multiparty marriage, unless one is also inclined to oppose marriage
altogether on the ground that its traditional form oppresses women. 331 And even
this sort of feminist opposition to marriage would not necessarily explain a
negative response to the idea of nonmarital relationships of more than two.
Third, the negative response to polyamory may also stem from the view that
these relationships are not physically or psychologically healthy. Polyamory
may inspire concerns about sexually transmitted diseases (STDs).3 32 Like other
sexually active people, polyamorists face risks that a partner is infected, and to
the extent that polys have more partners than people in couples, they might have
more cause for concern about STDs than some sexually active people. On the
other hand, in a polyamorous subculture that aspires to honesty about sexual
practices, informed communication about sexual health may be particularly
valued,333 and the social consequences of lying about sexual behavior and sexual
women, and 67% of Black children are born out-of-wedlock compared to 25% of white babies. In
the U.S. Constitution, Blacks were counted as three-fifths of a person for representation purposes.
Today, some lonely women remain ready to have a much smaller piece than three-fifths of a man."
(footnotes omitted)).
328. Bonnie Honig, Complicating Culture, BOSTON REV., Oct/Nov. 1997, at 30, 31.
329. See, e.g., Iversen, supra note 44, at 518-19 (describing how Mormon polygyny was both
feminist and anti-feminist).
330. See supra Section III.C.4.
331. Cf JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 104 (1986) (1859) ("No one has a deeper
disapprobation than I have of this Mormon institution [of polygamy]; both for other reasons, and
because, far from being in any way countenanced by the principle of liberty, it is a direct infraction
of that principle, being a mere riveting of the chains of one half of the community, and an
emancipation of the other from reciprocity of obligation towards them. Still, it must be
remembered that this relation is as much voluntary on the part of the women concerned in it, and
who may be deemed the sufferers by it, as is the case with any other form of the marriage
institution; and however surprising this fact may appear, it has its explanation in the common ideas
and customs of the world, which teaching women to think marriage the one thing needful, make it
intelligible that many a woman should prefer being one of several wives, to not being a wife at
all.").
332. See ANAPOL, supra note 127, at 28 ("Many people these days are fearful of choosing a
polyamorous lovestyle because of concerns about exposing themselves to AIDS or to sexually
transmitted diseases such as herpes .... ").
333. Cf, e.g., F.C.I. Hickson, P.M. Davies, A.J. Hunt, P. Weatherbum, T.J. McManus &
A.P.M. Coxon, Maintenance of Open Gay Relationships: Some Strategies for Protection Against
HIV, 4 AIDS CARE 409, 411, 414, 416 (1992) (reporting, in a study of 387 homosexually active
men, that 72.7% of the men in nonexclusive relationships (who made up 56.3% of those in
relationships) had "some agreement between the partners as to the nature of sex with third parties"
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health may be particularly great. 334 Moreover, promises of sexual exclusivity in
monogamous relationships may give monogamists more reason to have
unprotected sex or to lie about their sexual behavior. 335 People in ostensibly
monogamous relationships are caught in a bind if they contract infections; even
if they want to protect their other half from the physical harm of contagion, they
risk inflicting emotional harm and losing the relationship if they reveal their
infected status, and thus, their sexual dalliances.
33 6
The question of whether polyamory could have negative psychological
effects on participants is hard to answer. Maura Strassberg has argued that
polyamorous relationships may be coercive or oppressive, particularly when the
relationships are closed ("polyfidelitous") and involve more than three or four
people. 337 But coercion and oppression, of course, afflict bilateral relationships
as well as multiparty ones. 338 I have found little data the psychological effects
and the "most common type of rule amongst these couples concerned safer sex").
334. See, e.g., Vexen Crabtree, Human Sexuality: Poly, at http://www.vexen.co.uk/human/
poly.html#pastd (last updated Mar. 1, 2001) ("A person is not accepted into a poly group if they do
not take issues like pregnancy and protection seriously. There is a very high awareness of the
dangers of sexually transmitted diseases within poly groups .... ).
335. See, e.g., David Wyatt Seal, Gina Agostinelli & Charlotte A. Hannett, Extradyadic
Romantic Involvement: Moderating Effects of Sociosexuality and Gender, 31 SEx ROLES 1, 19
(1994) (observing that "most young adult heterosexuals believe that involvement in an 'exclusive'
dating relationship gives them immunity from exposure to HIV/STDs," leading them to frame
"'safe sex' in the context of pregnancy prevention rather than disease prevention" and thus to use
oral contraceptives and discontinue use of latex condoms); David J. Mack, Note, Cleansing the
System: A Fresh Approach to Liability for the Negligent or Fraudulent Transmission of Sexually
Transmitted Diseases, 30 U. TOL. L. REv. 647, 665 (1999) (reporting that a recent study of STD
infection found that "because perceived risk is generally lower in monogamous relationships,
married people are less likely than their single counterparts to use condoms" (citing Betsy Payn et
al., Men 's Behavior Change Following Infection with a Sexually Transmitted Disease, 29 FAM.
PLAN. PERSP. 152, 153 (1997))); see also Elizabeth Larsen, Poly Sex for Beginners: Swinging
Makes a Comeback Among GenXers, UTNE READER, Nov./Dec. 1998, at 20, 20-21 (noting that
"[m]any polyamorists make the point that, since their extramarital activities aren't secrets, the
likelihood of contracting an STD from their partner(s) is lower than that of many monogamous
couples who may be unknowingly infected by a straying partner who never fesses up" and
mentioning poly reports of "safe-sex circles" in which "each member is tested and new members
are not admitted until a period of months go by and they still test negative" (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
336. See, e.g., ANAPOL, supra note 127, at 28 ("A closed circle, whether of two or six or
twenty, healthy, trusted partners can make polyamory just as 'safe' as monogamy, perhaps more so
since the couple who have sworn to be monogamous may be more likely to lie about outside
affairs and less likely to frankly discuss their sexual histories with prospective lovers than those
who are openly polyamorous."); Mack, supra note 335, at 661-62 (discussing the role of "secrecy"
in the transmission of sexually transmitted diseases according to a recent report by the Sexuality
Information and Education Council of the United States); see also McPherson v. McPherson, 712
A.2d 1043, 1044 (Me. 1998) (describing the lawsuit of a woman against her former husband for
"infect[ing] her with a sexually transmitted disease he acquired through an extramarital affair").
337. Strassberg, supra note 8, at 496-99, 508-09.
338. To illustrate the coercive possibilities of polyfidelitous relationships, Strassberg cites the
example of the Kerista cult that existed in San Francisco from 1971 to 1991, in which certain
participants tried to urge new members on one another through peer pressure, and the group
punished certain members for disagreeable behavior by withholding sex from them. Id. at 497-
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of open relationships. There are a few studies comparing open relationships and
closed relationships among gay men, which show equal or greater relationship
longevity in open relationships and mixed results on whether reported
relationship satisfaction is different or the same; 339 these are, however,
preliminary empirical efforts. Moreover, it is hard to know the possible effect of
living in a nonmonogamous relationship in the context of a culture that frowns
upon such relationships.
Strassberg also worries, like the judge in the Divilbiss case, that children
will be damaged by exposure to polyamory.340  Some people may well be
concerned that polyamorous relationships are less stable or structured than
monogamous ones and would thus cause harm to any children the participants
might have. Of course, many people in polyamorous relationships may not have
children, which would eliminate this concern. But for those who do, more
information is necessary to evaluate the validity of the concern. 34 1 As with the
concern about the effects on the participants, some participants in polyamorous
relationships perceive those relationships as healthy for the children involved;
others perceive the relationships as unhealthy. 342 Speculative arguments can be
502. Strassberg finds this situation to be more coercive and unhealthy than a monogamous one, as
"the punished individual lost any possibility of sex," but the rest of the group members continued
to be able to have sex with each other. Id. at 502. This reasoning, however, cuts both ways
because members of monogamous couples have the power to make unilateral and unreasonable
decisions to cut out sex for the other person, a decision that only harms the withholder if he or she
values sex more than the negative emotion fueling the withholding. This is a coercive situation
that may be avoided in polyamorous relationships, where one person's decision to withhold sex
does not deprive another of the possibility of sex.
339. See, e.g., David Blasband & Letitia Anne Peplau, Sexual Exclusivity Versus Openness in
Gay Male Couples, 14 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV. 395 (1985) (finding, in a study of forty gay
male couples of which approximately 57.5% reported an open relationship and 42.5% reported a
closed relationship, no differences between the open and closed relationships in reported affection,
respect, love, or longevity); Lawrence A. Kurdek & J. Patrick Schmitt, Relationship Quality of
Gay Men in Closed or Open Relationships, 12 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 85, 95-96 (Winter 1985/1986)
(reporting, based on self-report measures by forty-nine gay male couples in open relationships and
seventeen gay male couples in closed relationships, that inter alia the couples in open relationships
lived together significantly longer than those in closed relationships, that the couples in closed and
open relationships reported equal satisfaction on some measures (respect/perceived similarity,
agreement, satisfaction with affection and sex, and shared activities), and that the couples in closed
relationships reported greater satisfaction along several measures (greater affiliative/dependent
need, more favorable attitude toward the relationship, and less tension in the relationship)).
340. See Strassberg, supra note 8, at 509-20; see also Westley, supra note 84, at 72 (arguing
that stability and nurturing of a monogamous family benefit children and thereby help create an
effective labor force).
341. See Strassberg, supra note 8, at 559-60. There is one study of the extent to which
parents in open relationships disclose their relationship details to their children, which concludes
that most parents do not fully inform their children of their involvements. See James Watson &
Mary A. Watson, Children of Open Marriages: Parental Disclosure and Perspectives, 5
ALTERNATIVE LiFESTYLES 54 (1982).
342. For a discussion of factors that may affect the well-being of a child in a polyamorous
family, see Strassberg, supra note 8, at 511-17 (discussing an interview with a psychologist who
felt she was harmed because her parents were "swingers" who engaged in casual sex with many
different people, including some who sexually abused her (citing Ryam Nearing, But What About
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made either way.
For instance, relationships might be less stable because there are more
participants or because participants are open to other relationships. On the other
hand, openness to other possibilities could prevent relationships from ending
because of outside attraction or sex and might generally permit a flexibility that
allows a relationship to survive through changing needs and desires. In terms of
child-rearing approaches, polyamory might seem loose and unstructured, but the
aspirations articulated by polyamorists include some structuring concepts like
consent and honesty, and, as discussed earlier, some polys are highly attentive to
boundaries.343 In terms of attention to children, some might worry that polys
would be too engaged with one another to care adequately for the children. On
the other hand, more hearts and hands might contribute positively to the care of
children; along these lines, some polys have suggested that polyamory provides
the "village" that Hillary Clinton and others have said it takes "to raise a
child."'344 What harm means in this context, whether it might occur, and what
the policy consequences might be are all difficult questions. Without clarifying
information, people may well be concerned about children in these situations.
Since many people never have children and discussions of polyamory typically
do not center on children, however, I would posit that possible effects on
possible children are not foremost in most people's minds when they react
negatively to the idea of polyamory.
Fourth, and relatedly, some argue that polyamory is incompatible with real
love. This objection comes in two principal forms: those in polyamorous
relationships cannot love one another equally or they cannot love one another
enough. But comparisons to other types of relationships suggest that there is no
obvious reason that relationships involving more than two are necessarily
unequal. For instance, as discussed in Part II, although people sometimes speak
of having a best friend, friends are generally thought able to love more than one
friend equally. Friendships may take different forms without necessarily being
valued disproportionately. Similarly, few people object to the idea of parents'
having multiple children on the ground that the parents won't be able to love two
or more children equally. Rather, parents are generally thought able to love
multiple children the same amount, even if reality does not always reflect that
ideal.
Moreover, even if some friends or children are loved more than others, it is
not clear that the other friends or other children are not loved enough. Indeed,
the Kids?, 24 LOVING MORE MAG., 10, 10-13 (Winter 2001))). For a description of interviews
with parents in alternative relationships, including polyamorous relationships, who characterize
their children's development as healthy, see PATRICK CALIFIA, When the Playroom Becomes a
Nursery: S/M-Fetish People Who Choose to Parent, in SPEAKING SEX TO POWER: THE POLITICS OF
QUEER SEX 46, 50-53 (2002).
343. See supra Section III.C.
344. Strassberg, supra note 8, at 560 & n.549 (citing Lady Alia-anor Ravenhart, Help! I'm
Going to Have a Baby! Part Two, 9 LOVING MORE MAG., 10, 11 (Spring 1997)).
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friendship is generally presumed not to be exclusive, even though most people
have varying levels of closeness to different friends. As discussed earlier,
feeling jealousy about a friend's other friends is generally not considered a sign
of true friendship. 345 On the contrary, where such jealousy exists, indulging it
by insisting that a friend drop other friends would seem antithetical to the
generosity and other-regarding feelings expected of friends. Among siblings,
though jealousy about parental love may even be common, the legitimacy of
parents' having multiple children is not called into question on this basis.
Parents with multiple children are typically deemed able to love their children
enough, even if they do not in every case love them in identical ways or even
identical amounts. Thus, while some people might prefer monogamy because
they feel that romantic love is uniquely defined by twoness, and thus reject the
relevance of these analogies for themselves, this personal feeling does not seem
an adequate objection to relationships formed by other people who have a
different view of love, namely, a view in which romantic love shares certain
properties of other types of relationships such as friendship.
Fifth, polyamory may tap into anxieties about other social taboos. For
instance, Judith Butler has suggested that a deep anxiety about incest underlies
our response to all sexual and familial taboos. 346 The judge's comments in the
Divilbiss case indicate that he could not escape the image of all three partners in
bed together-a practice that was not part of their relationship-and of the child
in bed with the three of them.347 Whether or not incest is the taboo into which
345. See supra text accompanying notes 41-48.
346. Butler writes:
Consider that the horror of incest, the moral revulsion it compels in some, is not that far
afield from the same horror and revulsion felt toward lesbian and gay sex, and is not
unrelated to the intense moral condemnation of voluntary single parenting, or gay
parenting, or parenting arrangements with more than two adults involved (practices that
can be used as evidence to support a claim to remove a child from the custody of the
parent in several states in the United States). These various modes in which the oedipal
mandate fails to produce normative family all risk entering into the metonymy of that
moralized sexual horror that is perhaps most fundamentally associated with incest.
JUDITH BUTLER, ANTIGONE'S CLAIM 71 (2000).
347. Over the protests of April Divilbiss's attorney that the three members of this triad were
not actually sleeping together, but rather, April was sleeping with each man separately, the judge
persisted in asking:
THE COURT: Well, at some point in time when the child walks into the bedroom and
there is mother in bed with two guys, now what is the child going to say about that?
Transcript, In the Matter of A.M., No. K1719 (Juv. Ct., Memphis and Shelby County, Tenn., Apr.
16, 1999). And the judge could not escape the specter of incest:
THE COURT: Well, it hasn't been shown that the child is in bed with everyone but the
child is in the same household. And if the child is in the same household and seeing
this going on, at some point in due time, the child is going to become aware of it.
Id. So somehow the idea of the child seeing all of them in bed together is intimately bound up
with the possibility that "the child is in bed with everyone." Though one can read the judge to be
asserting merely that the child need not be in bed with them to walk in on them, the implication of
his legal rhetoric-"it hasn't been shown that..."--suggests the possibility that one could show it,
and that one might have reason to try to show it. The form of his statement evokes a classic form
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many other taboos collapse, as Butler suggests, one could hypothesize about why
incest might haunt discussions of intimate group sex within a family.
Classically, parents are two, and children may be more than two. Our only
model for permissible sexual relations within a nuclear family is the parents. For
this reason, the idea of sex among three or more family members may evoke the
idea of siblings-the horizontal family relationship that can involve more than
two-rather than parents. In this way, sex within polyamorous families might
prompt an image of sibling incest. But this is, perhaps to a greater extent than
the other concerns, mere speculation.
Anxieties about homosexuality and bisexuality, on the other hand, bear a
more concrete relationship to the response to polyamory. Mutual sex among
three or more people necessarily involves some homosexual or bisexual
relations, since any group of people larger than two involves at least two of the
same sex. Sex between two people is either different-sex or same-sex,
heterosexual or homosexual. Sex among three people (or more)-where all
three sleep together or each of them sleeps with each of the others---cannot be
strictly heterosexual, since there are only two sexes. 348 Thus, an obvious part of
the resistance to polyamory among straight people is disapproval or lack of
interest in same-sex sex. Gays need not have the same resistance to the idea of
polyamory since polyamory can be exclusively gay. (As "monosexuals,"
however, gays presumably share with straights a lack of interest in multiparty
sex among men and women together. 349) The gay or bisexual element in some
of prosecutorial closing statement, "While it hasn't been shown that the defendant knifed his wife
to death, a bloody knife was found next to her body with his fingerprints all over it." The form of
the statement answers the question it implies. We may thus read the judge's comments here to
suggest that incest is the endpoint feared most in the transgression of "normal" family boundaries.
This revulsive turn occurs even in a polyamorous family that resists the image of group sex.
348. If all three are one sex, then there is same-sex sex; if two are one sex and the third is
another sex, then there is some same-sex sex and some different-sex sex, including what might be
called bisexual behavior. The principle is both obvious and not obvious, as indicated by its
presence in the familiar children's riddle: If you have thirty socks in a drawer, twenty black and ten
white, what is the maximum number of socks you must pull out of the drawer to guarantee a
matched pair? The answer is, of course, three.
349. A closer look at this aspect of the response to polyamory may illuminate a phenomenon
of gender politics, "bisexual erasure." Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual
Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353 (2000). A comparison between two simple models of group sex
points toward different perceptions of male and female bisexuality. In the situation of group sex
involving one man and two women, I would posit that outsiders are more likely to assume that the
women are engaging in the threesome for the man's sake; outsiders often assume the man is
getting more out of it. In part because people often do not believe people are really bisexual, they
are more likely to assume the women are straight, and having sex with each other because the man
wants it. (Not surprisingly, pornography created for straight males reflects and reinforces this
assumption.) By contrast, in a scenario of group sex among one woman and two men, I think
outsiders would be more inclined to assume that the men are actually gay, but not yet
acknowledging their homosexuality, and the woman is an excuse for them to have sex with each
other. Thus, bisexual erasure resolves itself in favor of heterosexuality in the case of (potentially
bisexual) women, whereas in the case of (potentially bisexual) men, bisexual erasure results in
homosexuality. This peculiarity might be explained by assumptions about power and desire; men
are assumed to have more of both. In both situations, the men are seen to be getting what they
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polyamorous relationships may thus help explain why some outsiders do not
want to become polyamorous. It does not, however, explain why they would not
want other people to be so. Any gap between the status of gays or bisexuals, on
the one hand, and polyamorists, on the other, must be due to something other
than the homosexual component of some polyamory.
As with the other reasons discussed in this Section, feelings about
homosexuality may be a factor in some people's response to polyamory. These
different factors warrant further discussion, which I hope to help prompt, but
these factors do not add up to the whole of the response. Something else is
going on. As I argue in the next Section, thinking about homosexuality does
help us understand the driving force behind the response to polyamory after all.
But it is the theory of homosexuality, rather than the practice, that points us
toward the missing piece.
B. The Problem of the Universalizing View of Polyamory
This Section takes its cue from insights into sexuality developed in the
context of homosexuality. In particular, the conceptual distinction between
"universalizing" and "minoritizing" views of sexual identity, posed by sexuality
theorist Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, helps to pinpoint a crucial problem for
polyamorists. 350
Sedgwick defines a "minoritizing" view of homosexuality as the view that
"there is a distinct population of persons who 'really are' gay." 351 By contrast, a
"universalizing" view of homosexuality holds "that apparently heterosexual
persons and object choices are strongly marked by same-sex influences and
desires, and vice versa for apparently homosexual ones .... ,352 The concept of
want sexually from the situation.
350. In her recent article, Maura Strassberg uses the same term-"universalizing"-to invoke
a distinct idea taken from a different theoretical context: Hegel's theory that monogamous families
prepare individuals to identify with a kind of universal rationality represented by the state, rather
than with their particular subjective experience. See Strassberg, supra note 8, at 555.
35 1. EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 85 (1990).
352. Id. Earlier in the book, Sedgwick defines the terms in a more tortuous fashion:
[I will be discussing] the contradiction between seeing homo/heterosexual definition on
the one hand as an issue of active importance primarily for a small, distinct, relatively
fixed homosexual minority (what I refer to as a minoritizing view), and seeing it on the
other hand as an issue of continuing, determinative importance in the lives of people
across a spectrum of sexualities (what I refer to as a universalizing view).
Id at 1. Sedgwick offers her minoritizing/universalizing axis as an alternative model to the
essentiallconstructed view of sexual identity. Id. at 40. The essential/constructed axis
distinguishes between hardwired-or "essential"--ideas of identity and culturally determined-or
"constructed"-ideas of identity. Thus, an essentialist view of homosexuality holds that some
people are born with the trait of homosexuality, and that these people have a homosexual identity,
regardless of their time in history or place in the world. By contrast, in the constructionist view of
homosexuality, people are not born gay; rather, gay identity, as well as straight identity, is a
product of cultural context and environment. See, e.g., Daniel R. Ortiz, Creating Controversy:
Essentialism and Constructivism in the Politics of Gay Identity, 79 VA. L. REV. 1833, 1836 (1998)
("Essentialism in this debate represents the belief that gayness is an intrinsic property, one that
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minoritizing and universalizing discourses of identity encourages a focus on the
ways that this aspect- of identity is pervasively important in the lives of many
people, even those who do not identify as sexual minorities. Rather than
focusing our attention exclusively on some narrow idea of biologically essential
identities-or some superficial assessment of identities as constructed and
therefore deconstructable-the minoritizing/universalizing axis prompts us to
ask: "'In whose lives is homo/heterosexual [or nonmonogamous/monogamous]
definition an issue of continuing centrality and difficulty?' 353  Sedgwick's
categories, therefore, urge a focus on the discourses and perceptions surrounding
a particular identity category, rather than on the search for any inherent truth of
sexual identities.
354
Sedgwick argues that "[m]ost moderately to well-educated Western people
in this century seem to share a similar understanding of homosexual
does not vary across history and culture.... Constructivism, on the other hand, represents the
belief that gayness is a property that has meaning only within certain times and cultures. Identity
categories, constructivists believe, are social creations. They result from social belief and practice,
are themselves complex social practices, and may be evaluated in terms of whose interests they
serve."). These terms arise out of feminist debates about whether various sex and gender
characteristics are, on the one hand, hardwired or, on the other hand, culturally produced. The
terms have also been applied to-and much disputed in-gay contexts. Disputants argue about
whether gay identity is essential or constructed, but they also take issue with the terms themselves,
contesting even whether "essential" and "constructed" are useful ways of understanding and
speaking about sexual orientation. See, e.g., infra note 353.
In addition, some scholars have used the terms "mutability" and "immutability" to
characterize similar concepts in debates over footnote four of Carolene Products and the criteria
for suspect class status. See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal
Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915, 932 (1989); Kenji
Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell," 108 YALE L.J. 485, 509 (1998).
353. SEDGWICK, supra note 351, at 40. More technically, Sedgwick notes that the
terminology of essentialist vs. constructivist tends to conflate distinct conceptual questions. In her
words, the essential/constructed terminology conflates "ontogeny" with "phylogeny." In other
words, essentialist/constructivist debates blur the question of how individual sexual identities are
formed-i.e. how an individual becomes gay or straight-with the question of how the cultural
idea of a sexual identity is formed-i.e. how understandings of sexual identity are formed. Id.
Daniel Ortiz agrees that the terms blur the distinction between questions of historical
development (what Sedgwick calls the phylogeny question) and individual development (what
Sedgwick calls the ontogeny question and Ortiz calls the "nature/nurture" question). Ortiz also
identifies a third set of questions incorporated into that debate: the question of "determinism"
versus "voluntarism." The determinism/voluntarism question "concerns the extent to which people
choose their sexual orientation." Ortiz, supra note 352, at 1837.
354. See SEDGWTCK, supra note 351, at 40. Sedgwick notes the pervasiveness of the
essential/constructed debate, then explains her choice instead to frame her work through the
minoritizing/universalizing distinction. Id. at 40. Sedgwick's choice of terms, in the gay context,
is avowedly a political one, since she sees the essentialist/constructivist discourse as fueled by an
implicit or explicit anti-gay politics, even in "ostensibly or authentically gay-affirmative contexts."
Id. at 43 ("If I had ever, in any medium, seen any researcher or popularizer refer even once to any
supposed gay-producing circumstance as the proper hormone balance, or the conducive endocrine
environment, for gay generation, I .would be less chilled by the breezes of all this technological
confidence.").
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definition," 355 one that is marked by "a radical and irreducible incoherence. '" 356
That is, Sedgwick claims that most people hold minoritizing and universalizing
views of homosexuality simultaneously. For example, many people think that
there is a distinct minority of people who are immutably gay, but many of these
same people also do not want their children exposed to gay role models for fear
that it could make their children gay. In this sense, I agree with Sedgwick about
the incoherence in views of homosexuality. But I would also posit that the
contemporary view of homosexuality is highly minoritizing relative to the
general view of polyamory.
Unlike homosexuals, who are understood by many to possess a distinct and
unalterable identity, polyamorists are rarely seen as having a distinct identity. In
the words of Jonathan Rauch:
Do homosexuals actually exist? I think so, and today even the Vatican
accepts that some people are constitutively attracted only to members of
the same sex. By contrast, no serious person claims there are people
constitutively attracted only to relatives, or only to groups rather than
individuals. Anyone who can love two women can also love one of
them. People who insist on marrying their mother or several lovers
want an additional (and weird) marital option. Homosexuals currently
have no marital option at all. A demand for polygamous or incestuous
marriage is thus frivolous in a way that the demand for gay marriage is
not.35
7
Similarly, Andrew Sullivan claims, "Almost everyone seems to accept, even if
they find homosexuality morally troublesome, that it occupies a deeper level of
human consciousness than a polygamous impulse." 358  Without directly
assessing the truth-value of their allegations about gays versus polys, both Rauch
and Sullivan reflect the divergence in popular perceptions of the depth of these
sexual identities. Gay identity is viewed by many to be a deeply rooted element
of identity; poly identity is seen to be so superficial as to be frivolous. Because a
desire to be involved with more than one person is not perceived to "occup[y] a
deep[] level of human consciousness, ' 359 nor to be a "constitutive[]
attract[ion], ' '360 polys are generally not seen as a discrete group of individuals.
There is little sense of a distinct group of people who "really are" poly.
Rather, the desire to be sexually involved with more than one person, or
with someone other than an existing partner, is viewed as nearly universal. To
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Jonathan Rauch, Marrying Somebody, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON, supra
note 10, at 286.
358. Sullivan, supra note 19, at 279. Sullivan neatly avoids the question of bisexuality here
too.
359. Id.
360. Rauch, supra note 357, at 286.
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translate Sedgwick's definition of universalizing homosexuality into an
observation about universalizing polyamory: "[A]pparently [monogamous]
persons and object choices are strongly marked by [nonmonogamous] influences
and desires .... ,361 The universalizing account of nonmonogamy may seem
obvious: Of course most people want to sleep with others; they just resist that
impulse. From this perspective, polyamory may seem, like bisexuality, to be a
form of greed or indulgence. 3
62
Much thinking and writing from within poly communities also sounds in a
universalizing register. Most notably, the idea of radical honesty363 is
universalizing about people's involvement in nonmonogamous activity, through
serial monogamy and adultery. The poly ethic of honesty posits that many more
people engage in nonmonogamous behavior than own up to it. From this
perspective, polys seem less a distinct minority than outspoken representatives of
the masses. Poly thinking thus shifts scrutiny to monogamy, asking how it is
constructed and why people lie about their nonmonogamous behavior and
desires.
The idea of privileging love and sex 364 also seems to offer benefits to
anyone willing and able to experience them. Rather than proposing that some
small subset of people might grow and enrich their lives through further sexual
and loving relationships, the poly commitment to experiencing love and sex
seems a credo of expansiveness, a manifesto of living that has no obvious
stopping point or confinement to those who espouse it. Moreover, the poly ethic
of self-possession offers a resounding critique of the strictures of monogamy-
of its jealousy, possessiveness, and patriarchy-a critique that implicates
mainstream institutions. 365
Deborah Anapol boldly captures the universalizing challenge inherent in
much poly talk:
The fact is that most of us are polyamorists at heart whether we are
willing to admit it to ourselves or not. It is no accident that "serial
monogamy," which is not really monogamy at all, is currently the most
common relationship form in our culture. Serial monogamy can be
viewed as being one step closer to who we really are. Unlike lifelong
monogamy, it allows us to express our polyamorous nature while
maintaining a monogamous fiction in which our multiple mates are
separated by linear time. For some people this marriage-divorce-
361. SEDGWICK, supra note 351, at 85; cf supra text accompanying note 352 (quoting
Sedgwick's phrasing, i.e., that "apparently heterosexual persons and object choices are strongly
marked by same-sex influences and desires").
362. See, e.g., Yoshino, supra note 349, at 374, 420 (describing the stereotype of the greedy
or promiscuous bisexual); see also supra text accompanying note 183 (quoting the judge in the
Divilbiss case disparaging April for deciding "I can have my cake and eat it too").
363. See supra Section III.C.2.
364. See supra Section III.C.5.
365. See supra Section III.C.4.
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remarriage cycle remains the best solution.
But divorce increasingly appears to be more stressful and disruptive
than first thought.... Where infidelity or the desire for broader sexual
expression is the primary cause for dissolution of a marriage, surely we
can find more imaginative alternatives than divorce....
.. The point is that, ultimately, the clash between our nonmonogamous
nature and our monogamous tradition must begin to be seen as a
legitimate reason to develop new forms of relationships....
... Polyamory, a viable alternative for those who wish to expand their
social horizons to include multipartner relationships, is a concept
whose time has come. 366
This is classic universalizing language, and it challenges people to admit their
own transgressions and violations of the law of monogamy, and to embrace an
alternative open to everyone. Anapol's position is interesting because it locates
polyamory as somehow essential, but essential in most everyone. In a gay
context, this might be akin to saying that homosexuality is hardwired into
everyone.
Notably, Anapol initially seems to blur the distinction between
nonmonogamy and polyamory by suggesting that everyone might be a
"polyamorist[] at heart." Arguably, though, she expresses herself in this way for
rhetorical impact. By the end of the passage, polyamory reemerges as a practice
distinct from other forms of nonmonogamy-such as "cheating"-because she
describes "polyamory" as a "viable alternative" involving "multipartner
relationships." This is consistent with the distinction I drew at the end of Part III,
that polyamory is a subset of nonmonogamy distinguished primarily by its
devotion to certain principles, such as honesty and privileging sexual and loving
experiences over jealousy.
Nonetheless, as Anapol points out, polyamorists have something in common
with much of the population: an impulse towards nonmonogamy. One might
contrast the prevalence of the capacity to imagine nonmonogamy-to experience
desire for someone other than one's primary partner-with the capacity to
imagine homosexuality. Arguably, many more people have nonmonogamous
fantasies than have homosexual fantasies. Even according to Alfred Kinsey's
findings, which have been widely criticized for overstating the extent of
homosexual desire and activity because of problems such as sample bias, 50% of
males reported no same-sex desires or experience after the onset of
adolescence,367 and 72% of females reported no same-sex desires at all.368 By
366. ANAPOL, supra note 127, at viii-ix (emphasis in original).
367. ALFRED KINSEY, WARDELL B. POMEROY & CLYDE E. MARTIN, Homosexual Outlet, in
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 610, 650 (1948).
368. ALFRED KINSEY, WARDELL B. POMEROY, CLYDE E. MARTIN & PAUL H. GEBHARD,
Homosexual Responses and Contacts, in SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 446, 453, 493
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contrast, somewhere between 25% and 75% of Americans have engaged in
adulterous sex, as discussed earlier.369 The number of people who have felt
nonmonogamous desires is, no doubt, much greater.
Indeed, it seems a fair assumption that almost everyone has at some time felt
desire for more than one person. There certainly may be some small subset of
people who have never experienced desire for anyone other than their current
partner (if they have one). Nevertheless, the prevalence of serial monogamy (as
indicated by divorce rates) suggests that it is an extremely rare person who
cannot imagine feeling desire for more than one person, since he can at least
think of two people that he has desired in sequence. Sexual variation is arguably
infinite, so there may well be some people who exhibit supermonogamous
desires par excellence-people who have desired one and only one person in
their entire lives. However, it also seems fair to assume that such people are
extremely rare.
In this light, polys would seem to have many potential allies because many
people could seemingly empathize with at least some aspect of polys' desires.
Although many people may not actually want multiple sexual partners in love,
most can presumably empathize with the aspect of poly desire that means more
than one sexual partner. The sheer ubiquity of nonmonogamous desire, and the
prevalence of nonmonogamous behavior, could mean a larger constituency and
more allies for pro-poly politics. I want to argue, however, based on certain
lessons from gay theory and politics, that the universalizing possibilities
suggested by Anapol's words form a basic stumbling block to public recognition
of poly relationships.
Rather than empathizing with others who share one's traits, people often
fear or shun the people they could become, particularly when the common traits
are stigmatized. 370 This difficulty may be understood through the figure of the
self-hating Jew, black, or homosexual. 371  Similarly, the principle behind
"homophobia" is that the presence of homosexuality in one's self can create the
fear of actual homosexuals. 372  Pervasive homophobia may therefore be
tbl. 131 (1953).
369. See supra notes 106-09.
370. See, e.g., Yoshino, supra note 352, at 512.
371. Id.
372. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is
Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 260 n.231 (1994) (quoting Iris Marion Young as
saying that "[h]omophobia is one of the deepest fears of difference precisely because the border
between gay and straight is constructed as the most permeable; anyone at all can become gay,
especially me, so the only way to defend my identity is to turn away with irrational disgust," and
arguing that homophobia only produces this kind of fear in people whose identity depends upon "a
certain kind of gender order, one in which sexual penetration connotes the dominance of the male
over the female" (quoting IRIS M. YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 146 (1990));
Jeffrey G. Sherman, Love Speech: The Social Utility of Pornography, 47 STAN. L. REv. 661, 677
n.89 (1995) (explaining that "homophobia and homohatred ought more properly to mean self-fear
and self-hatred, rather than hatred of homosexuality. Some would argue that the notion of
substituting 'self-hatred' for 'homophobia' is not so far from wrong, since expressions of
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understood as a sign of the pervasiveness of same-sex fantasies or desires. Thus,
one lesson from gay politics is that the universal potential of an identity trait may
engender distance rather than empathy, resistance rather than support.
In addition, the difficulty of organizing and generating support for an
"invisible" group has been a longstanding obstacle for gays. The challenge of
identifying invisible gay allies, much less convincing them to be oppositional
rather than to hide in the closet, has inspired political fantasies of all gays turning
blue.3 73 That is, if all gays were blue, then gays would have the ability-and the
need-to seek solidarity and to end the prisoner's dilemma of the closet.374 The
invisibility of gays may also contribute to a lack of empathy from nongays, or a
lack of avowed support from gay-friendly nongays, because those who support
gays may be mistakenly deemed gay in a way that supporters of a race- or sex-
based group can expect not to be. 375 The impulse to shy away from those who
are like oneself, rather than forming allegiances based on commonality, may also
be seen in the different attitudes toward homosexuality and bisexuality.
Bisexuals share with heterosexuals the common ground of a desire for the
opposite sex, yet bisexuals are more marginalized than homosexuals.376 If one
pictures a straight white politician who has the option of supporting the political
agenda of African-Americans, gays, or bisexuals, he would have the most reason
to fear being mistaken for a bisexual, and thus, the most reason to fear
supporting the bisexual agenda, although he seems to have the most in common,
along a salient identity axis, with the bisexuals.
Debates about whether homosexuality and heterosexuality, as we
understand them, have been present throughout history implicitly reflect the
extent to which we now understand this aspect of personality to be deeply
homophobia may be a device for cloaking or denying one's own homosexuality."); id at 685
(describing Robert Bauman as "[o]ne of the saddest and most conspicuous exemplars of the
hypocrisy and self-destructiveness of a furtive, nonintegrated sexuality" and explaining that
Bauman was "at one time a conservative congressman from Maryland [who] had an antigay voting
record and an inclination to make such public statements as, 'I would not want my children taught
or influenced by gay people,' until his arrest for propositioning a sixteen-year-old male prostitute
brought his legislative career to an abrupt end").
373. See, e.g., LARRY GROSS, CONTESTED CLOSETS: THE POLITICS AND ETHICS OF OuTING 49
(1993) (quoting Nancy Walker, Yanking Them Out, GAY COMMUNITY NEWS, May 14, 1983, at 5
("'I have often wished that all gay people would turn blue at the same moment and thereby put an
end to our oppression.... .')), quoted in Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument
for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1753, 1802 n. 221 (1996).
374. See Yoshino, supra note 373, at 1802.
375. See, e.g., Halley, supra note 352, at 973 (noting that "one's mere participation in
political action to alter laws affecting gays and lesbians can precipitously earn one a public
homosexual identity"); Yoshino, supra note 373, at 1807 ("Finally, just as the closet makes it
unclear that gays are gay, it also makes it unclear that straights are straight. Because gays can
masquerade as straight, every person who holds himself out as 'straight' is suspect.").
376. See Yoshino, supra note 349. The question of common ground does cut both ways; as
Yoshino has pointed out, heterosexuals also share with homosexuals the common ground of being
monosexuals. The connection between bisexuals and heterosexuals is, I think, more immediately
obvious.
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rooted. A historical-constructivist view of homosexuality posits that our
contemporary idea of homosexuality is a relatively recent invention. Most
closely associated with the historian Michel Foucault, historical constructivism
is the idea that during the late nineteenth century certain medical and legal
discourses created our modem belief that people have a sexual orientation
determined primarily and deeply by the sex of the people they desire. Foucault
colorfully called this nineteenth-century transformation a "perverse
implantation," 377 which moved western culture from seeing the sodomite as a
"temporary aberration" to viewing the homosexual as "a species." 3 78  Lest
anyone think that this constructivist view of homosexuality is a fringe theory, the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas officially acknowledged
it and arguably relied on it to show why Bowers v. Hardwick379 warranted
reversal.3 8 ° As Ed Stein has pointed out, the historical contingency of
recognition of homosexual and heterosexual identities does not necessarily
indicate that the identities themselves are not essential. 3 8 1 Nonetheless, theories
of the relatively recent vintage of homosexuality make an essential division
between heterosexuality and homosexuality less rather than more likely.
Additionally, as Kenji Yoshino has argued, because gays are not necessarily seen
to possess an essential, unchangeable gay identity, they may be asked to
assimilate in more ways than other minority groups, such as those marked by
race or sex.
382
But while the constructivist account posits "the mutability of homo-
sexuality" 383 the constructivist concept of perverse implantation also brings into
relief our rather deep (essentialist) intuition that we know what a homosexual
is-i.e., that a homosexual is a person who innately desires people of his or her
own sex. So while "homosexuality as we conceive of it today" is no doubt "a
space of overlapping, contradictory, and conflictual definitional forces, ' 384 as
Eve Sedgwick would have it, the contradictions in our definition of
homosexuality are not apparent to the naked eye. Instead, authors of the key
texts in the history of sexuality have had to dig up evidence that earlier eras did
377. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 36 (Robert Hurley trans., Random
House 1978) (1976). "The Perverse Implantation" is the name of the chapter in which Foucault
describes the transition from the sodomite, as a "temporary aberration," to the homosexual, as "a
species." Id. at 43.
378. Id.
379. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct.
2472 (2003).
380. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478-80 ("[A]ccording to some scholars the concept of the
homosexual as a distinct category of person did not emerge until the late 19th century.").
381. See EDWARD STEIN, THE MISMEASURE OF DESIRE 100-04 (1999).
382. See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 875-79 (2002). By saying race or
sex, I do not mean to suggest that people are marked only by one of these axes. See Kimberl6
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women
of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241 (1991).
383. Yoshino, Suspect Symbols, supra note 373, at 1827.
384. SEDGWICK, supra note 351, at 45.
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not share our beliefs about homosexuality, our idea that there is a class of
persons who are homosexual,385 in order to counterbalance the widespread belief
in the transhistorical essence of homosexuality.
The task of demonstrating polyamory's constructed aspects has not been
undertaken, an unsurprising fact in light of the gap between views of
homosexuality and of polyamory. Polyamory has not undergone a Foucaultian
perverse implantation. Instead, as the Sullivan and Rauch comments portray so
starkly, polyamory is not generally viewed as an identity at all.386 Polyamorous
instincts are widely seen to be universal or nearly so, while specifically
polyamorous people are not widely understood even to exist as a category of
individuals, much less an essential one.
387
Thus, many of the problems faced by gay rights advocates, relative to race
rights advocates, would likely be multiplied for anyone who tried to gain poly
rights.388  As Joy Singer observes, "seeking broad societal tolerance for and
acceptance of poly lifestyles appears to be more difficult than it was for the gay
movement... [because] our message just hits too much 'closer to home' for the
largely heterosexual, married opinion leaders who run the country ... ."389
Because "most people may in fact be 'pre-poly,' '' 390 Singer says, for them to
acknowledge the viability of polyamory is to imperil their self-conception, and
poly issues therefore "seem much more threatening" than gay or lesbian
issues. 391 Singer's statement that "most people" may be "pre-poly" is, of course,
a perfect example of the universalizing challenge of some poly talk.
Moreover, polys have another, related, problem. Not only might an outsider
385. See, e.g., Mary McIntosh, The Homosexual Role, 16 Soc. PROBS. 182 (1968) (positing
the seventeenth-century origin of the modem homosexual); Randolph Trumbach, London's
Sodomites: Homosexual Behaviour and Western Culture in the Eighteenth Century, 11 J. Soc.
HIST. 1 (1977-78) (claiming the eighteenth-century origin of the modem homosexual); Robert
Padgug, Sexual Matters: On Conceptualizing Sexuality in History, RADICAL HIST. REV.,
Spring/Summer 1979, at 22 n.28 (arguing, with Foucault, for the late-nineteenth-century origins of
the modem homosexual); Jeffrey Weeks, Movements of Affirmation: Sexual Meanings and
Homosexual Identities, RADICAL HIST. REV., Spring/Summer 1979, at 164 (same argument as
Padgug, supra); DAVID M. HALPERIN, Is There a History of Sexuality?, in THE LESBIAN AND GAY
STUDIES READER 416 (H. Abelove et al. eds., 1993) (same argument as Padgug, infra).
386. See supra text accompanying notes 357-58.
387. In addition, whether polyamory is best conceived as a category, as a spectrum, or on
some other model is an open question. See infra text accompanying notes 411-12. As the
discussion below suggests, polyamory may be understood as having some distinguishable
components-such as one's own desire for more than one sexual partner versus one's tolerance (or
even desire) for one's partner's having additional partners. See infra text accompanying notes
392-95,404-06.
388. See supra note 316.
389. Singer, supra note 111, at 5.
390. Id. Singer also proposes that "many could be seen as being 'poly' under the European
model." Id. The "European model" appears to be her term for polyamory that is not
acknowledged as such by the parties: "with an unspoken (or even spoken) agreement that each, or
at least the wife, will 'look the other way' at extramarital affairs while maintaining the marriage."
Id.
391. Id.
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to polyamory worry that she is poly because the desire for nonmonogamy is so
widespread; an outsider might worry that her partner is, or could become,
polyamorous.392 The next Part will discuss calculations that individuals may be
making in their own lives to balance nonexclusive desires and feelings of
jealousy. 393  But for purposes of this discussion of outsider opposition to
polyamory and polyamorists, it is important merely to note that many people
may fear not only a nonmonogamous impulse in themselves, but also, or perhaps
more so, in their partners. The mere possibility of her partner's interest in
polyamory could cause someone to treat the idea of polyamory as absurd and
avoid discussion that might increase its legitimacy.
Relatedly, the norm of compulsory monogamy can be useful to those who
wish to have it both ways.394  If someone wants to be nonmonogamous but
wants his partner to be monogamous, then in many cases, his only way to
achieve that goal is to pretend to embrace monogamy but dishonestly to practice
nonmonogamy. 395 In other words, he can get what he wants only by cheating.
Thus, cheaters may have an investment in disparaging the idea of polyamory.
In light of the above discussion, the rhetorical positioning of multiparty
marriage at the end of the same-sex marriage slippery slope makes sense. The
monogamous aspirations of the same-sex marriage campaigners fit well with the
nation's deep cultural commitment to the fantasy of monogamy and its equally
trenchant resistance to recognizing monogamy's frequent failure. 396  The
prevalence of the fantasy and the reality of nonmonogamy suggests, however,
that the rhetorical slippery slope masks the real proximity of nonmonogamy to
mainstream reality. For polyamory's practitioners, this paradox of prevalence
stands in the way of mainstream social or political support.
C. Alternatives and Implications
Alongside its universalizing aspect, polyamory has a minoritizing strand in
392. For the sake of clarity and brevity, here as in the rest of the article, the examples
sometimes involve males and sometimes females; nothing is intended by the selection of the
pronoun in a given example.
393. See infra Section V.A.
394. Cf J. Hughes, Monogamy as a Prisoners Dilemma: Non-Monogamy as a Collective
Action Problem (January 1992), http://hackvan.com/pub/stig/life/Monogamy-as-Prisoners-
Dilemma.html (suggesting that the greatest overall utility could be gained by widespread
nonmonogamy, but that each individual may achieve the greatest personal utility by having
multiple simultaneous partners, each of whom is monogamous with him or her).
395. An exception occurs if he is partnered with someone who does not wish to have other
partners but does not care if he does. In Part III.B.2, Eddie describes Amber as having that
approach to her relationship. See supra text accompanying note 196.
396. Familiar as they are with the political problems of universalizing identity categories,
though, most gay-rights advocates would be reluctant to make common cause with such a
differently threatening minority identity. To note this strategic perspective is not to say that same-
sex marriage advocates are anything other than entirely ingenuous in their desire to enter the core
institution of compulsory (for some) monogamy.
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its contemporary writings. Polys recognize that only a minority of people seek
honest, open, and autonomous nonmonogamy in the way that polys do, and as
discussed earlier, polys value knowledge about one's own desires in this regard.
But this type of minoritizing perspective is unlikely to reassure an outsider that
the group is discrete, since this perspective may seem to ascribe false
consciousness or cowardice to people who might otherwise be universally
similar. In fact, this kind of minoritizing may actually be the most radical form
of universalizing, along the lines of Deborah Anapol's claims that most (or all)
of us "really are" polyamorous "at heart."
397
In contrast to the universalizing quality of mainstream discourse (and of
some poly writings), a certain strand of poly thought is deeply minoritizing.
Some poly writings discuss polyamory as if it is hardwired. A statement such as
the following is not unusual in the pages of Loving More Magazine: "I've been
Bi and Poly since around the age of 13, and always had more than one
relationship going on as a teenager.... [M]onogamy is just not my nature." 398
Similarly, Eddie Simmons traced his poly identity to his early years: "When I go
and think back on my childhood, I begin to think I was probably polyamorous
then .... Instead of [a] best friend, I had several best friends .. . ."399 One
contributor to Loving More Magazine writes, "The other major source of
objections to polyamory is from those who are intrinsically polyamorous, but
have partnered with a monogamous mate and have pledged, perhaps unwillingly,
to be monogamous." 400 Another contributor, who initially presents polyamory
as a "choice," ultimately seems instead to view it as deep-seated aspect of
identity:
Once a person decides: "I am polyamorous;" or "I am monogamous,"
they can find partners and lifemates who in turn have practiced this
kind of self-examination and made a genuine choice one way or the
other.... It's better to abort a red-hot love affair early on with someone
who does not share your fundamental orientation than to spend the rest
of your lives together in bitter conflict over this desperately important
issue.... I mean, I may still fall madly in love with a man who is
decidedly gay, but I will learn quickly to rechannel my affections into
more appropriate directions and you can bet your boots I will not
397. See supra text accompanying note 366.
398. The Dragon Bear Family, supra note 283, at 15 (quoting the portion labeled "Jeffrs
Side").
399. See Simmons Interview, supra note 188.
400. Zell & Zell, supra note 300, at 26 (quoting from the portion labeled "Oberon," and
interpreting the two main objections to come from fear-in "people who are intrinsically
monogamous"-that their partners might want nonmonogamy if that were an option, and
resentment-in "those who are intrinsically polyamorous, but have partnered with a monogamous
mate and have pledged, perhaps unwillingly, to be monogamous"-that others are doing what they
want to do) (emphasis omitted).
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propose marriage to him!4
0 1
In light of this poly's analogy between polyamory and homosexuality, her
description of the choice to be poly looks more like a choice about how to
experience and express one's true poly identity. These writings reflect the view
that there are some people who "really are" poly.40 2 Moreover, this view is
sufficiently common in poly circles that its opposite-the view that while
relationships can be poly, people cannot-is designated an "alternate point of
view" on the alt.polyamory "frequently asked questions (FAQ)" page.40 3
This vision of poly identity as essential may follow from ideas about
jealousy as essential. From this perspective, an essential poly identity may be
determined by the absence of jealousy. Polys sometimes reflect on the different
amounts of jealousy in different people. For example, the alt.polyamory FAQ
page says, "Some people seem to have no jealousy; it's as if they didn't get that
piece installed at the factory. Others, including some long-term polyamorists,
feel jealousy, which they regard as a signal that something needs investigation
and care, much as they would regard depression or pain." 4°4 At times, the idea
of a hardwired absence of jealousy is explicitly tied to an idea of hardwired poly
identity. Eddie explained the relative levels of intrinsic polyness among his
family members through their relative amounts of jealousy. After explaining
that he thinks he was polyamorous even as a child because he had several best
401. id. (quoting from the portion labeled "Morning Glory").
402. Cf supra text accompanying note 351.
403. Matthesen, supra note 130. Matthesen quotes the following anonymous posting as an
"alternate" view:
There aren't polyamorous and monogamous people; there are polyamorous and
monogamous relationships. The same person may at various times be happy in both
monogamous and polyamorous relationships at various times in his/her life. What is
right depends on you and your feelings, and the feelings of those you are involved in
relationships with. You may at some times be involved in a relationship that is
monogamous, and that may be the right thing for the people in that relationship; at other
times, you may be in a relationship which works better as part of a polyamorous
network of relationships. In any case, the important thing is probably to act kindly and
responsibly, and to communicate clearly with intimate partners and potential partners
about these issues. Don't deny your feelings or the feelings of those that you care
about. Get in touch with how you and those you care about really feel, rather than how
society wants you to feel, or how you think it would be logical to feel, or how you've
been told polyamorous people (or monogamous people) should feel. Then behave in
ways which are honest, and which make you, and the people you care about, and the
people they care about, happy and fulfilled. If this results in you having more than one
intimate relationship at the same time, or being involved in a relationship with more
than two people, those who are big on categorizing and labeling people will label you a
"poly person."
Id. (quoting from the portion of the website labeled "How can I tell if I am polyamorous?", at
http://www.polyamory.org/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2004)).
404. Id. (quoting the portion labeled "What about jealousy?"). The website continues,
"Jealousy is neither a proof of love (and this is where polyamory differs from possessive or
insecure monogamy) nor a moral failing (and this is where polyamory differs from emotionally
manipulating one's partner(s) into relationships for which they are not ready)." Id.
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friends, he observes:
[T]he jealousy wasn't a big piece.... Some of us do and some don't
[experience jealousy] .... [It's a] grey scale. I think Adam came hard-
wired [as poly], even more so than me. Amber didn't; she deals
with jealousy. Mike has learned... through experience he's
discovered .... [He's] in the middle.40 5
From this perspective, then, individuals can be described in terms of fixed levels
of jealousy, which in turn determine fixed levels of polyness. 40 6 It is important
to emphasize that the idea that poly is defined by a lack of jealousy is just one
strand of poly writing; as discussed earlier, much poly writing focuses on ways
to overcome jealousy, work through it, and supplement or replace it with
feelings of compersion. 40 7 Nonetheless, we see signs here of an essentializing
view of polyamorous identity, and the idea that such fixed polyness exists only
in certain people leads to a minoritizing discourse of poly identity.
The suggestion of an essential poly identity presents intriguing possibilities
for a politics based on an ingenuous or a strategic essentialism 40 8 through which
polys could try to build an image of themselves as a discrete minority.
Convincing the mainstream nonmonogamists that polyamorists are a
recognizable group with a distinct identity might be polys' best chance of
overcoming the effects of the paradox of prevalence.
Several conceptual and practical problems undercut this possibility,
however. First, this vision of poly identity may not be essential enough. Gays
are frequently considered at best the outer limit of a spectrum of immutability or
essential identity, and even a constructivist view considers homosexuality to
have undergone the "perverse implantation" discussed above, 40 9 which fixed
405. See Simmons Interview, supra note 188.
406. Of course, there is no theoretical reason why jealousy and the desire for nonmonogamy
should be on the same axis. Someone could lack jealousy but also lack the desire for
nonmonogamy, or possess both jealousy and the desire for nonmonogamy. See infra Section V.A.
Polys tend to combine them, I think, because most people prefer to place the same limits on their
partners that they place on themselves.
407. See supra text accompanying notes 310--315. As discussed earlier, compersion is a poly
word for taking pleasure in a partner's pleasure, as a preferable alternative or supplement to feeling
jealousy.
408. See, e.g., DIANA Fuss, ESSENTIALLY SPEAKING: FEMINISM, NATURE & DIFFERENCE xiv,
18-19, 30-32 (1989); GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing
Historiography, in IN OTHER WORLDS: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL POLITICS 197, 205-07 (1987); see
also Fuss, supra, at 118 ("How are we to negotiate the gap between the conservative fiction of
experience as the ground of all truth-knowledge and the immense power of this fiction to enable
and encourage student participation? ... 'Essentially speaking,' we need both to theorize
essentialist spaces from which to speak and, simultaneously, to deconstruct these spaces to keep
them from solidifying."); cf Sara Danius & Stefan Jonsson, An Interview with Gayatri
Chakrovorty Spivak, in BOUNDARY 2, at 24, 35 (1993) (quoting Spivak as asserting that "as a
phrase, I have given up on" strategic essentialism because it "became the union ticket for
essentialism," but equivocating as to whether she has given up on it "as a project").
409. See supra text accompanying notes 377-87.
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homosexuals with a perceived pathology in the eyes of sexology and, ultimately,
the broader culture. Polys have undergone nothing like this perverse
implantation, nor is it feasible (or presumably desirable) to recommend that they
pursue one.
410
Second, this view of polyamory may not be minoritizing enough. The
jealousy-poly continuum looks more like a sexual-orientation spectrum that
recognizes a blurring of categories and a wide middle range of bisexuality.
Eddie's "grey scale" of jealousy-and thus of polyamory-is reminiscent of
Kinsey's sexual continuum4 and ideas of universal bisexuality.4 12 Like
bisexuality, polyamory founded on this idea of a continuum is unlikely to
reassure its putative outsiders that they are safe from the threat of falling into this
state that they deem undesirable.
Third, the impulse to settle upon one view of polyamory-minoritizing or
universalizing-may be worth resisting for theoretical and political reasons.
While elaborating the potential benefits of political organizing around acts rather
than identities in the aftermath of Bowers v. Hardwick, Janet Halley has also
suggested that marginalized groups may draw strength from a "multiplicity of
strategies. "413 Conceptual ambiguity about the origins and scope of
homosexuality and bisexuality has in some ways been an obstacle for sexual-
orientation-based rights claims, but it has also been the source of important
intellectual and political activity.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this approach may not be radical
enough-it may go against the meaning of polyness for many polys. The poly
philosophies outlined at the beginning of the article do pay a great deal of
attention to individual growth and experience, but they also articulate visions for
others, and for the broader culture, and part of their power on all levels comes
from their transformative vision. 4 14  This is why goals such as marriage are
apparently not desirable to a sizable minority of polys, particularly if they come
410. Related to this, some polys have taken the kind of political stand reflected in certain gay
and pro-gay writings-that it simply does not matter whether the identity is essential or
constructed. See, e.g., Moon Dragon, Born Poly?, at http://www.polyamorysociety.org/
BornPoly.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2004) ("I may, or may not, be born poly, but I'll die one.").
411. Cf Yoshino, supra note 349, at 356-57 (discussing "the view-powerful in modem
American culture from at least the publication of the Kinsey studies onward-that sexual
orientation arrays itself along a continuum from exclusive heterosexuality to exclusive
homosexuality" (citing KINSEY, POMEROY, MARTIN & GEBHARD, supra note 368)).
412. Cf MARJORIE GARBER, VICE VERSA: BISEXUALITY AND THE EROTICISM OF EVERYDAY
LIFE 16-18 (1995); PAULA C. RUST, BISEXUALITY AND THE CHALLENGE TO LESBIAN POLITICS: SEX,
LOYALTY, AND REVOLUTION 1 (1995).
413. Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v.
Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1770-71 (1993) ("Any attempt to exploit the rhetorical
possibilities created as Hardwick becomes part of our legal and extra-legal culture and should
embrace the multiplicity of strategies adopted by the Court. Anti-homophobic strategy should look
both to identities and to acts as conceptual locations for opposition.").
414. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 363-66.
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at the expense of a more radical vision.415
Many in the mainstream share with polys the desire for more than one
sexual partner. This leads them to resist discussions or acceptance of
polyamorists and their lifestyle. But does this mean that most everyone wants to
be polyamorous? To think directly about what people want for themselves, we
have to separate some different possible aspects of polyamory and monogamy
and to pose some different questions about what kinds of choices people may (or
may not) be making in their own lives. This is the starting point for the next
Part.
V.
DISPOSITIONS: SEXUAL AND LEGAL
The paradox of prevalence focuses largely on perceived identities: how
polyamorous identity is generally understood and why it is considered by most
to be beyond the realm of political possibility. To think about how law may be
actually shaping each of us with regard to monogamy and polyamory, however,
we must consider what these practices might look like at the level of desire or
disposition. That is, if we try to imagine desire itself separate from the
normative conception of desire, we can think more distinctly about how law
might be shaping those desires.4 16 In order to frame a provisional discussion of
the proper role of law with regard to monogamy, this Part first considers the
possible components of two contrasting identity possibilities: what we might
call-so as not to confuse them with the practices of monogamy and
polyamory-"mono" and "poly" dispositions. To promote discussion about
monogamy and its alternatives, the article then concludes with a thought
415. The slight data on poly views on marriage suggest that 32% oppose civil group
marriage, while 68% support it. See Ryam Nearing, Poly Political Animals Speak, LOVING MORE
MAG., Winter 1996, at 22 (reporting on a "political quiz," which received over two hundred
responses).
Many [respondents] expressed a desire to get the government out of the bedroom and
people's intimate lives, except in the case of child welfare, but they also indicated that
as long as marriage benefits are available for hetero couples, they should also be there
for those in other forms of intimate relationships.
Id. The article about the survey primarily printed individual responses, rather than numerical or
statistical results. Those individual responses printed largely tracked that summary, with tepid
support for legalization of group marriage, if something more radical-like the abolition of
marriage-is unavailable in this society. Id. at 22-23. The other key numerical observation
offered is that "[t]he three highest priority legal issues as ranked by our respondents were: medical
rights for poly partners; nondiscrimination in employment, and zoning which allows for non-
related people to live together." Id. at 22.
416. I express no opinion here on whether desire could actually exist independent of
discourse; I posit only that we can usefully try to think about desire as a feeling separate from how
a culture or community categorizes that desire.
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experiment imagining how certain laws might themselves be used to promote
discussion about some of these issues.
A. A Dispositional Model of Poly and Mono Desire
The first purpose of this Section is to try to imagine what a complete desire
for polyamory or complete desire for monogamy might look like. Put another
way, how might we conceive of the most "open" (poly) and most "closed"
(mono) sexual dispositions? "Disposition" here refers to an identity defined by
the desires of the participants, rather than, for instance, their behavior or their
self-identification.
4 17
Tables 1 and 2 present one way to think about extreme poly and mono
dispositions. The rows of each table are defined by the behavioral axes regulated
by criminal adultery and bigamy laws. As discussed in Part III, polyamory may
be seen as the intersection of two types of transgression: a transgression of
norms and laws requiring exclusivity in sexual relationships (regulated by
adultery laws) and of norms and laws prescribing the numerosity of domestic
sexual relationships (regulated by bigamy laws).418 So the first row concerns
whether someone desires sexual exclusivity (one sexual partner or more than one
sexual partner), and the second row concerns whether someone desires domestic
twoness (one domestic partner or more than one domestic partner.)419
The two columns, "for oneself' and "for one's partner(s)," recognize the
possible distinction between one's desires with regard to oneself and one's
desires with regard to one's partner(s). 420  For instance, along the exclusivity
axis, a person may desire more than one sexual partner for himself, but he may
desire only one sexual partner for his partner. Or, along the numerosity axis, a
person may want only one domestic partner for herself, but she may want more
than one domestic partner for her partner perhaps because she does not want to
have to fulfill all the needs of her partner.
A few caveats are important. First, these charts are not meant to define
polyamory or monogamy, but rather to show what particular extreme versions of
417. See STEIN, supra note 381, at 45 (defining "the dispositional view of sexual
orientation .... [as the view that] a person's sexual orientation is based on his or her sexual desires
and fantasies and the sexual behaviors he or she is disposed to engage in under ideal conditions").
As Stein points out, there are significant epistemological and methodological problems in trying to
gather empirical data on people's sexual dispositions. See id at 210-11. My purpose here is only
to use the dispositional model as a way to think about people's desires with regard to mono and
poly.
418. See supra text accompanying notes 157-58.
419. These may well be two quite different types of desire; an interesting avenue for inquiry
would be to think about the properties, antecedents, and development of these different wants and
desires.
420. Because the primary purpose of these tables, at least in this article, is to discuss people's
disposition towards monogamy or an alternative model, I often speak of one partner as the
exclusive case and multiple partners as the nonexclusive case, even though exclusivity can be a
property of relationships among multiple partners.
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each, from the perspective of disposition, might look like. Second, I do not
mean these charts to suggest that the relevant desires are fixed in people, that
they are knowable, or that they exist independent of discourse and social
practices. Rather, the charts try to capture a hypothetical snapshot of current
people under current norms if we had access to their desires with respect to
sexual and domestic partners. Indeed, this exercise aims to help us imagine what
aspects of desire are more or less malleable under various norms. Third, this
approach views polyamory entirely through the lens of monogamy's norms,
casting it as the nexus between two transgressions of monogamy. There are of
course many ways to view polyamory, as discussed in Part III, and this is merely
one perspective. Fourth, this approach does not take account of people who
themselves want no sexual or domestic partners at all or who, out of spite,
discomfort, or something else, want their partner to have no sexual partners at
all. Finally, this characterization does not answer the question of what
constitutes "sex" for purposes of exclusivity or nonexclusivity. As suggested
earlier, actual physical contact, and particularly genital contact, is typically
considered to be a more acceptable prompt for jealousy than nonphysical
friendship.421 But relationships can take many forms, as can jealousy. What is
perhaps most relevant for many relationships is what the other partner would
consider to be sex for purposes of jealousy.
Table 1: Extreme Poly Disposition (most "open" intersection of desires)
For oneself For one's partner(s)
Sexual Exclusivity A) B)
(targeted by adultery Poly sexual desire with Poly sexual desire with
statutes) regard to oneself: desire regard to one's partner(s):
for more than one sexual desire for one's partner(s)
partner to have sexual experiences
beyond oneself, i.e., the
opposite of jealousy, or
compersion
Domestic/Romantic C) D)
Numerosity (targeted by Poly partnering desire Poly partnering desire with
bigamy statutes) with regard to oneself: regard to one's partner(s):
desire for more than one desire for one's partner(s)
ongoing to have more than one
domestic/romantic ongoing domestic/romantic
partner partner, i.e., more than
oneself
421. See supra Section II.A. 1.
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Table 1 presents one idea of an extreme poly disposition. We can use this
table to imagine an individual whose desires tip in the poly direction in each of
the four boxes. In Box A, which concerns the question of exclusivity for
oneself, this individual desires more than one sexual partner for herself, perhaps
out of a desire for sexual variety or because she finds many people sexually
attractive. In Box B, which concerns exclusivity with regard to one's partner,
she desires her partner to have more than one sexual partner. That is, the person
with a complete poly disposition wants her partner to have sex with people in
addition to her. Factors contributing to this desire might be sexual excitement at
the idea of her partner's having sex with someone else422 or the emotion of
compersion, the poly term for the opposite of jealousy, for empathetic pleasure
in one's partner's sexual satisfaction.
423
In Box C of Table 1, where the numerosity row intersects with the self
column, the completely poly-disposed individual would desire more than one
ongoing domestic or romantic partner. She might want more than one partner
because, for instance, she likes having multiple interlocutors, prefers pooling
domestic resources, enjoys processing, or feels her needs are better met by
multiple people rather than one person. Finally, in Box D, numerosity with
regard to one's partner, the poly-disposed individual would want her partner to
have more than one domestic or romantic partner, perhaps because she prefers
that her partner have more than one person to fulfill her needs. The distinction
between Box C and Box D might also be understood-through the metaphor of
traditional polygamy-as the difference between how a person might feel about
being the one woman in a polyandrous relationship (Box C) or about being one
of several women in a polygynous relationship (Box D). In sum, Table 1
presents a portrait of a completely open, completely poly, disposition. It is hard
to imagine that a person with this disposition would be happy in any relationship
other than a polyamorous one, in the sense of a relationship open to multiple
sexual partners and multiple domestic partners.
424
422. Or, relatedly, a feeling of pride or flattery in a partner's sexual attractiveness or
"prowess."
423. See supra text accompanying note 315.
424. In addition, consistency across rows may indicate a disposition along a particular axis.
For example, a person with strong affirmative responses in Boxes A and B, such that she desires
additional sexual partners for herself and her partner, is likely to be content only in a sexually open
relationship. A person with strong affirmative responses in Boxes C and D, who desires additional
domestic partners for himself and his partner, is likely to be happy only in a domestic living
arrangement of multiple people. (It is an interesting question whether a family with children or
other dependents might in some way satisfy the latter desire.)
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Table 2: Extreme Mono Disposition (most "closed" intersection of desires)
Exclusivity A) B)
Mono sexual desire with Mono sexual desire with
regard to oneself: desire regard to one's partner(s):
for one and only one desire for one's partner(s)
sexual partner to have sexual
experiences with only
oneself, i.e., jealousy at
the idea of one's partner's
having sex with others or
perhaps at the idea of a
partner's desiring others
Numerosity C) D)
Mono partnering desire: Mono partnering desire
desire for one and only with regard to one's
one ongoing partner(s): desire for
domestic/romantic partner one's partner(s) to have
only one ongoing
domestic/romantic
partner, i.e., just oneself
Table 2 presents the opposite disposition: complete mono desire. In Box A,
an individual with this disposition desires sex with one and only one person.
Many reasons are plausible. He might experience sexual satisfaction only
through an exclusive sexual bond, he might obtain such tremendous sexual
satisfaction from exclusive sexual intimacy that he does not desire anyone else,
he might be romantically consumed by one particular person, or he might have
tremendous nervousness that is reassured only by one particular person. In Box
B, this individual also desires that his partner have only one sexual partner: him.
His desire for the other person only to have him (which might broadly be called
jealousy) might be rooted in, for example, anxiety about losing the partner or
being compared to others, a desire to spend all his time with the partner and a
corresponding wish that the partner never be otherwise occupied, or
embarrassment at the idea of his partner having other sexual partners because
observers would assume he was being betrayed.
Along the numerosity row, in Box C he would want only one domestic or
romantic partner, perhaps because he feels that all his needs are met by one
person, or does not want to divide his resources or energies among multiple
people. Finally, in Box D, this mono individual would want his partner to have
only him as an ongoing domestic or romantic partner. He might want the person
always to be available to address his needs; he might want to feel loved more
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than anyone else in his partner's world. This is a portrait of a completely closed,
completely mono, disposition. It is hard to imagine a person with this
disposition being happy in anything other than a completely monogamous
couple.
4 25
In light of the number of people who commit adultery, 426 and the
presumably greater number who desire it, it seems fair to assume that most
people are more on the poly side (Table 1) for Box A. By contrast, the
prevalence of jealousy would suggest very few people are in Box B of the
completely poly table (Table 1), and instead most probably place themselves in
Box B of the completely mono table (Table 2). That is, most people may desire
multiple sexual partners for themselves, but desire a partner who is exclusively
sexual with them. The rarity of poly relationships also suggests that for both
Box C and Box D-the desire for one domestic partner for oneself and for one's
partner, respectively-most people are on the mono side (Table 2). In sum,
viewing current desires at face value, we may provisionally conclude that most
people seem likely to place themselves in Table 1 (completely poly) for Box A,
but Table 2 (completely mono) for Boxes B, C, and D.
Thus, it seems that most people find themselves with neither a completely
poly nor completely mono disposition. A sort of "bi" disposition in this regard
might be understood as conflicting boxes between tables, as described above, or
as a bi-directional desire in one or more boxes, or, alternatively or also, as a
flexibility or indifference in one or more boxes. Thus, most people possess some
sort of mix of desires, with the largest number perhaps meeting the profile
described above: a poly-type desire for multiple sexual partners for oneself, but a
mono-type desire for one's partner to have only one sexual partner, and mono-
type desires along the numerosity axis for both self and partner.
People with mixed impulses with regard to sexual exclusivity and
numerosity might choose to enter either monogamous or nonmonogamous
relationships for any number of reasons. People might choose to embrace
monogamy as a goal (perhaps even if they are in danger of slipping up
occasionally) because while they might prefer nonexclusive sexual possibilities
for themselves and, due to jealousy, exclusive commitment from their partners,
in the end they would prefer exclusive sexual commitment for both over
nonexclusivity for both. In other words, jealousy trumps sexual desire for
425. As with Table 1, consistency across the rows in Table 2 may also be significant. See
supra note 424. For example, a person with affirmative responses in Boxes A and B (the
exclusivity row), but negative responses in Boxes C and D (the numerosity row), wants sexual
monogamy for herself and her partner, but multiple domestic relationships for herself and her
partner. This person presumably will be happy only in a sexually exclusive relationship, but will
also presumably want to live with more people than her partner. As noted above, one wonders if
living in a house with children or other dependents might partially or fully satisfy this multi-
partnering urge. On the other hand, a person with affirmative responses in Boxes C and D, but
negative responses in Boxes A and B, will presumably have a strong desire for a sexually open
relationship, but for a domestic partnership of only two.
426. See supra text accompanying notes 106-09.
Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
2004]
N. Y U. REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE
additional partners. Thus, in the absence of finding a partner who wants to be
sexually exclusive and have a partner who is nonexclusive, such a person favors
exclusivity for herself and her partner.
If many people are in this situation, then they might feel that a widespread
societal commitment to monogamous norms and behavior would help them
solve a collective action problem for all those who want that compromise. But
this approach assumes that jealousy is fixed and would not diminish in the face
of different norms and possibilities surrounding sexual nonexclusivity. This
proposition is far from certain.427  Moreover, if so many want exclusivity,
collective action should not be a particular problem even in a world of less
restrictive norms; social clubs and identity names (such as "monogamist" or,
more specifically, "exclusivist" or "dualist") might be generated to help the
many people with this preference find each other. The same might be said for
people who might prefer monogamy as a kind of precommitment strategy
because they have nonmonogamous desires but prefer monogamous rules and
behavior because of certain beliefs about morality or concerns about possible
emotional pain stemming from more sexual or romantic relationships. Those
preferring this precommitment approach could find each other through the type
of channels and techniques currently used by most individuals to find those with
whom they are compatible in a whole range of ways.
Perceived risk might also be a factor in some people's decisions about
monogamy. Concern about risk might be understood as a component of what we
call jealousy, or as an independent form of rational calculation. Either way,
some people might feel that having outside sexual experiences-or a partner's
having outside sexual experiences-creates a greater risk of losing the partner.
They may therefore interpret an agreement to have sexual experiences outside
the relationship as a sign that one or both partners lack concern about losing each
other and thus feel less love than those who commit to exclusivity. (This logic
may explain why people sometimes experience pleasure when learning that a
partner is jealous: they may experience the jealousy as a sign that the partner is
risk averse about losing them.).
But there is also a different theory of risk: if a relationship does not permit
outside experiences, then one or both partners may grow agitated, feel confined,
feel bored, feel resentful, stop having sex, stop growing, or face similar
undesirable consequences. Such risks are more apparent if we imagine the
outside experiences as nonsexual, i.e., as relationships that typically do not
violate monogamy's law, such as friendships. If two partners promised not to
have any friends outside of the relationship, or dropped all their friends because
427. There is limited empirical work suggesting that a person may feel less jealousy in
response to a partner's "extradyadic" sex if the first person has also engaged in extradyadic sex at
some point. In addition, the first person, particularly if female, may experience less
disappointment if her partner has engaged in extradyadic sex previously. See Bram P. Buunk, Sex,
Self-Esteem, Dependency, and Extradyadic Sexual Experience as Related to Jealousy Responses,
12 J. Soc. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 147, 152 (1995).
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emotional exclusivity made one or both partners feel more special, they would
presumably, from a practical perspective, decrease the chances that one of them
would fall in love with someone else, since they would not be interacting with
anyone else. But the relationship could become cloying and limiting, the
partners might grow resentful or bored, and might eventually break out of this
bind by leaving. They might even do this by sneaking around to find
companionship outside the relationship. In addition, any new friendship would
need to be secret, and this very secrecy might, by creating frisson and guilt, lead
to a shift of loyalties. 428 In other words, under a no-friends rule, simply having a
friend in addition to the partner could generate anxiety, drama, and secrets from
the partner. But if friends were permitted, as they are in most relationships, then
the picture looks rather different.
For some, then, concerns about the risks of sex outside the relationship may
trump concerns about the risks of exclusivity. Given a choice between
exclusivity and nonexclusivity rules, then, these individuals will presumably
choose exclusivity. For some others, however, concerns about the risks of
exclusivity may trump concerns about the risks of outside sexual partners.
Given the two options, these individuals will presumably choose nonexclusivity.
As discussed earlier, some may also choose cheating to try to capture the best of
both worlds. 429
In light of the above discussion, neither monogamy nor polyamory
necessarily seems an unreasonable choice, depending on individual or partner
dispositions, feelings, and priorities. That said, this talk of choices about how to
behave in the face of mixed desires suggests that people are actively choosing to
live one lifestyle or the other. I suspect, however, that contemporary norms
decrease the availability of true choice. The next Section will consider the
current and ideal role of law in shaping those norms.
B. The Role of Law: A Thought Experiment
Law contributes to the norm of compulsory monogamy in many ways.
Most obviously, in many states, the criminal law penalizes married people who
engage in nonexclusive sexual behavior, through adultery laws, and also married
people who try to marry or cohabit with additional partners, through bigamy
laws.4 30 Moreover, the marriage law in all fifty states prevents multiple parties
from marrying one another, and no U.S. jurisdiction's domestic partnership laws
permit multiple partners to register. 43 1 And, whether appropriate or not under
428. Cf Kipnis, supra note 110, at 40-43.
429. See supra text accompanying notes 394-95.
430. See supra notes 50-51.
431. With one possible exception, I have seen nothing to indicate that polyamorous
relationships, as distinguished from traditional polygamy with its one-sided acceptance of only
polygyny, are featuring prominently in the political landscape of any country. Martha Ertman
notes that the city of Cork, Ireland, considered a bill that would extend "domestic partnership
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applicable custody laws, the power of the state has been used to separate a
mother from her child based on her polyamorous relationship, as the Divilbiss
case demonstrates. 432 People living in polyamorous relationships worry about
losing their jobs due to discrimination based on their relationships, 433 and no
statute or principle has been held to protect individuals from such job
discrimination. Zoning laws, limiting the number of unrelated persons who may
reside together, may shape people's choices about their family arrangements.
434
Each of these legal issues is complex and warrants its own article. Nonetheless,
in the remainder of this article, I turn to one of the more discrete and explicitly
coercive forms of legal intervention into decisions about monogamy: criminal
prohibitions on adulterous conduct.43
5
An obvious legal implication of the analysis thus far-which acknowledges
the prevalence of nonmonogamous sexual behavior and desires and takes
seriously polyamory as a viable relationship practice for some-is that adultery
laws should be repealed. Although these laws target only a small part of the
sexual, loving universe that polyamory comprises, they embody as an absolute
rule the normative presumption that underlies monogamy's law: the idea that
sexual jealousy is a constitutive part of romantic love. The existence of these
laws threatens to interfere with people's choices to adopt a lifestyle other than
monogamy, and thus with any true "choice" between monogamy and
nonmonogamy. 436 And there are a number of reasons that we might prefer a
provisions beyond couples to include polyamorous affiliations, reasoning that intimate partnerships
sometimes have more than two partners just as business partnerships do." Ertman, The ALl
Principles, supra note 26, at 116 (citing Jan Battles, Cork Opens Door to Gay Couples, SUNDAY
TIMES (London), Feb. 6, 2000).
432. See supra Section III.B. 1.
433. See supra note 316.
434. See supra note 415; cf Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality
opinion).
435. Bigamy laws are a more complicated issue. Because multiparty marriage is not legal,
much of the behavior bigamy laws target is fraud-possibly on the other spouse but certainly on
the state. As noted earlier, there are five states that criminalize bigamous cohabitation, see supra
note 158, which does not necessarily contain any fraudulent intent, but the laws arguably aim to
capture Mormons who marry and divorce several wives in order to create a de facto polygamous
marriage and thereby circumvent the bigamy laws. See, e.g., Ryan D. Tenney, Tom Green,
Common-Law Marriage, and the Illegality of Putative Polygamy, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 141 (2002)
(discussing the prosecution of a polygamist Mormon under bigamy and common-law marriage
statutes).
436. There are two things to note here. First, as I discuss below, adultery statutes are not
generally enforced; this fact partially prompts this inquiry into whether they should be amended to
incorporate a notion of consent and then enforced or simply allowed to fall into desuetude.
Second, adultery laws may not directly affect gay people's lives since gay people cannot many
and, at least under some state laws, same-sex extramarital sex does not constitute adultery, see
Anne Saunders, New Hampshire Supreme Court: Gay Sex Cannot Be Adultery, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Nov. 7, 2003. As same-sex couples approach legalized marriage, however, such
proscriptions may soon apply. Cf, supra text accompanying notes 55-58 (discussing the use of
the term "exclusive" in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003)).
Although adultery statutes are not the most pressing legal concern for polys, it is worth noting that
in a context in which gay sex is relevant to adultery, a relationship such as Eddie Simmons's, see
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world in which people choose monogamy or choose open relationships or
polyamory, at least to a greater extent than they do now. For example, the
preceding discussion of differing dispositions suggests that some individuals
may be happy only in a poly or a mono relationship context. If people could
choose either monogamy or one of its alternatives, rather than being urged into
automatic promises of monogamy, there might be fewer ugly, painful betrayals.
More people who value sexual nonexclusivity or a larger domestic circle might
find one another, rather than bonding with unlike individuals, at times under
false pretenses. It might be easier to be confident that one's monogamous
partner really wants monogamy, if that partner has seen viable alternative
relationship models and turned them down in favor of monogamy.
This last point might be understood as similar to the contemporary situation
with regard to homosexuality, in which we are less likely than ever before to
think that homosexuals and bisexuals may be lurking secretly everywhere,
because there are fewer reasons for gays and bis not to come out under current
historical conditions.437  Because the set of poly desires is so complex and
potentially contradictory, 438 the outness model goes only so far in describing
polyamory and polyamorous desires. It seems likely, though, that if more people
accepted alternatives to monogamy, there would be greater openness on the part
of those who valued sexual nonexclusivity or multiparty domestic arrangements
more than or instead of the contrary monogamous values. No doubt there would
still be cheaters and people who felt trapped by circumstance. But cheating
might be less painful for some if the world did not assume that the extramarital
activity was the betrayal of a sacred promise, or if the parties did not establish
sexual fidelity as the foundational promise of their relationship.439 A world in
which both monogamy and its alternatives were viable options would be a
complex world, but this newly complex world might well have virtues to rival
the current privileging of monogamy, with its sometimes contradictory fantasies
and realities. Whether or not the state should actively encourage polyamory and
open relationships as viable relationship models, the state should arguably stop
using the coercive power of the criminal law to discourage alternatives to
monogamy.
supra Section III.B.2, could be subject to prosecution. Given the law's penchant for singling out
marginal individuals for prosecution, Eddie's family might have reason to fear being a prime
target.
437. The historical frame of this assertion is the last 150 years, the period of the modem
"homosexual" experience. See supra text accompanying notes 377-82. As to whether it makes
sense to think about tolerance or intolerance of homosexual identities prior to that time, I express
no opinion here.
438. See supra Section V.A.
439. The emotion behind jealousy may arguably be due in part or in full to the meaning
ascribed to promises of monogamy. If a person says explicitly or implicitly that the most hurtful
thing his partner could do to him is to have sex with someone else, then it is hard to know what
part of his hurt over his partner's cheating is due to the outside sexual behavior and what part is
due to the partner's knowingly doing what had been established as the "most hurtful thing."
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Thus, the obvious next step would seem to be to repeal the adultery laws
that exist in nearly half the states. 440 These adultery laws are rarely enforced,44 1
but they always present the possibility of enforcement,442 and they stand as
emblems of the expectation of monogamy. And thus repeal may well be the
most desirable path. But here we would do well to pause before proceeding, to
consider two points. First, if the problem with the adultery laws is that they are
coercive, then perhaps the solution is not to repeal the laws, but rather to amend
them to eliminate their coercive element. In the language of contract law, we
should consider turning these "immutable rules"-rules that the parties must
accept as part of their agreements-into "default rules"-rules around which the
parties can contract.443 I explain this idea further below.
Second, if the aim is to encourage individuals to make affirmative choices,
and to choose partners with compatible desires, then we should encourage
conversations between partners and between potential partners. The question
then becomes whether law might play an affirmative role in that process. More
specifically, contract law principles suggest that modifying adultery statutes,
rather than repealing them, is the best way to encourage those conversations.
Under the principle of information-forcing default rules, one way to force
conversations is to set the default at something other than what the parties would
have wanted-in other words, to create a penalty for parties who are not explicit
about what rules they want to govern their relationship. 444 In what follows, I
first explain what it might mean to amend adultery statutes to make them default
rules, then I use the idea of information-forcing default rules to consider the best
way to set the adultery default rule. Finally, I conclude by considering whether
the criminal law is the proper realm for this approach.
Adultery statutes, as currently written, are immutable rules. For example,
the Massachusetts statute provides, "A married person who has sexual
intercourse with a person not his spouse or an unmarried person who has sexual
440. See supra note 50.
441. See supra note 50.
442. For example, a prominent lawyer in Virginia, John R. Bushey, Jr., was recently
convicted of adultery. See Kelly, supra note 50. Bushey has been joined in his appeal by the
ACLU, which plans to challenge the constitutionality of the adultery statute in light of Lawrence.
See John F. Kelly, Va. Man Challenges State's Adultery Law; ACLU Joins Appeal, Cites Privacy
Issue, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 2004, at B8.
443. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989) ("The legal rules of contracts and
corporations can be divided into two distinct classes. The larger class consists of 'default' rules
that parties can contract around by prior agreement, while the smaller, but important, class consists
of 'immutable' rules that parties cannot change by contractual agreement. Default rules fill the
gaps in incomplete contracts; they govern unless the parties contract around them. Immutable
rules cannot be contracted around; they govem even if the parties attempt to contract around
them." (footnote omitted)).
444. See generally id; Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults,
51 STAN. L. REv. 1591 (1999).
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intercourse with a married person shall be guilty of adultery . ,445 A married
person who engages in extramarital sex in the relevant jurisdiction is guilty of
adultery, regardless of any agreement by the parties to the contrary.446 The
problem, then, with these laws may not be that they exist, but that they interfere
with the parties' ability to make their own agreements about sexual exclusivity.
Adultery statutes could instead be written as default rules. For instance, a
statute could criminalize extramarital sex by married persons only if the spouses
have agreed to require exclusivity, or only if they have not agreed to permit
extramarital sex. In the language of the criminal law, the extramarital sex would
be criminal adultery unless the other spouse gave his "consent." 447 Rape law
might serve as a model here, with the caveat that the crimes of rape and adultery
445. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 14 (2000).
446. The closest these statutes come to a consent-based model is the four state statutes that
condition prosecution on a complaint by the other spouse, but this is not the same thing as a
defense of consent; the spouse could complain after the fact even if the adultery was agreed upon
in advance, and nothing in the statutes permits the adulterer to offer that prior consent as a defense.
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1408(B) (West 2001) ("No prosecution for adultery shall be
commenced except upon complaint of the husband or wife."); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.36(2)
(West 2003) ("No prosecution shall be commenced under this section except on complaint of the
husband or the wife, except when such husband or wife is insane, nor after one year from the
commission of the offense."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-09(2) (1997) ("No prosecution shall be
instituted under this section except on the complaint of the spouse of the alleged offender, and the
prosecution shall not be commenced later than one year from commission of the offense."); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 871 (West 2002) ("Adultery is the unlawful voluntary sexual intercourse of a
married person with one of the opposite sex; and when the crime is between persons, only one of
whom is married, both are guilty of adultery. Prosecution for adultery can be commenced and
carried on against either of the parties to the crime only by his or her own husband or wife as the
case may be, or by the husband or wife of the other party to the crime: Provided, that any person
may make complaint when persons are living together in open and notorious adultery."). Note that
the Oklahoma statute does not quite fit in this group since it provides for prosecution if the
adultery is open and notorious and anyone complains, even if the spouse does not want to pursue
the complaint. Note also the odd exception for insanity in the Minnesota statute, which suggests
that it is the complaining spouse's insanity that is relevant.
In addition, it is worth noting that Rhode Island's statute might be deemed ambiguous in this
regard because it specifically identifies "illicit" sexual intercourse by a married person as
penalized. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-6-2 (2002) ("Every person who shall commit adultery shall be
fined not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500); and illicit sexual intercourse between any two (2)
persons, where either of them is married, shall be deemed adultery in each."). By the language of
the statute, the second phrase could either be defining adultery to include only illicit adultery (i.e.,
secretive, perhaps even nonconsensual) or it could be expanding outward from the traditional
definition of adultery to mean open and notorious extramarital sex by a married person.
447. The statute also needs to give content to the terms it uses, such as "sex" or "sexual
intercourse." This is another matter for consideration. Ideally, parties could be urged to define sex
in their agreements around it; where they have not done so, however, certain defaults would need
to be available. I bracket this question, noting that the possibilities are numerous but that erotic
physical intimacy seems to be one of the axes, if not the key axis, for most. See Christina Tavella
Hall, Note, Sex Online: Is This Adultery?, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 201, 211-13, 220-21
(1997) (discussing the views of various courts and commentators as to how broadly sex should be
defined in the context of adultery as a fault-based ground for divorce, and concluding that the
proper definition is "one spouse's physical intimacy with someone other than their marital partner"
and "should not be read broadly or explicitly expanded to cover the ephemeral sphere of emotional
or virtual infidelity").
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are extremely different. Rape is a useful model, however, because it is a
criminal legal category defined by the absence of consent. In a certain schematic
sense, rape is sex minus consent. 448 Similarly, under a consent-based model of
adultery statutes, adultery is extramarital sex minus consent. In the language of
analogy, then, extramarital sex is to adultery as sex is to rape.
Consent is obviously a complex and contested concept.449 There might be
reason to wonder, in any particular case, if consent given to a spouse's
extramarital sex is freely given.450 But in the context of an adultery statute, the
worst that happens if the consent was not freely given is that no prosecution
occurs. Since there are few prosecutions under the current status quo, and the
goal of a statute is to encourage open and honest communication rather than to
prosecute adulterers, then some number of false positives on consent should not
worry us in the way that it does in other contexts.
Before proceeding to explain the hypothetical scheme, I briefly pause to
448. The less favorable version of the equation would then be "sex = rape + consent." Both
descriptions are schematic; different jurisdictions have different definitions of rape and numerous
other terms for nonconsensual sex. See, e.g., Stacy Futter & Walter R. Mebane, Jr., The Effects of
Rape Law Reform on Rape Case Processing, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 72, 78 (2001) (surveying
states' varying definitions of rape). But to define rape as nonconsensual sex is not uncommon.
See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Text, Context, and the Problem with Rape, 28 Sw. U. L. REv. 297,
302 (1999). As Baker points out, however, a great deal of cultural confusion surrounds the exact
definition of nonconsensual (or consensual) sex. Id. (observing that thinkers as diverse as
Catherine MacKinnon and Richard Posner seem to agree that rape and consensual sex are not so
very different from each other).
449. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 448, at 302-06. (citing sources on the ambiguities
surrounding the concept of consent).
450. As a general matter, love might prompt people to agree to arrangements that they would
not choose; whether this rises to the level of nonconsent is a complicated matter. More
specifically, one context where genuine consent might be a concern is a heterosexual relationship
in which the age and encumbrances of the partners lead to widely different statistical prospects of
finding a new partner for the man as opposed to the woman. After divorce, women are much less
likely to remarry than men, and the presence of children affects women's ability to remarry but not
men's. See, e.g., Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for
Egalitarian Marriage?, 84 VA. L. REv. 509, 546-50 (1998). "Although remarriage is popular
among both sexes," Wax reports:
[D]ata gathered in the late 1980s indicate that the remarriage rate for women aged 35-
44 is about two-thirds the rate for men, with the ratio dropping to less than one-half for
women over 45....
... [In addition,] women with children remarry at a lower rate than women without
children, regardless of age of divorce. Children have no effect on remarriage for
men.... [And], education is inversely correlated with the incidence of remarriage
among divorced women.
Id. at 549 n.96 (citations omitted). One might worry that a woman, particularly above a certain
age, would not feel she had a genuine choice about whether to accept a male partner's request for
nonexclusivity, if she believed her prospects of finding another partner were inadequate. This
concern would not obtain in many situations of course, and there would also be situations where
the power was distributed differently among the parties. Moreover, as explained in the text, the
context of considering criminal law sanctions should help to ease these worries to an extent, since
her nonconsent means only that his extramarital relationship is not criminally punished, a result
that would be the likely outcome under the status quo.
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address several general matters. First, this article does not aim to raise or answer
the question whether marriage should be viewed as a status, viewed as a
contract, or abolished in favor of a contract-based system of private relations or
an alternative model. 451 The principles of penalty defaults employed here were
developed in the realm of contract law, but nothing about these principles
inherently confines their application to contracts. 452  Second, as a thought
experiment, this discussion need not resolve the matter of the specific harm that
would warrant the intervention of the criminal law in this context; however,
several possibilities present themselves. In the language of Lawrence v.
Texas,453 adultery may be understood as "an abuse of an institution the law
protects," 454 and this may be all the more true where adultery actually violates
the trust of the relationship, as is the case under a consent-based model. In
addition, to the extent that the state might punish adultery because of an "injury
to a person,"455 such a rationale seems more sensible if the crime targets only
those who actually injure another person-i.e., only those individuals whose
spouses did not consent to the adultery, as provided in the statutory schemes that
follow. Third, the penalty should be imagined as slight, since the intended
purpose here is not for the state to express condemnation of adultery, but merely
for the state to encourage parties to make express agreements about the
exclusivity or nonexclusivity of their relationships. A small fine seems most
451. See, e.g., Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 Nw.
U.L. REV. 65, 111-20 (1998) (discussing different legal understandings of marriage as a status or a
contract); cf, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF
DEPENDENCY (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 66-69, 133-41, on file with author) (considering
the implications of abolishing marriage as a legal category); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott,
Marriage As a Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225 (1998); Shanley, supra note 120.
452. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 2027 (2002) (applying the idea of information-forcing default rules to statutory
interpretation); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1189 (2004) (describing the general relevance of the concept
of information-forcing default rules to contexts in which planners want to force people to make
explicit choices); Ian Ayres & Katharine Baker, A Separate Crime of Reckless Sex (Feb. 4, 2004)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (applying the principle of information-forcing
penalty defaults to propose the crime of reckless sexual conduct, i.e., having sex without a condom
in a first-time sexual encounter, to which evidence of consent to the unprotected aspect of the sex
would be a defense).
453. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
454. Id. at 2478 (stating that, in reference to sodomy laws, "statutes do seek to control a
personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the
liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals. This, as a general rule, should
counsel against attempts by the State, or a court, to define the meaning of the relationship or to set
its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects."); see also Mary
Anne Case, Of "This" and "That" in Lawrence, 2003 SuP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2004)
(manuscript at 54, on file with author) ("Like so much of the rest of the majority's prose, this
passage is admittedly obscure, but my best guess is that the reference is... to something akin to
the likely continuing validity of laws prohibiting bigamy and adultery, which can be seen as abuse
of the institution of legal marriage even when extraordinary circumstances such as spousal consent
allow the acts to take place 'absent injury to a person."').
455. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478.
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appropriate,456 and, since this is a thought experiment, perhaps we can imagine
that the fine is borne only by the wrongdoer, rather than coming out of collective
property. If that is unsatisfying to some readers, then perhaps a penalty such as a
small amount of community service can substitute in the hypothetical. Finally,
the fact that criminal adultery statutes are rarely enforced against civilians457 is a
useful background condition for this inquiry. The question here is whether,
rather than being repealed or falling into desuetude, adultery statutes could and
should be amended and reinvigorated in an affirmative effort to use law to
encourage discussion in this area. The following statutory models aim to
evaluate the potential utility of that idea.
In a consent-based model, a hypothetical amended statute might read as
follows:
Statute 1: A married person who has sex with a person not his or her
spouse is subject to prosecution unless the married person's spouse has
consented to the extramarital sex. 458
Under this statute, someone is subject to prosecution for adultery only if his or
her spouse had not consented to the extramarital sex. Though the question might
arise as to whether the consent needs to be given prior to the acts, if the idea is to
encourage conversations, rather than to have people surprised by their partner's
acts, then the consent would need to be obtained beforehand.
The main difference between consent in this context and consent in the rape
context is that the power of consent or nonconsent is bestowed on someone other
than a participant in the relevant sex: In the adultery context, consent is the
province of a third party. That is, one spouse has the power to transform the
other spouse's criminal extramarital sexual behavior into legal sexual behavior
through consent.
Because a third party must consent, the consent will, in most instances, not
be contemporaneous with the sex. Thus, consent could be understood as a
feature of the relationship-i.e., general permission that is given as part of the
marital agreement. Alternatively, it may be understood as something closer in
time to the nonexclusive sexual activity-i.e., permission that is given with
regard to a particular extramarital sexual act or relationship. In a sense, then,
there are two relevant time periods: the prenuptial period during which the
relationship agreement is formed, and the postnuptial period leading up to the
456. Cf, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591,
593 (1996) (observing that the sanction of fines does not express a clear message of condemnation,
in contrast to imprisonment).
457. See supra note 50.
458. In contrast to the Massachusetts statute, see supra text accompanying note 445, this
statute does not criminalize the activity of the nonmarried participant in the adultery. This is a
complicated issue separate from that of the individual participants in the relationship, and one I
bracket for purposes of this discussion. In addition, on the complex question of the meaning of
"sex" in such a statute, see supra note 447.
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adulterous sex.459 While the most heartache might be spared by conversation
prior to marriage, concerns of "bounded rationality" and changed desires might
make this difficult in many cases. 460  At the moment of marrying, when
emotions and expectations are high, people may be peculiarly poorly suited even
to recognize a possible future desire for nonmonogamy. As Pollock and
Maitland famously observed, "Of all people in the world lovers are the least
likely to distinguish precisely between the present and the future tenses." 461 As
the Divilbiss example in Part III shows, an unforeseen adulterous or potentially
adulterous affair may lead a couple to transition into a polyamorous relationship.
The criminal law presumably should not interfere with the Divilbisses' decision
to make this transition, even if they did not foresee it.
From this perspective, the statute should credit consent given at any point
prior to the acts. Nonetheless, to encourage people to have these conversations
prior to marriage, couples should arguably be permitted to give durable consent,
through a marital agreement, to nonexclusivity. But, because a spouse should be
able to consent to extramarital sex at any point up to the time of the sexual act in
question (for the reasons discussed above), durable nonconsent should not be
permitted. This is an asymmetry, but a defensible one, in light of a party's
freedom to leave the relationship if he changes his mind and wants an exclusive
relationship but cannot persuade his spouse to change the terms of their marital
agreement. 462 The asymmetry tips away from prosecution in a sensible way:
459. Note that the model of contemporaneous (or nearly contemporaneous) consent, while
allowing more flexibility over time, gives one spouse the power to control the other spouse's
sexual options. This seems less consistent with the poly value of self-possession and more
consistent with the principle of monogamy's law that jealousy trumps outside sexual desires and
experiences. Introducing a notion of consent aims instead to undermine the absolute assumption
that jealousy will exist and thus trump outside sex. Moreover, the alternative possibility created by
the statute-of the parties agreeing at the outset to a rule that keeps the criminal law out or
provides binding consent, at least with regard to criminal intervention-is therefore a more
significant departure from the norm. But, because of the bounded rationality and signaling
concerns discussed in the text, both temporal options for consent seem important.
460. See, e.g., Brian H. Bix, Choice of Law and Marriage: A Proposal, 36 FAM. L.Q. 255,
270 (2002) (defining bounded rationality as "people's natural inability to calculate rationally or
effectively about certain matters" and observing that "[t]here is some argument that the problem of
bounded rationality might be particularly important for parties' bargaining about marriage");
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211,
254-58 (1995) (arguing, on the basis of bounded rationality concerns, that courts should evaluate
prenuptial agreements for "whether, in light of all relevant factors, the parties were likely to have
had a mature understanding that the agreement would apply even in the kind of marriage scenario
that actually occurred").
461. 2 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 368-69 (photo. reprint 1968) (2d ed. 1898).
462. This distinguishes durable consent in this context from durable consent in the context of
rape, as does the third-party nature of the consent. Giving up one's power to withdraw consent to a
spouse's extramarital sexual activity is not like giving up one's power to withdraw consent to
sexual activity with oneself. No nonconsensual physical intrusion into the self is involved in the
former; durable consent merely means here that the state will not intervene and criminalize the
activity because one spouse has changed her mind.
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that is, a person who enters a marriage on the premise of nonmonogamy cannot
later be prosecuted for acting on that premise. The person can of course be
reasoned with or left by her partner. A statute that expressly permits consent at
either point in the relationship-prenuptial or postnuptial-might look like this:
Statute 2: A married person who has sex with a person not his or her
spouse is subject to prosecution unless the married person's spouse
consented either to nonexclusivity as part of the marital agreement or to
the particular extramarital sexual act.
463
Statute 2 makes clear that consent may be given prior to or during the
marriage, in a blanket or a situation-specific manner. The marital agreement
may be imagined in any number of ways-as the spoken or unspoken
understanding of the spouses (hard to enforce), as an optional written prenuptial
(easier to interpret and enforce, but less easily created), 464 as a mandatory
written agreement or perhaps even as boxes that spouses must check on their
marriage license (easier to interpret and enforce, but raising concerns about
paternalism, unless the parties have the option of checking a box indicating that
they make no legal marital agreement about exclusivity).465
In one respect, Statute 2 is still coercive. Statute 2 omits an important
alternative: the option of leaving the law out altogether. And this is arguably the
option most people would want. The political trend has been toward repeal of
adultery laws, such that fewer than half the states still have them and more are
considering repeal, and the existing statutes are rarely enforced.466 As a legal
matter, adultery is typically of little consequence in the criminal domain. 467 To
allow people the option of what the political status quo suggests they want, the
statute might need to look more like Statute 3:
Statute 3: A married person who has sex with a person not his or her
spouse is subject to prosecution unless (1) the married person's spouse
463. A number of questions arise about symmetry. For instance, should the state enforce
asymmetrical exclusivity agreements, that is, agreements in which one spouse has permission to
have extramarital sex and the other does not? Similarly, should one spouse's adulterous sex (with
the consent of the other) create a form of implied consent to the other spouse's adultery, at least
within a certain time period thereafter?
464. Though data on prenuptial agreements are hard to obtain because couples are not
required to register the agreements, it is estimated that only five to ten percent of marrying couples
sign premarital agreements. See, e.g., HEATHER MAHAR, JOHN M. OLIN CTR. FOR LAW, ECON., &
Bus., HARVARD LAW SCH., WHY ARE THERE So FEW PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS? 1 (2003),
available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olincenter/papers/pdf/436.pdf; Frantz &
Dagan, supra note 102, at 80 n.12.
465. See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 452, at 1189, 1194-95.
466. See supra note 50.
467. A general exception to this is the military context, where prosecutions for adultery occur
with much greater regularity. See, e.g., Winner, supra note 50, at 1073-74 (noting that the military
actively enforces its adultery laws); Haggard, supra note 50, at 469-70 (noting that the military
treats adultery "radically different[ly]" than in civil law, where it is "rarely enforced and seldom
prosecuted").
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consented to nonexclusivity as part of the marital agreement, (2) the
married person's spouse consented to the particular extramarital sexual
act, or (3) the married person's spouse consented to excluding the
criminal law from this realm of the marriage.
Statute 3 permits people to choose the option many or most probably want, thus
making the option of contracting around the default more complete. Moreover,
Statute 3 may obviate the concern that this statute, which attempts to improve
individual welfare, paternalistically forces people to make a choice when they
may wish not to choose.46 8 Admittedly, Statute 3 still forces a choice, to the
extent that it requires people to choose not to have the law involved. On the
other hand, it does not force the more emotionally charged decision of whether
the relationship will be sexually exclusive. The legal precedents for permitting
people to opt out of the criminal law are less obvious than those for consent.
Some practices with regard to prosecution of domestic violence might provide
analogous models.469  More abstractly, certain legal decisions permit people
effectively to opt out of the criminal law. For instance, the decision to marry can
make legal what would otherwise be criminal sex with a statutory minor.
470
Statute 3 may, therefore, be a viable statute, which brings together the consent
and timing points from Statutes 1 and 2 and also permits people to opt into the
current status quo.
The second step of the analysis is to determine the best way to set the
default to encourage constructive conversation. The concept of information-
forcing default rules, also called penalty defaults, is relevant here. Penalty
default rules are an alternative to market-mimicking default rules. In the
contracts context, a traditional approach to setting default rules for gaps in
contracts has been to try to approximate what the parties would have wanted, in
other words, to mimic the market. 471  Ayres and Gertner have importantly
argued, however, that parties may be encouraged to reveal more information
about their preferences by defaults set to something other than what the parties
would have chosen.472 That is, penalty defaults could encourage parties to share
information, to negotiate over their preferences, and to close gaps in their
contracts, because there is a penalty to declining to do so. Although Ayres and
Gertner focus on efficiency as the primary factor in choices between penalty or
468. See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 452, at 1189, 1194-95.
469. See, e.g., ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 184,
184-88 (2000) (discussing support and opposition among different feminist groups to "the courts'
current practice of dismissing cases when the battered woman refuses to participate," and
evaluating alternatives to this practice).
470. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Many Faces of Sexual Consent, 37 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 47, 56 (1995) (noting that in Virginia, a minor of fourteen can retroactively consent to sex
with an adult by marrying the adult (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-66 (Michie Supp. 1995)).
471. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 443, at 90-91 (citing authority for what the authors call
the "would have wanted" approach).
472. Id. at 127-30.
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tailored defaults, 473 they also note the relevance of the penalty defaults idea to
noneconomic goals,474 and subsequent work by them and others has built upon
its implications in other contexts.4
75
In the context of adultery laws, if we assume that the current regime is what
most people want, then an amended adultery statute needs to prescribe a default
rule different from the status quo to force the expression of preferences. As
discussed above, judging by the current nonenforcement of adultery laws in most
contexts, we may reasonably conclude that complete legal indifference to
extramarital sex is what most people want from the criminal law. Under the idea
of information-forcing default rules, then, the theoretical adultery statute should
set the default at something other than nonpunishment of adultery. The last
statute discussed, Statute 3, seems to comport with this model.
The form of Statute 3 also seems to suggest a preference for exclusivity, in
that it threatens to punish adulterers. This might align it with the move to create
"super-marriage" through covenant marriage. 476  From the perspective of
penalty default rules, however, the aim is not to compel a particular choice-
exclusivity or nonexclusivity-but rather to encourage couples to choose one or
the other. The statute is drafted to encourage the more informed party to reveal
the information that that party might not otherwise reveal-that is, to encourage
the party inclined towards extramarital sexual activity to reveal that inclination.
Norms provide the exclusivity-seeking party with an incentive to express his
view, but the non-exclusivity-seeking party has a disincentive to express her
view. Thus, counterintuitively, the pressure of the law should go with the norm
in order to encourage the nonnormative figure to voice the nonnormative
intention. Remember, however, that we are imagining a very small penalty, such
as a small fine, because the purpose is for the state to encourage discussion, not
to express condemnation of adultery.
That said, we still might worry about drafting the statute to require people to
opt out of criminally enforced exclusivity rather than requiring them to opt into
it. We know that default rules are often "sticky. '477 That is, people may well
fail to take the affirmative communicative steps required to opt out of
473. See, e.g., id at 128.
474. Id. at 129-30 (discussing, as one example, Justice Scalia's penalty default approach to
statutory interpretation in Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 483 U.S. 143, 157
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring), where he applied it to the issue of statutes of limitations in RICO
cases).
475. See supra note 452 (citing examples).
476. Covenant marriage statutes set stricter criteria for entering into and exiting marriage.
E.g., Steven L. Nock, Laura Sanchez, Julia C. Wilson, & James D. Wright, Covenant Marriage
Turns Five Years Old, 10 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 169, 170-72 (2003). Three states have adopted
covenant marriage statutes: Arizona, Arkansas, and Louisiana. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-901 to
-906 (West 2003); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-801 to -810 (Michie 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 9:272-9:274, 9:307 (West 2000).
477. See, e.g., Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 452, at 1175-76; Ayres & Gertner, supra note
444, at 1598.
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vulnerability to adultery prosecution, even if they and their spouse would both
prefer nonexclusivity or at least nonprosecution. 4 78  Punishing such inaction
with the criminal law seems harsh and might well have a normative effect
opposite to that intended. That is, people might feel even more pressure to
conform to norms of exclusivity.
In addition, information-forcing principles might encourage a different
solution than that reached above. As Ayres and Gertner state in a very different
context, "gap filling should grow out of one's substantive theory of why
particular contracts are incomplete." 479 As discussed above, the person seeking
nonexclusivity is more likely both to have private knowledge that we want her to
communicate, and not to communicate it because of social pressure, among other
things. But presumably she decides not to communicate a desire for
nonexclusivity not because there is no later penalty to nonexclusivity or because
the penalty is not great enough. To the contrary, the potential penalties for
nonexclusivity are great. Her partner may be hurt, she may lose the relationship,
and society may disapprove of her choice. In this way, lack of a penalty is not
the problem, so further penalties are likely not the solution. And, in this context,
penalizing the nonexpression means penalizing the nonnormative behavior as
well. Thus, shifting the normative balance of power might be necessary to try to
encourage the parties to exchange information more openly.480  In order to
encourage more open, less coercive conversations about exclusivity and
nonexclusivity, then, the statute might need to adopt the nonnormative position,
and require spouses to opt in to the normative position.
481
A nonnormative statute also comports with an analysis of the parties' likely
"propensity to contract around."4 82  Because of normative pressure, bounded
rationality, and the potential emotional costs of expressing a desire for
nonexclusivity before marriage, we may expect more parties to be willing to
contract around a nonnormative statute than a normative one. Lovers are quite
inclined to express their eternal and exclusive love for one another, particularly
at the time of marriage. 483  Thus, a statute that assumes nonexclusivity and
478. Concerns about the marrying couples not knowing about the adultery statutes and the
possibility of opting out could, however, be addressed by providing informational booklets to
parties who wish to marry or by requiring local clerks to inform parties directly. The latter
approach has been used in the covenant marriage context, though with uncertain success. See Bix,
supra note 460, at 270-71.
479. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 444, at 1592.
480. Cf Ayres & Gertner, supra note 444, at 1592 (noting "the distribution of bargaining
power" as a factor in whether a particular penalty default will lead to efficient contracting
behavior).
481. This approach might also be understood to build on what we know about the effect of
framing on people's choices. See, e.g., Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 452, at 1179-80. Fewer
people may be expected to opt out of a regime when the frame of the law comports with existing
norms, in part because the law does not prompt them to think outside of the normative box.
482. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 444, at 1602.
483. See supra text accompanying note 461.
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requires people to opt in to exclusivity may lead to more conversations and more
relationship agreements that reflect what the parties want. An opt-in statute of
this sort might be thus drafted:
Statute 4: Any extramarital sex by a married person will be treated as
consensual and therefore noncriminal unless (1) the married person and
his or her spouse committed to exclusivity, enforceable through the
criminal law, as part of their marital agreement, and (2) the married
person's spouse did not consent to this particular instance of
extramarital sex.
As discussed above, the parties may not give durable nonconsent to extramarital
sexual activity, so the two requirements here are conjunctive, rather than
disjunctive. Statute 4 should be information-forcing because it effectively
penalizes the exclusivity-seeking spouse if he fails to discuss and reach
prenuptial agreement with his spouse on exclusivity. The penalty if he fails to
do so is not a criminal sanction, but rather, the express approval by the criminal
law of his spouse's extramarital sex.
As a theoretical matter, then, Statutes 1 through 4 present models of what an
information-forcing adultery statute might look like. Far-fetched as such a
proposal sounds, the criminal law seems to offer certain advantages for thinking
about how the principle of penalty defaults might play out as a conversation-
forcing tool with regard to monogamy and its alternatives. First, criminal laws
create the occasion for possible state intervention during a marriage, rather than
only on its dissolution. Second, the automatic application of a criminal statute
creates the occasion for law to affect the behavior of all marrying couples, not
just the very few who are inclined to write premarital agreements. 4 84
That said, the possible harms of using the criminal law in this way likely
outweigh the benefits. The criminal law has the capacity to brand people, and
sex-crime registries in some states force people to carry that branding with them
throughout their lives. 4 85 Given the various reasons people may have for
committing adultery, including the desire to end a failing relationship, or the
desire to achieve satisfaction through surreptitious behavior, which both parties
might want but could not do if the law forced them to speak up or face criminal
prosecution, the state probably should not bring the force of law to bear on
people who make certain choices in this domain.4 86 Moreover, after Lawrence,
484. See supra note 464.
485. See Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003); Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84
(2003). At least some states include relatively minor offenses, such as adultery and voyeurism,
among those for which registration is required. See, e.g., Abril R. Bedarf, Comment, Examining
Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 83 CAL. L. REv. 885, 888 (1995); Rick Kittel, K.S.A.
22-4901 et seq.-Offender Registration in Kansas, J. KAN. BAR ASS'N, June/July 2000, at 28, 36.
486. In addition, there may be an argument that promises of monogamy create the conditions
for a kind of "efficient breach"-if parties tell one another that there is one thing the other person
could do that would prompt an immediate breach of the relationship, parties can signal an ending
to the relationship with that particular behavior alone. Moreover, in addition to adultery's potential
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the constitutionality of criminal adultery statutes is uncertain. 4 87 Ultimately,
then, the criminal law should probably extricate itself from this realm.
4 8 8
The principles of consent-based default rules might be applied in other
contexts. For instance, a civil tort law could perhaps be structured to achieve the
advantages of the criminal statutes explained above. The civil law of course
raises its own host of complex problems, which deserve separate and sustained
consideration. In addition, we might want to consider using these principles to
try to urge discussion along the numerosity axis. As noted earlier, the adultery
statutes reach only a narrow swath of the population affected by monogamy's
law, and these laws primarily address only the exclusivity axis of monogamy.
The principle that jealousy equals love and that loving relationships are therefore
exclusive is, however, foundational to monogamy's law, and thus has framed the
particular legal discussion here. In the interests of addressing the numerosity
axis, though, another site for possible application of these principles might well
be bigamy statutes. In states that prohibit bigamous cohabitation, 4 89 consent-
based statutes might be used to encourage spouses to make agreements about
their openness to future domestic partners. The topic of bigamy statutes also
raises many complicated issues that deserve further attention. It is my hope that
this article will help to prompt future work in these and other areas.
VI.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I wish to return briefly to two topics raised in the
Introduction: the issue of same-sex marriage, and my invitation, drawing on
Adrienne Rich, to monogamous-identified individuals to examine the idea of
monogamy as a choice for themselves and for others. For same-sex couples who
are now marrying,4 90 and those who will marry in greater numbers in coming
years, this may be a uniquely fertile time to think critically about the kind of
intimate relationships they are forming. The present moment may someday be
revealed as the end of an era, the end of a period in which same-sex couples
were not subject to precisely the same pressures of compulsory monogamy as
straight couples. Moreover, for everyone, regardless of relationship views or
status, this monumental debate about marriage presses the question of the proper
components-both practical and emotional-of intimate relationships. It is the
hope of this article that everyone will take this opportunity to question
to prompt the end (efficient or not) of many relationships that should come to an end, some have
argued that adultery may create opportunities for significant experiences. See, e.g., Kipnis, supra
note 110, at 42. While the injured party may have an interest in preventing that result, the state's
decision to side with that partner is more debatable.
487. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2490 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); supra
note 442.
488. For additional reasons, see supra text accompanying notes 435-36.
489. See supra note 158.
490. See supra note 3.
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monogamy "as a 'preference' or 'choice'... and to do the intellectual and
emotional work that follows... ."491 Monogamy may be both more of a choice
and less of a choice than we think, but whether the paradox of prevalence
persists in dictating our views of others' relationships is undoubtedly a choice.
By depicting the ways that people frequently fail to achieve the ideal of
compulsory monogamy, by tracing the ways that polyamorists openly embrace
this failure rather than simply falling into it, and by beginning to imagine how
the law might be used to encourage people to express monogamy-related
preferences to their partners, this article has attempted to shed light on the
practice of intimacy and on our conflicted relationship with monogamy's law.
491. Rich, supra note 1, at 648 (calling on women to question heterosexuality in this
manner).
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